HOPPER BRUCE
C.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480006-6

27 July 1945

Dr. Bruce C. Hopper
1403 19th Street
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Hopper:

I have [illegible] over at A[illegible] Central [illegible] Sunday July 22, 1945. We have [illegible] your [illegible] from [illegible] possible [illegible] and although we should like to [illegible] [illegible] you to complete your work for General [illegible], we [illegible] unfortunately do [illegible] that it will not be possible for us to [illegible] you on our rolls beyond the limit of [illegible] September. We very much regret that this decision has been forced upon us, but I am sure [illegible] will understand that under the circumstances [illegible] no alternative.

Bill asked me to thank you for the fine contribution which you have made to this organization and to the history of air power. Your service with us in Sweden was of the highest order and we are indebted to you for [illegible] the groundwork without which any real [illegible] would have been impossible.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Charles H. Chastain
Acting Director

Col. Doering

Write from me to Mr.

JD

7/20/45

Director's Office

Date 29 July

From [illegible]

I [illegible] that
Ave Bruce [illegible] so understand that no provision has been made in this [illegible]'s budget for this work, and that Charlie Cheston has told Dr. Hopper that because of the budget situation, we will be unable to continue.

[illegible] Jr.

Office of the Executive Officer

(30849)

Memo

Hoover

Bruce

Dear Colonel Donovan

Colonel Bruce

From the standpoint of OSS, I feel that Dr. Hoffman's continuance on the payroll after October first is a luxury — especially in view of drastic cuts in expenses that we can ill afford. Yet he is in mind appears to be a certainty for an award such as might be granted to a historian by the Guggenheim Foundation — unable from the write a book on Air Power, not only in regard to its achievements, but in interpretation of its political implications. This might be a valuable contribution to history, but is not within the investigations of OSS. At General Eaker's request, we lent Dr. Hoffman to the 8th Air Force, and I think that his loan should be terminated on Oct 1st. Otherwise, it may go on indefinitely, and from the standpoint of the OSS library, value

OSS

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To: Dave Bruce

I would like your suggestions.

WJ

7/17/45

Director's Office

OSS Form 3054
(3308)

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1001 K STREET
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 July 1945

Dear Mr. Cheston:

Enclosed please find a small memo, not elaborated because the thing is so obvious. I understand perfectly why I might be considered a luxury. And yet the situation is rather unusual. I did carry out my mission; it remains to reap the harvest.

Just at the moment I feel spirtually exhausted. It must be the heat. I long for a mossy bank, to be quiet. Every great work in history has had its pioneers. Being a pioneer has some satisfaction. One hears also that virtue is its own and only reward.

In any case, I do wish Bill would talk to both General Spaatz and Fred Anderson. Whatever they decide I will accept without further question(I mean what ever the [illegible] decides after learning their views).

As a combination of Gadfly and Jeremiah I believe I have accomplished something, but not the final thing,- [illegible] based on Air Power. I know of nothing more impertant than that, especially in view of the prospective political troubles in the Far East. Russia in the Far East, and Asia generally, has for twenty five years been my special subject in writing and teaching.

I, leave Thursday morning for France. My [illegible] address is General F.L. Anderson's office, A-1, Pentagon.

Sincerely, with thanks for your kind [illegible] feel, genuine interest, [illegible]

Pierre C. Hoffman

1025 E STREET
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 July 1945

Memorandum:
From: Dr. Bruce C.Hopper, Historian,USSTAF.
To: Mr. Charles D.Cheston, Acting Director,
Office of Strategic Services.
Subject: Continuance of My Assignment After 1 October 1945.

I. Reasons for Continuance.

A. General.

The redeployment of USSTAF to the Pacific under the continuing command of General Spaatz of necessity alters the plans for completion of the history,- e.g. postponed the day when General Spaatz can unfold the inner story of high policy in conduct of the war.

Control of Air Power is the most important political stake of the victory. The interpretation of the meaning of Air Power should have high priority in the defense plans of our country. It would be logical to retain in the service men whose efforts have been focussed on the study of Air Power and World Politics until the fruits of their war participation-experience is fully utilized.

B. Special:

My warm personal relations with General Spaatz and his Air Commanders represent a long time investment of good will. Part of our understanding was that I should not press the Commanding General for explanations during hostilities, but prepare the archives for background ,and assemble all possible outside evidence. Then we were to do the final version of The Use of Air Power with the advantage of perspective gained by retrospect. The necessary postponement of that final phase actually deepens its value because it will thus include the Pacific story as well.

1625 K STREET
WASHINGTON, D. C.

General Spaatz has accepted the recommendations in the attached brief: On Preparation of History of USSTAF. I have exclusive access to his private papers (to be kept under seal during his sojourn in the Pacific), and to those of General F.L. Anderson also. These two treasures contain the high policy papers of strategic bombing, to be supplemented by C.C.S. papers pertaining to the air. The real story of the Use of Air Power in destroying Germany can be brought to light only by interpretation of these papers, and by consultation with the two Generals . If I am not allowed to do it I doubt if it ever will be done. The archives would fall to other hands, and the project of two years persistent effort would thus be abandoned.

II. Proposals.

1. Work in Europe, to be finished by the end of September.

A. Historical narrative (required by Army regulations) "Inception, Organization, and Functions of USSTAF."

B. Brochure on Strategic Bombing and the Victory. (Analysis of planning and operations).

C. Historical survey by the historians of the Luftwaffe (General von Rohden and Colonel Kriesche) under my guidance.

D. Furtherance of the study of Anglo-American collaboration in the air, - interviews with Lord Trenchard, Sir Charles Portal, and the "friends of daylight bombing" in Air Ministry.

E. Consultation of files of the American Embassy, London, for documents of significance for the politics of the air war,

F. Absorption into the archives of the remaining files of USSTAF directorates, mostly Intelligence.

1885 R STREET
WASHINGTON, D. C.

2. Upon returnting to the United States at the end of September I would propose to keep my trained staff(all Air Force personnel) and the archives intact as a working unit. Because of space conditions General Chauncey has decided that all returning historical units will be located outside Washington for the completion of thir tasks(probably Baltimore).

I should like to continue to be attached to the person of General Spaats as his historian (and political adviser). I should like the Historical Section,staff and archives, to be regarded as a rear echelon of USSTAF, no matter where it might be established. That continuity would but reflect the continuity of the Command.

Of course, all this is contingent upon General Spaats' desires. He did say he wanted me to come with him, or rather follow him out, after finishing the work in Europe. I suggest that General Donovan consult General Spaats ,and also General F.L. Anderson, now A-1, U.S.A.A.F. General Anderson has a deep concern for the studies on the meaning of Air Power.

3. In continuance of my functions I could serve in other ways useful to the Air Forces (lecturing to the staff college,etc) while attached to General Spaats.

Bruce C. Hopper
Bruce C.Hopper,
Historian, USSTAF.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] from [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] of a new era

- [illegible] effect of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].
- [illegible] and social effects.
- [illegible] in history. [illegible] than the [illegible].

[illegible] opportunity for historical [illegible] [illegible] operations.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] for high level research in the [illegible].

[illegible] from participant-experience.

[illegible] in the Air Force.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] for history.

[illegible] not in order but in the [illegible].

[illegible] Air Force in world

[illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible]

E. Recommendations:

1. That [illegible] to serve [illegible] control [illegible].
2. That the [illegible] confidence of the [illegible] and that [illegible] [illegible].
3. That an [illegible] incoming and [illegible] to [illegible] of historical [illegible].
4. That an [illegible] Daily Journal for the [illegible].
5. That the archives, during [illegible], be regarded as the [illegible] Archives.
6. That [illegible] a historical officer for [illegible].

[illegible]

Tank Honso
USSTAF (Main)
24 June 1945.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. Paper Plan Anniversary.

On VE Day (8 May 1945) [illegible] Allied military commanders [illegible] Germany was no more than a geographical [illegible] area about to be parcelled into four zones for administration by the occupying Allied powers. The operation [illegible] from flying low over the [illegible], the [illegible] lay on the ground, was then [illegible] and cities were in the [illegible] were [illegible]. Germany [illegible] had all but ceased. Whereas the [illegible] destruction is yet to be [illegible] [illegible] on VE Day that Germany had stopped breathing, [illegible] as a nation had come to a catastrophic [illegible].

2. For the first time in history definitive victory was [illegible] upon the preliminary destruction of the [illegible] of a powerful industrialized country. [illegible] first total war the problem was totality [illegible]. There was no other way to deprive the [illegible] army which kept Israel in power, and

[illegible]

3. It is also the fact that an military [illegible] industrialized country [illegible] from the battle lines, by continuous attack on the [illegible] of war supplies, its production capacities, and its communications. To break the cycle will be found by developing the use of weapons per to an extent adequate to [illegible] for the first time it was made overwhelmingly effective. The new weapon which [illegible] seems to combine the advantages of the jet-propelled [illegible] the B-29 bombing by night, and the P-51's combat by day. Rocket-powered [illegible] made possible by the two types of operations, is considered to have more than the destructive effectiveness of bombs. It is not possible, at present, to evaluate the production [illegible] of the various allies in the [illegible] war. But, considering the enormous [illegible]

the conditions, it is possible to [illegible] of their [illegible], but one incontrovertible [illegible] of [illegible]. The [illegible] as [illegible] of [illegible] forces in the field, the [illegible] of the [illegible].

3. Secondly [illegible] it may be [illegible] for the first time [illegible] of a great war [illegible] conscious that a new weapon, [illegible] developed to unprecedented [illegible] of destruction, [illegible], has in effect altered the course of history. The [illegible] under consideration the transition to a new era. [illegible] of the transition is political, economic, and social.

a. From the political point of view the disappearance of Germany from the life of Europe, even though temporary, is a historic fact of the first magnitude. The traditional balance of power was the [illegible] of the European nationalistic system. It operated even during the [illegible] of [illegible] period. That [illegible] is now gone, [illegible] moved to the periphery and [illegible] leaving Europe a [illegible]. [illegible] the nationalistic system may be fundamentally changed in character, after an existence of 300 years. [illegible] small states become like medieval towns whose

[illegible] in the long run [illegible] the eye. Many of the [illegible] another "blitz." In any of [illegible] because of an experience gained, which is [illegible]. The truth is that Air Power of a [illegible] evolved on the scale of world [illegible] be planned without consideration of [illegible] either, whether it be the [illegible] of [illegible], the establishment of world or regional security systems, the control of international air policy, or any other question of equal significance. The capacity to [illegible] and control the use of Air Power in the future is [illegible] political stake of the victory.

Likewise, incidentally, the disappearance of Germany as the traditional supplier of industrial goods to Central and Eastern Europe produces a vacuum the consequences of which can not now be measured. With Germany's industrial equipment reduced to [illegible] by strategic bombing it is difficult to see how her manpower of [illegible] millions can be employed, granted that the Allies do not intend to permit immediate reconstruction. There might ensue a wide dispersal of German technical brains and skilled workmen which would seriously alter the international division of labor, and change the channels of international trade.

[illegible] the vast movement of peoples, the [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] uprooted and [illegible] [illegible] the gradual [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] will [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] may have [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] still [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] civilization.

It [illegible] more [illegible] that the [illegible] [illegible], not in [illegible] the forces which [illegible]. The new weapon merely [illegible] of work in society, and [illegible] [illegible] destruction of the industrial power of [illegible]. The resultant [illegible] of Germany, [illegible] of the overall victory, is a historic [illegible] new international forms for the [illegible] by [illegible]. These changes are [illegible] affairs of all nations politically, [illegible] socially.

[illegible] the [illegible] for enforcement of [illegible] from the [illegible] power of land and sea [illegible] power of air forces. The range of [illegible] the development of the long [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]. It also [illegible] by [illegible] of a very effective

[illegible] jet propulsion of a flying wing on the [illegible] of the new age. From this point of view the [illegible] bomber is the prelude or chrysalis of the [illegible] period; it prepares one into a new age.

With the significant advances in synthetic [illegible] and during the war the transition might imperceptibly [illegible] a shift from reliance on coal and iron (foundation of the first industrial revolution) to reliance on synthetic [illegible], alloys and plastics (foundation of a second industrial revolution). All we know is that Air Power sparks the [illegible]. The nation that first understands Air Power in [illegible] as that Britain instinctively understood Sea Power will be the one which will set the pace; it will likewise determine the pattern of the new world--the outlines of which we can not yet see.

4. Lastly, for the first time there seemed to be an opportunity for historians to do their historical [illegible] concurrent with military operations. The A.E.F. of World War I produced no history worthy of the name. This time preparations had been made in Washington for all round administrative effort to insure preservation of records. Thus (in May 1944) Lt. General Ira Baker, (then Major General) [illegible] Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force, invited the [illegible] to set up a Historical Section in his command the [illegible] was acceptable because of the profound opportunity

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[illegible] Survival Program.

[illegible] the consideration for the world significance [illegible] destruction of Germany, and at the [illegible] the political attitudes of day, the [illegible] resolved to bear the burden of [illegible] [illegible] a high order or to apply [illegible] [illegible] this this resolve to demand the support of [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] memorandum of 4 June 1945, prepared by the [illegible] and by General Lemay, appears the [illegible]

[illegible] the Eighth Air Force is to be [illegible] the high level of historical scholarship, [illegible] standards of impartial interpretation. [illegible] may can a record be made which will stand [illegible] by historical scholars. A document [illegible] authenticity will be required by the [illegible] government when the time comes to [illegible] the Strategic Air Bombing for the world, every [illegible] conference table. It would be [illegible] if the United States were to possess [illegible] power, but less the dam, the knowledge, [illegible] to make that power serve the cause of [illegible] world. This must be anticipated in the good [illegible] adequate records that kept by the [illegible] Force (A.E.F.), but had the lessons [illegible] documented, it is conceivable [illegible] multiplies in the present war might [illegible] to those practical ends, and to [illegible] here, the history of the Eighth [illegible] continue."

[illegible] recollections of personnel and [illegible]

[illegible] narrator must have been a virtually [illegible] scholarship. He should be young, [illegible] idea, and astound in imagination

[illegible]

[illegible] Army, the Air, and Navy, with organizations [illegible] the rule of interpreting [illegible] of unquestionable integrity [illegible] the Commanding General, and his [illegible] and all past operations. [illegible] details of the records for the [illegible] perspective. Above all he must put flesh and blood into the history by observation and [illegible] staff officers in the many [illegible] and by the inspiration of frequent contacts [illegible] the Flying personnel. He must humanize [illegible] the spirit of the Eighth Air Force, to transfer its wings to history."

It was realized that implementation of this [illegible] would require a special position for [illegible] that had been a haphazard and low level [illegible] assignment would have to be elevated and [illegible] to a division of high-level scholarship. Certain [illegible] were made. Some were easily accepted by [illegible] others were implied by the approval of the

[illegible] enough.

[illegible] Consultants (Weekly Bibliography):

That preparation of bibliography would be considered [illegible] official functions in a work, such a [illegible] demand.

[illegible] The historian would work on the level of [illegible] general, and in his discretion, thus no [illegible] substantial materials for the inevitable future [illegible] of [illegible].

6. That the historian, as one of his assistants, [illegible] at staff meetings and decision-making [illegible] for the purpose of recording changes in policies.

7. That the historian and his assistants would be [illegible] participant-observers, thus to bring [illegible] discipline to bear on historical research [illegible] operations.

8. That there would be an automatic flow of the [illegible] section of classified documents for study and [illegible] the archives.

9. That the historian would be allowed to examine [illegible] current documents (except those concerning future [illegible] operations) in order to select those of historical [illegible] for copying, processing, indexing and filing [illegible] subject in the archives, or for preservation [illegible] in the historical safe.

3. That the historian might be allowed to keep a chronology of policy-making decisions, and other events affecting the course of the air war, by periodic consultation with the Commanding General and by access to his papers.

4. That the historian would have the active support of the Commanding General in his quest for high level policy documents, especially those affecting Anglo-American service collaboration in the air. Such documents, essential to an understanding of the political implications of the air war, are to be found in Air Ministry and in the back files of the American Embassy.

V. Barriers to Fulfillment of the Historical Concept.

In practice the above assumptions were fulfilled only in minor and fractional ways. General Baker did open a door for the historian to attend the Commanders' meetings. Its privilege was discontinued with the establishment of [illegible]. The main barriers, however, were those inherent in the Army's low concept of the function of history, - mere narratives without reference to policy. Within the system, given normal human inertia, the concept of historical research current with air operations could not be implemented. Following are some of the more obvious [illegible].

A. There was no directive to overseas Air Forces from Gen. H.H.A., which encouraged a historian to be much more than a routine chronicler and a collecting agent. There was

-14-

[illegible] allegiance for high level research in the field. The [illegible] location of the Eighth Air Force and USSTAF [illegible] the United Kingdom, however, created conditions which [illegible] non-traditional. Moreover, the history-directing [illegible] of Air Power required that new methods be tried.

General Spaatz's position was that he did not want [illegible] think about history during hostilities for fear that [illegible] for historical correlate might influence his judgment [illegible] the conduct of the air war. That position was sound. [illegible] his subordinates, although without his command [illegible] limitations, were inclined to take their coloring from [illegible] attitude, an attitude which could be justified only at the very highest level. The Historical Section, therefore, was compelled to fight its battle to win a place for shoulder-[illegible] without support from the home base, without the active [illegible] of the Commanding General, and without effective [illegible] collaboration from the staff officers. The happy exceptions [illegible] were rare) would only prove the rule. History [illegible] a tolerated nuisance; it never attained the status [illegible] a necessary function.

5. It was essential to the history program that [illegible] historian gain participant-experience, to grow with the [illegible] as the Combined Bomber Offensive moved through [illegible] many targets. In no other way could he learn of events [illegible] changing policies. He sought to be a silent observer [illegible] staff conferences. This request was granted for two short periods: at the end of General Eaker's command at Wedmore, [illegible] and during October and November, 1944, when

[illegible]

6. [illegible]

[illegible] necessary to expand
[illegible] that they remain
[illegible] expand offensive to the
[illegible] time to explain current opera-
[illegible] tiveness. Some failed where
[illegible] succeed. But it is hard to see
[illegible] assistants could not be found
[illegible] they could merely by being present,
[illegible] It was once contemplated that such
[illegible] time to collaborate with the
[illegible] resistance. But most of the
[illegible] of reciprocness; their participation
[illegible] ...ed.

[illegible] there dilemma is the prevailing
[illegible] operation-minded officers
[illegible] would not in any case be good.
[illegible] stories and the reluctance to
[illegible] theory which would be rea-
[illegible] that were seen tested, which
[illegible] two theories had to begin grow.
[illegible] which reflects the disparity
[illegible] tactical skill and the immaturity
[illegible] and nature of world politics. Under
[illegible] ...ess groups could not also find
[illegible] ...ment a mutual position.
[illegible] ...ment contrast to long-trained

[illegible] given the case, it was in the end found
[illegible] unprepared by [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] as [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] the time of the [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] largely [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] would [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] attempt to [illegible] their [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] only their [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] high [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] they were [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] they were done, in spite of [illegible], [illegible] and
[illegible] have [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible].

[illegible] sections,

[illegible] has at his [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]. He was able to [illegible] of the [illegible] this [illegible] only [illegible]. [illegible] fashion. The [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] for their [illegible] the whole [illegible] with the scheme for [illegible] as they arrive, [illegible] according to subject, and, [illegible] indexed with cross references. This [illegible] by a small team of different [illegible], Marble, Huber, Feldman, [illegible] the able supervision of [illegible] assistants also carry on research [illegible] for the [illegible] avoid accumulation of papers [illegible] interest. Likewise it was considered [illegible] various [illegible] types of [illegible] appeal only to an antiquarian, [illegible] collective [illegible], or of purely [illegible], the [illegible]

and [illegible] an [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] through various media. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] which were [illegible] [illegible] when [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] their tenure. The difficulty [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] very [illegible]. While the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on the [illegible] levels it was not [illegible] possible to [illegible] the knowledge of what makes it [illegible] [illegible] document historically significant. Having [illegible] succeeded in its quest for key materials to [illegible] the air war, the Historical Section is [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] gain custody of the remainder and thus establish a precedent for the necessity of organized [illegible] archives as distinct from A.G. records.

The archives are designed for reference by students [illegible] of Air Power in the European phase of World [illegible] [illegible] collection from which the published [illegible] prepared, and therefore of immediate value to an Air [illegible] College. That end in view might justify some of the cost, if not the [illegible], of building the Archives, [illegible].

IV. The Historian and his Materials.

[illegible] most pressing of the historian's materials [illegible] the policy of the historical [illegible] a high level support with [illegible] persistent administrative pressure in the [illegible] [illegible] materials to document the air war from [illegible] results which must result [illegible] end of his period of "picking" [illegible] through [illegible] dance over to the historian for [illegible] [illegible] story. There exists a body of policy papers of [illegible] importance for the historical officers of the Eighth [illegible] where research was done in the USSAF archives. [illegible] diary was acquired immediately prior [illegible] departure from the theatre, but lack of [illegible] [illegible] funeral Sparks allowed the historian to examine [illegible] items concerning the Regensburg and Schweinfurt raids. The real work in the display of the air [illegible] "warfare" is done by the historian at the [illegible].

[illegible] interviews with key air officers should be [illegible]. Beginning in the summer of 1945, these interviews [illegible] with air commanders, planners, technical [illegible] and outstanding members of the staff. They contain [illegible] relevant opinion and factual information. Living [illegible] perspective, however, important for the political [illegible] of the war, failed to [illegible] results. The

[illegible] existing [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] correspondence and [illegible]
[illegible] by the [illegible] material which
[illegible] collaboration in the air-
[illegible] signed as liaison officer on AMC
[illegible] to [illegible], but [illegible], until the
[illegible], the Air Ministry asked that the
[illegible] the [illegible] section cease by
[illegible] to such materials in its archives.
[illegible] minded on order [illegible] the
[illegible] "Official History of the Allied
[illegible] direct access to matters discussed
[illegible], Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army
[illegible], the Historian of USSAF, "should
[illegible] to any minutes of staff or other
[illegible] mention or disagreement."

[illegible] also spent the carefully surveyed
[illegible] to obtain English comments on
[illegible] way. The access dried up. All
[illegible] correspondence with Air Ministry,
[illegible] spring of 1945 by the historian and
[illegible] classification. Even material of the
[illegible] factual, with demonstrated good
[illegible] proved among Apaka. This was a
[illegible] contrary work begun in the field,
[illegible] made by bona authorities. The
[illegible] compromised. Search for data on

[illegible] the Iberian Peninsula, Tangier, that was [illegible] in Morocco, the military and political [illegible] of the Iberian peninsula in 1940, the Axis powers [illegible] the Nazis [illegible]. The [illegible] as several [illegible] agent, really, he [illegible] after he had [illegible] the files and removed [illegible] which for [illegible] or [illegible] could not be known. From a period of eight months the Abwehrstelle established eight networks on the Iberian Peninsula and the surroundings. The [illegible] of the Abwehr was not had be [illegible] there [illegible] [illegible]. They covered the period [illegible] of Anglo-German collaboration was established.

The interpreter maintained the purity of the [illegible] through to the fall of Paris, [illegible] disengagement. If there was a mistake, it was one of his own making. He was allowed freedom for personal [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] pursued their duties with [illegible] devotion and [illegible] energy. Major Ottenwald was [illegible] the activities of the [illegible], but [illegible] the responsibilities in [illegible] with [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible]. He guided the [illegible] of the [illegible], and prepared the [illegible] of events to be [illegible] in the [illegible] from 1940 to 1944. Are Captain Parker [illegible]

[illegible] in [illegible] high level [illegible] as [illegible] to the [illegible] of staff.

[illegible] it should be [illegible] and to gain [illegible] during [illegible] by personality, than to write history [illegible] from the [illegible] the assignment, or [illegible] to the Commanding General, [illegible] done, however, under the [illegible] not only of the Commanding General, but of the immediate staff, [illegible] and to a certain degree of all the AAF Commands. This [illegible] personal relationships, [illegible] in trying times with the [illegible] in terms of time, and should be [illegible] in the ultimate writing of the [illegible] history. Personality factors are still the [illegible] as well as [illegible].

[illegible] Institutional Narrative.

[illegible] achieve this long range preparation he documented the use of Air Power is the necessity to submit a narrative entitled "Inception, Organization, and Functions of H.Q. USSTAF." The administrative b[illegible] was [illegible] delayed because of the inaccessibility of materials which would describe the [illegible] of the various Directorates and Sections of USSTAF. Further, it was found that the materials, when available, were too fragmentary. Consequently, it was necessary to call upon the Directorate and Section chiefs either to submit to a series of interviews, or to order the preparation of functional narratives by their own staffs, which papers [illegible] to be coordinated with the output of the Historical [illegible] (e.g., the directive of 31 March 1945). This particular task is really one for professional Army or [illegible] officers who by training are equipped to select the [illegible] which make USSTAF unique amongst military institutions. After the inevitable procrastination had run its course it was found that the key officers within [illegible] of the Directorates, who knew most about organization and functions, had already been redeployed. Picking up the pieces, from memory and documentary fragments, was difficult to a high degree. More than ever the Historical [illegible] was regarded as a nuisance and a pain in the side.

[illegible]

Power and Capability.

[illegible] attack this later range preparation [illegible] [illegible] Air Power in the [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] "Deception, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]." The [illegible] history [illegible] of the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] describe the functions of the [illegible] and Services of Supply. Further [illegible] [illegible] rifle, when available, were too [illegible] quantity, it was necessary to call upon [illegible] and Section chiefs either to submit to [illegible] [illegible], or to order the preparation of [illegible] by their own staffs, which papers [illegible] documented with the output of the Secretariat [illegible] directive of 31 March 1948). This [illegible] is really one for professional Army or [illegible] training are equipped to select the [illegible] "ULTIMAT" unique design military [illegible] [illegible] the terrible preparation had run [illegible] we found that the key officers within [illegible] organizations, the key men about organiza[illegible], had already been redeployed. Picking [illegible] Army and Company Engineers, was [illegible] more than ever the Sisyphean [illegible] [illegible] and a pain in the ass.

Dealing with the participants during conferences is extremely disruptive dealing with [illegible] in planet Dejenaliko.

[illegible] as indeed

[illegible] report which History contains

[illegible] following conclusions are inescapable.

[illegible] to find enough blame for History,

[illegible] we were [illegible] the "Cold War."

[illegible] begin with the historical concept

[illegible] to have been adopted. Certain of

[illegible] leaders of USSAF were well-conscious

[illegible] reality, but they were too busy to

[illegible] the historian. It may be that the

[illegible] The Air Force certainly was not

[illegible] organizations of those engaged in

[illegible] are to grind, and no public be

[illegible] requires the historian to equal

[illegible] and vindication for the cause of his

[illegible] History to sustain the true structure

[illegible] scholars, whose vision includes the

[illegible] the destruction of the enemy country,

[illegible] and keep vigil alone.

[illegible] of the difficulty, which made for

[illegible] and specific, was not in U.S.

[illegible] improvement. Allowance was made in

[illegible] level unit historian, sensitive nurse-

[illegible] fact sound, and certainly unusual.

[illegible] between official records (A.G.)

[illegible] corporation and political [illegible] which are based also on the Russian [illegible], whether in the United States or in [illegible], [illegible] the basis of positive and [illegible] [illegible] ventilation in the natural [illegible] in the [illegible] around the Mississippi [illegible] on politics, is only [illegible] by which we could [illegible] [illegible].

5. As a postscript, however, the application of [illegible] to the new and [illegible] subject of air power in [illegible] politics, the [illegible] section, [illegible], might merit a word of consideration. It bore the torch by [illegible] [illegible] revelations of the political problems of [illegible] military actions, of the significance of the destruction of Germany, of the historic effect of the new weapon in [illegible] the process of transition to a new age which [illegible] be marked by jet propulsion. From this point of view, the [illegible] and educational effect of the position [illegible] have been entirely in vain. One day the Russian [illegible] may actually be [illegible] by the air power. [illegible] be demonstrated that air power is an instrument [illegible], as much as [illegible] was.

The preservation of the [illegible] military of [illegible] [illegible]. The requirement is that the [illegible] staff

[illegible] the archives of USAF [illegible] as a whole, retaining the identity of historical sections [illegible] in [illegible] such as exists in [illegible]. The commandants, including the director of USAF Operations, will [illegible] numbers. Many of the participants are already beyond [illegible] for contributions of certain publication or [illegible]. Minor [illegible], although [illegible] only in [illegible] and [illegible], will be [illegible] in [illegible] along with all the advantages of [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible]. In particular, the contribution of the [illegible] level of the commanding General must await his return from the Pacific, as his long delayed [illegible] is [illegible]. These will serve as the [illegible] in the final version of the History of USAF-wide use of Air Power in the European War.

D. Recommendations.

1. That historical scholarship be utilized to [illegible] current Air Power as for centuries it has served the Army, thus to prepare for the future Mission of the Air. There is indicated a necessary marriage of reason between essential knowledge of Air Power and historical as well as [illegible] knowledge of world politics.

2. That the historian of an Air Force, or of a [illegible] such as USAFAF, be a scholar who has the confidence of the commanding General. He should be

[illegible]

5. That the Historical Archives, [illegible] [illegible], be regarded as the continuing [illegible] [illegible], the entire [illegible] be kept together in order that [illegible] documentation of air operations [illegible] be [illegible].

6. That such Historical and [illegible] [illegible] of ability and distinction [illegible] [illegible]. The function of such historical [illegible] [illegible] the materials [illegible] [illegible] in the central archives, and to produce, [illegible] [illegible], the historical narrative of the [illegible].

The above recommendations reflect the [illegible] [illegible] Historical Section, USSTAF. The aspirations [illegible] Historical Section were not out of keeping with the [illegible] strategic bombing, the history-making [illegible] of the Air Force, and the brave deeds of American [illegible] in battle. They were, in 1944, geared to [illegible] [illegible] of the Combined Bomber Offensive, [illegible] the new subject, Air Power in World Politics.

Finally, it remains to add with humble apology [illegible] completed its mission in Europe. Men of the Air [illegible] knew how to fight and win. In the fulness of time they will acquire experience in world politics, and become aware of goals beyond even the most superb technical achievement. It may be that the traditions of the Air Force, founded on experiences of this war, will take [illegible] from this late effort to capture its history [illegible] [illegible].

Bruce C. Hopper
Historian, USSTAF

Park House, USSTAF (Main)
22 June, 1945.

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EJP is anticipating Hopper.

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94077. 109 TO CHESTON.

BRUCE HOPPER WHO IS NOW IN UNITED STATES WAS LOANED BY US 8TH AIR FORCE TO PREPARE THEIR HISTORY. I UNDERSTAND SPAATZ HAS BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH HIS WORK. CAN YOU SEE HIM AND ASCERTAIN HIS FUTURE PLANS. I DO NOT KNOW THAT WE HAVE ANY FUTURE OBLIGATIONS TO CONTINUE HIM. BRUCE HAD IS IN PARIS MADE ORIGINAL ARRANGEMENTS. I AM CABLING HIM FOR INFORMATION AS TO THEIR NATURE.

SECRET

4 JULY 1945

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[illegible]

[illegible]

HISTORY OF USSTAF

(A Brief)

NOLD-FOR-WID

I. Great time in History:

A. Military Necessity. Preliminary "total" destruction of Germany's productive forces.

B. Destruction from ultimate-by strategic bombing.

C. Consciousness of a new era:

A. Political effect of temporary disappearance of Germany.
B. Economic and social effects.
C. Transition period in history: Four-month bother the epoch.

D. Prompt opportunity for historical research current with operations.

II. Historical Problems:

A. Concept.

B. Assumptions.

C. Barriers:

A. No allowance for high level research in the field.
B. Historian excluded from participant-experience.
C. Lack of history-consciousness in the Air Force.

III. Historical Approach.

IV. Historian and Assistants.

V. Functional Narrative.

VI. Conclusions:

A. No red carpet spread for history.
B. Sources of difficulty not in USSTAF but in the War Department.
C. Pathfinder to any majority Air Force in World Politics.
D. Necessity to keep staff and archives intact until work is completed.

6. Recommendations.

A. That Bloodgood Indoctrinate as quickly as possible to serve current air force as it has served the Army.

B. That the Mission be a unit in the auspices of the Commanding General and that be added following authorizations:

1. That an assistant director be assigned as director and authorize grade of Lieutenant Colonel.

2. That an assistant director be assigned to relate to the Commanding General.

3. That the activity, during hostilities, be regarded as the equivalent of a theater.

4. That each Director and Assistant appoint a Historical officer for the unit.

Forrest.

Park Hines
VUWZAP (Main)
20 June 1945.

[redacted]

MILITARY DRAFT

C. Propaganda

on

Victory of VERCAR

(A Evil)

1. First Time In History.

On VE Day (8 May 1945) certain leaders of the allied victory commanded the attention of thinking men and tempered their celebration of the hour of triumph. Germany was no more than a geographical term denoting a large area about to be parcelled into four zones for administration by the emerging allied powers. The impression gained from flying low over the targets, and visiting bombed areas on the ground, was that German industries and cities were in the biblical sense destroyed. German organizations were torn apart. German economic and civic functions had all but ceased. Whereas the actual destruction is yet to be scientifically measured it did seem on VE Day that Germany had stopped breathing, that her existence as a nation had come to a definitely abandonedill.

1. For the first time in history definitive victory was signed upon the preliminary destruction of the productive capacities of a powerful industrialized country. It was the first total war; the predicate was totality of destruction. There was no other way to overthrow the ruling reactional group which kept itself in power, and

[illegible] and [illegible] of [illegible]
[illegible] establishment of the most [illegible]
[illegible] ever known to [illegible]. This was [illegible]
[illegible] of a [illegible] order. The line between military
[illegible] and non-combatant, [illegible]
[illegible] international law even during World War I,
[illegible] total war, caused from the [illegible] of
[illegible] military security, although [illegible]
[illegible] total war, is terrifying for the
[illegible] 19 [illegible] further investigation.
[illegible] first time in history that a great
[illegible] country was destroyed from within, for
[illegible], by continuous attack on its sources
[illegible], its productive capacities, and its [illegible]
[illegible] the enemy's will to resist by depriving
[illegible] of waging war is an ancient objective in
[illegible] First time it was made overwhelmingly
[illegible] weapon which obliterated Germany's
[illegible] the struggle was the four-engined heavy
[illegible] bombers by night, and the U.S.A.A.F.
[illegible] Round-the-clock bombing, made possible
[illegible] of operations, is considered to have
[illegible] destructive effectiveness six times. It
[illegible], now desirable, to estimate the proportion-
[illegible] of the various Allies to the common
[illegible] considering the sublimal nature of some of

war operations, it is possible to differentiate the respective shares of their three services, land, sea, and air, but the incontrovertible fact does remain from the ruins of Germany: The large-scale destruction of German capacity in large war, as distinct from defeat of German armed forces in the field, was primarily and preponderantly the result of the strategic bombing.

3. Somewhat less definitively it may be said that for the first time contemporaries of a great war are immediately conscious that a new weapon, forged in battle, and developed to unprecendented range of destructive power, has in effect altered the course of history. The four-engined bomber symbolizes the transition to a new era. Evidence of the transition is political, economic, and social.

A. From the political point of view the disappearance of Germany from the life of Europe, even though temporary, is a historic fact of the first magnitude. The traditional Balance of Power was the sine qua non of the European nations-states system. It operated even during the League of Nations period. That Balance is now gone, (or rather moved to the periphery and overseas to non-European powers) leaving Europe a fluid disequilibrium. In the sequel the nations-states system may be fundamentally changed in character, after an existence of 300 years. Sovereign small states become like medieval towns whose

[illegible] in the three wars [illegible] by [illegible] and blind to [illegible] the very [illegible] of the [illegible] for constant "alert," in [illegible] of [illegible] extent of every instance of an aggressor power, would be intolerable. The truth is that Air Power of a new and more terrible type has arrived on the scene of world politics. Nothing can be planned without consideration of the changed [illegible], whether it be the definition of boundaries, the establishment of world or regional security systems, the control of international air police, or any other question of equal significance. The capacity to maintain and control the use of Air Power in the future is the most important political issue of the victory.

Likewise, economically, the disappearance of Germany as the traditional supplier of industrial goods to Central and Eastern Europe produces a vacuum the consequences of which can not now be measured. With Germany's industrial dominance reduced to impotence by strategic bombing it is difficult to see how her manpower of seventy millions can be employed. Granted that the Allies do not intend to permit immediate reconstruction, there would ensue a wide dispersal of German technical skills and skilled workers which would seriously alter the international division of labor, and change the channels of international trade.

Socially, the vast movements of population, the return to their homes of the survivors of an estimated ten million [illegible] stress, and the eventual outward movement of [illegible] themselves, involve historic shifts in the balance of [illegible] power which may well change the face of [illegible]. Continental Europe may have less immediate importance in the new era than the still underdeveloped lands of [illegible]. The fall of Germany is ipso facto the decline of [illegible], the cradle of Western civilization.

[illegible] it is not here implied that the fault-ridden [illegible] of itself, set in motion the forces which [illegible] the transition. The war merely [illegible] a process already at work in society, and achieved [illegible] by destruction of the industrial power of [illegible] mightiest nation. The resultant exclusion of Germany, [illegible] of the overall victory, is a historic [illegible] that new international forms for the [illegible] of Europe must be devised. These changes are [illegible] the affairs of all nations politically, [illegible] and socially.

[illegible] politics the reliance for enforcement of [illegible] from the striking power of land and sea [illegible] striking power of air forces. The range of [illegible] necessitated the development of the long [illegible] nature, the winning combination. It also [illegible] development by Germany of a very effective

[illegible] The exploitation of a flight will be [illegible] the air [illegible] from this point of view [illegible] power is the spiritual [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] prophets and have a new [illegible] [illegible] distinguished [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] we see the transition might [illegible] [illegible] from [illegible] on soil and iron (Revolution [illegible] [illegible] revolution) to rubber on [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] foundation of a sound [illegible] [illegible] All we have to do: Air Power opens the [illegible] [illegible] that first understands Air Power in [illegible] Britain instinctively understood Sea Power [illegible] will set the pace; it will determine [illegible] of the new world-the sublime of [illegible] for one.

[illegible] For the first time there seemed to be [illegible] historians to do their historical [illegible] with military operations. The A.H.P. of [illegible] history worthy of the name. This [illegible] was made in Washington for all round [illegible] to insure procurement of records. [illegible] General Ira Baker, (then Major General) [illegible] of the Eighth Air Force, invited the [illegible] Historical Section in his command the [illegible] opportunity of the unusual opportunity

to make historical scholarship serve the new command Air Force as far centuries it had served old and brief sea power. At that time the Casablanca directive (January 1943) was implemented by a plan (Combined Bomber Offensive) to carry out the "..... progressive destruction of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened." The ultimate significance of this directive was fully realized by the infant Historical Section: "To be equal to the historic moment, in which the total destruction of a great industrial power was in prospect, the methods of preparation of history would have to be quickened to keep pace intellectually with the speed of the air weapon," to capture history on the wing (current events). The establishment of USSTAF, 6 January 1945, widened this opportunity. USSTAF is a unique military institution designed to achieve the ideal of mass in attack. The Commanding General's coordinating function included administrative control of two air forces in the same theatre of war (Eighth and Ninth), and operational control of two air forces in two theatres (Eighth and Fifteenth). USSTAF also served to guard the purity of the strategic bombing concept, and to disseminate lessons learned in the technical and tactical advance. Further, because of its base in the United Kingdom, and proximity to the British government,

[illegible] partook of America's [illegible] and [illegible] in America not only in Britain, but in Russia, France, and [illegible]. OSRAF has [illegible] been [illegible] to a large extent, the [illegible] in a new field: Air Power in World Politics.

[illegible]

III. Historical Program

[illegible] the pending destruction of history, and of the loss of any future on the published [illegible] war, the Historical Section requires to [illegible] the task of compilation, [illegible] to [illegible] compliance with this resolve it [illegible] history.

1. Concept.

In a memorandum of 4 June 1948, prepared by the Historian and approved by General Kisley, appears the following:

"The History of the Eighth Air Force is to be prepared on the high level of historical scholarship, [illegible] the requirements of impartial interpretation in no other way can a record be made which will stand future scrutiny by historical scholars. A document of unquestioned authenticity will be required by the United States Government when the time comes to determine Eighth Air policy for the world, over the international conference table. It would be irretrievable if the United States were to possess dependent Air Power, but lack the data, the knowledge, and the wisdom to make that Power serve the cause of peace (or war). War must be conducted in the cold atmosphere. Bad although [illegible] been kept by the Eighth Air Service (AAF), and had we learned [illegible] been duly implemented, it is conceivable that a flying committee in the persons who alone have been here. In these pages all have [illegible] to [illegible] purpose, the history of the Eighth Air Force will be dedicated."

In regard to qualifications of personnel, the memorandum says:

"The historical narrator must have been involuntarily [illegible] to historical scholarship. He should be young, without preconceived ideas, and should be [illegible]

to the personnels of the Issues of Air Power, and the meeting to Washington in this period of History. As he will work at every level, he must have capacity to subsect factors of historical significance from the mass of details presented by the [illegible] the pre-digested materials, and to write with imaginative sensitivity to the speed of the subject. (It is not given to a perspicuous mind to measure the reach of Air Power.) In order to follow operations from inception on the policy level to execution by combat units, he must have access to secret directives, as most recent. Therefore, he must be a person of outstanding integrity, a true scholar by vocation, who is not likely to be tempted later into furtherance of a political or a writing career by exposure of secrets (or of mistakes most) which he has learned in the course of his work [illegible]. (Subsequent leakage!)

"The historian must be a scholar combining knowledge of the Army, the Air, and History, with experience in civil politics adequate to his role of interpreting the [illegible] of Air Power in the peace settlement. He must be a person of unquestionable integrity to merit the confidence of the Commanding General, and all other [illegible] at the policy level, in regard to all past policies and all past operations. [illegible] he must [illegible] routine details of the records for the sake of historical perspective. Above all he must put flesh and blood into the history by observation and conference with staff officers in the many subdivisions, and by the inspiration of frequent contacts with the flying personnel. He must imprint in words the identity and spirit of the Eighth Air Force,- to transfer its wings to history."

It was realized that implementation of this visionary concept would require a special position for History. Hence had been a haphazard and low level book-keeping, assignment would have to be elevated and transformed into a mission of high-level scholarship. Certain recommendations were made. Some were orally accepted by General Eaker; others were implied by his approval of the

[illegible]

[illegible] (Secret Illustrations)

[illegible] preparation of history would be combined [illegible] functions in a word, this is the [illegible]

[illegible] historian would work on the level of [illegible], and in his confidence, thus to [illegible] materials for the inevitable future [illegible].

[illegible] historian, or one of his assistants, [illegible] staff meetings and decision-making [illegible] purpose of recording changes in position. [illegible] historian and his assistants would be [illegible] participant-observers, thus to bring [illegible] discipline to bear on historical research [illegible].

[illegible] would be an automatic flow to the [illegible] of classified documents for study and [illegible].

[illegible] the historian would be allowed to examine [illegible] (except those concerning future [illegible]) in order to select those of historical [illegible], processing, indexing and filing [illegible] in the archives, or for preservation [illegible] historical [illegible].

[illegible] in the field. [illegible]
[illegible] and [illegible] were [illegible]
[illegible] conditions, the [illegible]
[illegible] used new methods in [illegible]
[illegible] criticism was [illegible] all [illegible]
[illegible] conditions [illegible] that
[illegible] might influence his [illegible]
[illegible]. That position was [illegible]
[illegible], although [illegible] his [illegible]
[illegible] to make many [illegible] from
[illegible] which would be [illegible] only at
[illegible] Mississippi [illegible], [illegible],
[illegible] make [illegible] a place for [illegible]
[illegible] home [illegible], without the [illegible]
[illegible], and without [illegible]
[illegible] positions. The [illegible]
[illegible] were the [illegible]. History
[illegible] never attained [illegible]

[illegible] in the history [illegible]
[illegible], [illegible] the
[illegible] defensive [illegible]
[illegible] could [illegible] of [illegible]
[illegible] to be a [illegible]
[illegible] was [illegible] for [illegible]
[illegible] Lincoln's [illegible] [illegible],
[illegible] Lincoln, 1864, [illegible]

-28-

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

intellectual slaves who chose to work in the dog house for ends not authorized by regulations, e.g., a study of Air Power as distinct from unit histories. As a matter of record, the time of the historian and his assistants was largely consumed in gaining custody of key documents (which should have flowed to the Section automatically) and in the attempt to educate staff officers up to the historical concept. Only their faith in the inevitable rightness of their high cause sustained them. They were convinced that what they were doing, in spite of difficulties, would one day prove to be of significance.

III. Archives.

The historian had at his command only the powers of personal persuasion. He was able to melt down some of the barriers only to see them rebuilt again,- the accretions of established Army habit. Nevertheless, the missionary zeal was not without fruits. The archives continued to grow. Often inactive files were turned over to the Historical Section which were found to contain invaluable items of historical significance gleaming like gems amongst the rubbish. These archives now contain some forty filing cabinets of documents selected for their importance not only to HQ USSTAF, but to the whole strategic air war in Europe. In accordance with the scheme for preservation of records, the materials are processed as they arrive, broken down into items, classified according to subject, and, insofar as time permits, indexed with cross references. This continuous function is performed by a crack team of enlisted personnel (Sergeants McFarland, Martin, Weber, Friedman, Freiland, and Farrell) under the able supervision of Major Stackpole. These trained assistants also carry on research and prepare preliminary narratives for the long-range program. It was early decided to avoid preparation of reports on subjects of transient interest. Likewise it was considered wise to exclude from the archives proper various types of fugitive materials which would appeal only to an antiquarian.

Despite the lack of effective sanction, or of ready cooperation from the high authorities, the Historical Section

did accumulate an impressive mass of important materials through various means. Fundamental documents were sometimes literally rescued from the flames when inactive files were ordered destroyed, often without inspection for stray treasures. The difficulty was in knowing when such holocausts were contemplated. While the cooperation was more certain at the lower levels it was not always possible to transmit the knowledge of what makes a particular document historically significant. Having partially succeeded in its quest for key materials to document the air war, the Historical Section is all the more eager to gain custody of the remainder and thus establish a precedent for the necessity of organized historical archives as distinct from A.G. records.

The archives are designed for reference by students of the use of Air Power in the European phase of World War II,- a working collection from which the rubbish has been screened, and therefore of immediate value to an Air Staff College. That end in view might justify some of the pains, if not the means, of building the Archives, USSTAF.

IV. The Historian and His Assistants.

The most pressing of the historian's functions was to maintain the purity of the historical concept,- research on a high level current with operations. That involved a persistent educational process in the unending quest for policy materials to document the air war. (Two years' talk with results which must remain intangible). At the end of his period at Widewing General Baker turned his correspondence over to the historian for selection of items to copy. These made a body of policy papers of first importance for the historical officers of the Eighth Air Force, whose research was done in the USSTAF archives. General Anderson's diary was consulted immediately prior to his departure from the theatre, too late for serious study. And General Spaatz allowed the historian to examine his diary for items concerning the inception and organization of USSTAF. The real work on the diaries of the Air Generals must therefore be done by the historian at the home base.

Periodic interviews with key air officers should be mentioned. Beginning in the summer of 1945, these interviews included those with air commanders, planners, technical officers, and outstanding members of the staff. They contain a wealth of participant opinion and factual information. [Living testimony]

Two projects, however, important for the political background of the air war, failed to attain results. The

first was an attempt, extending over eighteen months, and involving voluminous correspondence and negotiations, to obtain from Air Ministry the essential materials which would explain the Anglo-American collaboration in the air. Major Lawrence was assigned as liaison officer at Air Ministry. Progress was slow, but satisfactory, until the late summer of 1944, when Air Ministry asked that the Commanding General of the U.S.A.A.F. sanction access by the historian, USSTAF, to such materials in its archives. The ultimate answer included an order "conforming to War Department policy" that "Official Historians of the Armed Forces will not be permitted access to matters discussed by the Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff and their subcommittees." Further, the historian of USSTAF... "should not be permitted access to any minutes of Staff or other meetings which indicate contention or disagreement."

This bombshell blew apart the carefully nurtured project at Air Ministry to obtain British comments on American efforts in the air war. The source dried up. All subsequent negotiations and correspondence with Air Ministry, carried through to the spring of 1945 by the historian and Major Lawrence, ended in Chinoiseries. Even Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, with demonstrated good will, could not get the project going again. This was a clear instance in which necessary work begun in the field, by the means at hand, was undone by home authorities. The time wasted can never be recaptured. Research for data on

the Anglo-American collaboration in British sources is, therefore, unfinished business.

The second project was the attempt to gain access to the back files of the American Embassy, London. What was sought here, in particular, was military and political information of the formative years 1940 to 1942, the build-up period for the Eighth Air Force. The Ambassador on several occasions agreed, orally, to permit access after he had examined the files and removed papers which for reasons of state should not be shown. Over a period of eight months the historian submitted eight memoranda on the subject to the Ambassador; none was acknowledged. The true history of the air war can not be written until these documents become available. They cover the period when the pattern of Anglo-American collaboration was established.

The historian maintained the purity of the historical concept in the face of what seemed at times to be brickwall discouragement. If that was a mistake, it was one of his own making. He was allowed freedom for parallel war work (e.g., lecturing, etc.) because members of the trained staff performed their duties with selfless devotion and commendable energy. Major Stackpole not only administered the multifold activities of the Section, but carried out the responsibilities in relations with Historical Sections of the subordinate commands. He guided the research of the enlisted personnel, and prepared the necessary chronicle of events to be noted in the air history from 1940 to 1945. And Captain Foster

had unusual success in obtaining high level materials as Sp in preparation for his studies on the Command and Contr problems of USSTAF.

In sum, it must be admitted that the historian was "shooting the moon"--which was to gain participant-experience and collect essential materials during hostilities as food for reflection in tranquility, thus to write history with authoritative conviction. He failed to realize his hope, cherished from the moment of accepting the assignment, of becoming a political adviser to the Commanding General. He does, however, enjoy the warm friendship not only of the Commanding General, but of the immediate staff family, and to a certain degree of all the Air Commanders. Thus he was granted very special privileges as a person,- not as a function. These personal relationships, established in trying times with the splendid men who actually planned and conducted the air war, are beyond price in terms of life, and should be of great value in the ultimate writing of the true history. Personality factors are still the master keys to telling about wars, as well as fighting them.

V. Functional Narrative.

Cutting athwart this long range preparation to document the use of Air Power is the necessity to submit a narrative entitled: "Inception, Organization, and Functions of H.Q. USSTAF." The administrative history was long delayed because of the inaccessibility of materials which would describe the functions of the various Directorates and Sections of USSTAF. Further, it was found that the materials, when available, were too fragmentary. Consequently, it was necessary to call upon the Directorate and Section chiefs either to submit to a series of interviews, or to order the preparation of functional narratives by their own staffs, which papers could then be coordinated with the output of the Historical Section (e.g., the directive of 31 March 1945). This particular task is really one for professional Army or Air officers who by training are equipped to select the features which make USSTAF unique amongst military institutions. After the inevitable procrastination had run its course it was found that the key officers within several of the Directorates, who knew most about organization and functions, had already been redeployed. Picking up the pieces, from memory and documentary fragments, was painful to a high degree. More than ever the Historical Section was regarded as a nuisance and a pain in the side.

Checking with the participants during hostilities is extremely difficult; checking with them afterward is almost impossible.

VI. Conclusions.

From the above report of the History Commands attached to USSTAF the following conclusions are suggested:

1. There was no red carpet spread for history. The results that may ensue were achieved the "hard way," against odds thrown. To begin with the historical concept seems in general not to have been adopted. Certain of the high ranking officers of USSTAF were world-conscious in their outlook on Air Power; but they were too busy to talk on the subject to the historian. It may be that the concept was not too high. The Air Force certainly was not accustomed to the high expectations of those engaged in pure scholarship with no axe to grind, and no public to serve. A condition which requires the historian to spend his time in unremittent supplication for the tools of his craft does not permit history to attain its true stature and dignity. And the scholars, whose vision includes the distant horizon beyond the destruction of the enemy country, time stoke their own fires, and keep vigil alone.

2. The source of the difficulty, which made for the gulf between concept and practice, was not in H.Q. USSTAF, but in the War Department. Allowance was made in regulations for low level unit histories, routine narratives which accumulate dust unread, and certainly unsung. A distinction is maintained between official records (A.G.)

and records of historical interest. No allowance was made for a high level policy history commensurate in scope to the reach of Air Power, and especially dictated by the coordinating and political functions peculiar to USSTAF, which was based close to the Supreme Allied Commander, whether in the United Kingdom or on the Continent. Without the backing of positive and specific authorization from Washington it was natural that air officers in the field should exclude the historian from discussions on policies, the only means by which he could prepare history supreme palame.

3. As a pathfinder, however, in exploration of paths to the new and commanding subject of Air Power in World Politics, the Historical Section, USSTAF, might merit a word of commendation. It bore the torch by consistently reminding warriors of the political predicates of their military actions, of the significance of the destruction of Germany, of the historic effect of the new weapon in hastening the process of transition to a new age which will be paced by jet propulsion. From this point of view, the missionary zeal and educational effort of the Section may not have been entirely in vain. One day the function of scholarship may actually be welcomed by the Air Force. It will then be acknowledged that Air Power is an instrument for preventing, as well as waging, war.

4. The preparation of the true history of USSTAF will continue. The requirement is that the trained staff

and the archives be kept intact as a unit, retaining the identity of Historical Section, USSTAF, in Washington until the work is completed. The documentation, including the diaries of USSTAF Generals, will assume massive proportions. Many of the participants are already beyond contact for confirmation of certain policies or events. History *currente calamo*, although existent only in outline and fragments, will be transmuted into history *ex post facto* with all the advantages of perspective and retrospect, in quieter times. In particular, the contributions on the highest level of the Commanding General must await his return from the Pacific,- to his long delayed reflections in tranquility. These will serve as the electric current in the final version of the History of USSTAF--the Use of Air Power in the European War.

5. Recommendations.

A. That historical scholarship be utilized to serve emergent Air Power as for centuries it has served Sea Power, thus to prepare for the future Mahan of the Air. There is indicated a necessary marriage of reason between technical knowledge of Air Forces and historical as well as current knowledge of world politics.

B. That the historian of an Air Force, or of a coordinating command such as USSTAF, be a scholar who has the confidence of the Commanding General. He should be

allowed to attend all policy and decision-making conferences in order to keep a careful record for the General. If the record is kept for the General, it will be kept for history without saving the time of operational officers.

C. That an assistant historian be stationed at a desk outside the Commanding General's office door with the highly confidential task of examining all ingoing and outgoing papers. He would unlock, for copying on the spot, all those which pertain to history, thus not to arrest (for more than a few moments) the flow of documents through work channels. This is necessary because so many documents of the highest importance exist in only single copies, and even these are frequently buried in obscure files. Such copies may be processed through the archives immediately, or simply reserved under seal in the historical safe, according to the degree of secrecy of the information. There seems to be no other way to insure complete preservation than to give the historian an inside, instead of a marginal, function.

D. That an assistant historian be allowed to keep the Daily Journal for the Commanding General, principally to insure that it shall be kept. By answering questions of his chronicler for five or ten minutes a day the Commanding General could be assured that his war activities would be recorded with supporting documents.

E: That the historical archives, during hostilities, be regarded as the Commanding General's archives, his special interest and concern in order that the security obstructions of his subordinates might be overcome;

F: That each Directorate and Section appoint a historical officer of ability and sufficient rank to enjoy respect. The function of such historical officers would be to supervise the automatic flow of significant documents to the central archives, and to prepare, current with operations, the historical narrative of the unit.

The above recommendations reflect the difficulties faced by the assigned Section, USAFE. The aspirations of the historical officer were not out of keeping with the brilliant strategic leadership, the history-making performance of the Air Force, and the brave deeds of American airmen in battle. They were, in fact, geared to the special character of the Combined Bomber Offensive, and to the new subject, Air Power in World Politics.

Finally, it remains to add with Homeric acclaim: USAFE completed its mission in Europe. Men of the Air Force were now to fight and win. In the fulness of time they will acquire experience in world politics, and become masters of goals beyond even the most superb technical achievements. It may be that the traditions of the Air Force, founded on experiences of this war, will take inspiration from this long effort to capture its history on the wing.

Bruce C. Hopper
Historian, USAFE

Park House, Lecta (Main)
20 June, 1946.

(OSS Form 60 (Revised))

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 12, 1944

REC'D 12/3/44 5:54 PM

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USTHAVIC, LONDON

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DIRECTOR

Hector Bruce, Fuller

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#85601. 109 to Armour, Bruce and Hopper.

I do not understand from your cable exactly what you wish to do. My recollection is that your salary now is higher than that which you had in Stockholm. In view of the important work you are doing, it seems that this should continue. Please let me know your desires.

TOD: 12/3/44 5:49PM

WJD

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INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

OSS
Form 69 (Revised)

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#92301. To 109 only f on Armour. #92371 CONFIDENTIAL

In reference to Bruce Hopper's cable to you. I have no knowledge of what he is doing outside of being historian for USSTAF. His total earnings at present time $8750 plus a car purchased by us for his exclusive use and serviced by this organization. Understand he was attached to Embassy in Stockholm salary was $6000 per annum plus rental allowance.

TOR: 11/30/44 1:10 PM

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Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 30 1944

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USTRAVE, LONDON

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F92271. To 109 from Bruce. Hopper

Thanks your effective support my Embassy tasks. Promise highest level research and liaison between retread personalities in project approved by you in September. To further this project especially in political aspects I now urgently request that you either restore my salary to approximately what it was before June 1943, or assign me the difference as representation allowance . Please reply as decisions impend.

Neil P

See what you can
do with this.

CONFIDENTIAL

TOR: 11 /30/44 10:31 AM

FILE COPY

W. Fox

Hoppin, Donald

X Gilt du Pont

X Fabian, Gerald

WAR DEPARTMENT
Office of Strategic Services
European Theater of Operations

19 September 1944

Dear Bruce,

I talked with the Ambassador last night and I told him that I hoped he would go through this with you. He said that he would, and I judge from his conversation that he had some question as to the particular way it should be done. He agrees that it should be carried on.

You know, as well as I do, that it may be difficult to get going, but since he agrees with the principle of it, you had better stay close to him.

I suggest that it would be good for Ted Curtis or Tracy to drop him a note.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director, OSS

Hoppin

11,806
Hopper, Bruce

BGH/mbm.

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Office of the Historian
APO 633, U. S. Army.

4 September, 1944.

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
c/o American Embassy,
71, Grosvenor Street,
London, W.

Dear Bill,

Your envoy, from the thinking echelon of O.S.S. to lair of the air warriors, begs to thank you for gracing the Retread Reunion, and for your winning and very effective words on the occasion.

This is to report that Gil Winant will probably get in touch with you tomorrow. Object: my proposal (made with the approval of Ted Curtis, thus of Spaatz) that I be attached, as liaison from the Commanding General, USSTAF, to the person of the American Ambassador, in order to capture past and present politics of Air Power for air history.

Here's what I have in mind, Bill. There are two gold - mines of air policy material:

1). Toosy's Diary, which is to be turned over to me at the end of hostilities (in America!);

2). Gil Winant's papers and memories.

The dispersal of this Headquarters is the signal for me to shift the focus from the straight military over to the political aspects of Air Power history. That story of the century, including the justification for strategic bombing, centers on the Commanding General and the Ambassador, the military and the political. If I can match the two streams, the story will be preserved on the top secret level for the Air Force and the country.

It seems to me that the open season for blunders is almost upon us now (e.g. Eastern Europe). War raises the technical expert to decision-making power, and then tends to leave him there even though the problem changes in essence. The technical people of the armed

services seem unaware of the political stakes won by their skill, and are inclined to say: "That's not our mission." And yet even their actions in the field are controlled by the politics behind the scene, as the Chinese say: "Behind the sleeves of the dragon."

There is a happy conjuncture of personality factors:

Donovan, Winant, Spaats, and Curtis, plus Hopper.

That combination should attain the goal: The authentic record of the intermarriage between Air Power and World Politics in this period of history. Thus far I have come alone, with Ted's genial tolerance. I now need the full support which only you can give.

To arrive at this moment I many times quelled my old yen for the uniform. (You remember December, 1941?) I remained a civilian on the staff of the Commanding General of America's Air Power in Europe, and have thus been privileged to retain a fierce independence of mind.. I am now ready to enter upon the labor of love for which I have prepared. Air Power is the only loot from the war.

Incidentally, this work has given me plenty of time to think. One subject which fascinates me is World Intelligence after the war. George McDonald and I maintain a sort of running conference, trying to envisage the type of personnel which will be necessary, - pukkah sahibs, who are neither compliant nor inclined to anger, but blandly confident to reflect the arrival at maturity of our country's power. The moment for greatness may come before we are spiritually prepared: that is a story about which I may talk on Monday, 11 September, to Wally Phillips' luncheon club of American businessmen.

This takes my high regards always,

With cheers for the Magic Carpet

Bruce C. H.
BRUCE C. HOPPER,
Historian,
USSTAF.

General O'Donnell — just a reminder to Fred. Wanted in any reorganization will send them a copy. or I'm not afraid. B.E.H.

Extract from Private Journal. 21 August, 1944.

Informal Memorandum to the C/S, USSTAF:

1. The Commanding General regrets the necessity for curtailing the historical function during war, but I am confident that the pending great dispersal will be the occasion for lifting history from my knees in the Strategic Air Forces. Ergo, three requests:

a. That one highly qualified and trained enlisted man from the staff of the Historical Section be stationed at our Forward Headquarters, thereto carry on the function of capturing, preserving and processing all documents and other materials pertinent to the Official History (e.g. as required by Army Regulations) of the Strategic Air Forces. | agreed to by Curtis

b. That the historian be allowed to attain his proper level in order to prepare the new type of history demanded by young and vigorous air power. That function requires:

(1) His presence, as silent observer, at staff conferences and other meetings at which policies are discussed and decisions made. In no other way can he tap the life stream of current thinking which alone can give meaning to the ultimate desiccated documents.

(2) Further action to gain access to high-level documents which outline air policy.

(It may interest you to know that Major Lawrence stands in a corner with curtained eyes while a young civilian female of Air Ministry holds her hand over paragraphs, or paraphrases dangerous thoughts from the folders. Lawrence becomes a small boy before whom candy is dangled. This fanciful the inextinguishable laughter of the s...vants of the far-flung Empire. Even the gods are amirk.

Further mirks arise because the same documents, minus the British notations which make them priceless, have been available at SHAEF. The NAAF Historian merely claps his hands, and then the Combined Chiefs and the President move in on him from A to Z. Unfortunately, he has already gone to France; the documents are enroute.

A further example is Lt. Col. James Parton, who not only has all the documents of NAAF, and many from afar, but is now to have the assistance of Miss Mary Jaqua, who, for the whole period of the MTO, was personal secretary to the Commanding General. That makes an energetic team.

Only in USSTAF, and possibly in the Eighth, is history still in swaddleth.

(4) Personal [illegible] for the Secretary General with the political and air power in politics in the United States of the United [illegible] possibly the [illegible] possession to [illegible] of [illegible] in the use of air power, [illegible] and so on. [illegible] in [illegible] style.

[illegible]

a. Time is running out. Events move swiftly in this [illegible] days. There is a tide in the affairs of men, and the United States Air Forces is now at its flood, which [illegible] the last eight months. Unless we hold [illegible] the good ship of [illegible] in the [illegible].

b. To achieve a history in keeping with the power of the air, and dramatized by the [illegible] of [illegible], there is only one way: to take advantage of the [illegible] of a [illegible] division, to keep [illegible] a [illegible] party, and a separation in matters political. [illegible] to play inspired to the [illegible] of air power, with a [illegible] of [illegible] the [illegible] of historical scholarship, all [illegible] research, criticism, and action.

Meanwhile, General Arnold wants [illegible] for the [illegible] is [illegible] the matter is [illegible], assuming [illegible] and not just a backscoper. Backscoping [illegible] blood out of stones. Also, General Hill [illegible] personal [illegible], that he would like an historical [illegible] in [illegible] the Plans Conference on post-war problems. That is [illegible] [illegible] with the [illegible].

Also, meanwhile, over us all is the [illegible] voice of the [illegible], calling us the one drum with this [illegible]: A [illegible] is [illegible] in. [illegible] sing [illegible]. Old methods pass. Old [illegible] [illegible], or [illegible] into obsolescence. A new [illegible] begins, and new [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], to keep pace with such [illegible] as [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in the [illegible] of [illegible] and [illegible] history has [illegible] with the [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and departed, leaving behind only the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. For them will inevitably follow the [illegible] of [illegible]. The story of the [illegible] century [illegible] [illegible] problems [illegible] our own [illegible] may be delivered by [illegible] hands [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible].

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

Cocktails - Sewall Tropicana.

Dinner Dancing on the Terrace - Shanghai.

Program of Excursion in Shanghai.

[redacted]:

Quotation from Sir Walter Raleigh. "The 'Blade' of Incredibility' of the Air Service is Tradition. Another Air Service tradition is not recorded in any history. It exists in the hearts of all pilots to face the exclusivity from the last one to take - Intercede."

[redacted] To these the dropped out of formation in 1918.

[redacted]:

"During 1918 all pilots, including many old crocks, kept writing in saying they had served under General Quade at Issoudun and would like to do so again. Their reasons were various, - the one's particular one being valued by Harlan Cooper "Lady"

[redacted]: To all the Schools the height are short.

[redacted]:

"The tradition will be safe; the new ones carry on."

[redacted]: The Intrepids, Classes 1944 - 1945.

[redacted]:

"When we were preparing the Air Force for war we found it extremely useful to call in pilots from the last war who had extensive combat experience. The Intrepids spanned the Air Force."

[redacted]:

"A history must be recorded of the extraordinary services rendered by General Spaatz and General Hoyt in strengthening faith in Britain in the dark years of the war."

[redacted]:

"At last it has come! Ground troops are to be controlled from the Air in at least one command. It will be a real combat test!"

[redacted]:

"General Spaatz in 1940 made the prophecy that the R.A.F. would defeat the Luftwaffe and retain air superiority over Britain, and therefore Britain would not be invaded. That was an historic and correct analysis."

[redacted]:

"It is notorious that airmen cannot think and that is why they call in the ground soldiers."

[redacted]:

"Colonel Hughes and I work together because he cannot talk and I cannot hear! Tonight he talks with great humility but I still cannot hear what he says." (Reflective from Colonel Hughes).

[illegible]:

"[illegible] the Force hundred and [illegible] Fighter Squadron [illegible] and the Intrepid. Started a war in front of the ground troops, and [illegible] all that possible [illegible] weight."

[illegible]: (To Colonel Stevens to General Bonnell)
[illegible] advisor the other [illegible]

[illegible]:

"Children must be quiet in the presence of such heavy [illegible]."

[illegible]:

"I [illegible] a Retreat just to keep up with my daughter's [illegible]."

[illegible]:

"Continuing services by Army Intelligence officers made questions possible."

[illegible]:

"Reliable services, even in technical matters, of General Donovan in the early years of the war."

[illegible]: To General Sprate, Commissioner of the Interior.
The old Commander, the new Commander, - always the Commander.

Vote of thanks to the Hostess - Mrs. Legendre.

Only one toast was proposed over during dinner. After dinner the party adjourned to the Hospitality to see the films: "Men Work to the Tune".

[illegible]

[illegible] in any stage.

Hopper Bruce 11,806
X 8th Air Force

Headquarters
United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe
Office of the Historian
APO 633, U.S.Army.

Tel. Kingston 7733,
Ex. 374.

20 August 1944.

Brig.General William J.Donovan,
% American Embassy,
71 Grosvenor St, London.

Dear Bill:

Ted Curtis gave me the good news that you expected to be in London by August 20. I hasten to send you an invitation to attend our Retread Reunion, August 23, this coming Wednesday evening. I know Toohey Spaatz would be delighted. It will be a non-serious evening, to take note of the rediscovery of France. A social organization of old pilots might emerge.

Enclosed find some odds and ends pertaining to the Reunion. Also a rough draft of a memo to General Spaatz through Ted, suggesting more adequate(e.g. political) use of the Historian in this period.

We are in the slip stream of tremendous events. The mechanical revolution, symbolized by the flying bombs, will make many preconceived solutions obsolete. Never was there such compelling need for historic imagination.

Our little house(19 Trevor Place) was blasted during Effie's two weeks in Cornwall. Except for that time ,we have stayed right through the period, marveling at the spirit of the people. Our windows(and frames) have been almost all restored, so we are in an ample. I am thinkable to come to see you, can I come & go?

Sincerely always,

Bruce C. Hopper

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Office of the Historian
APO 633, U. S. Army

18 August, 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : General Curtis

FROM: General Spaatz

1. The problem of Air Power is shifting from the military gear per se to the politico-military gear.

2. The actual writing of the History of U.S. Air Policy in Europe can (e.g. must) wait until General Spaatz will be ready to use his historian for the designated purpose. The international politics of Air Power can not wait; 12 o'clock has struck.

3. This is to request that the historian be utilized as a political adviser to brief the General on political developments, and to record trends, decisions, etc, which affect the use of America's Air Power (e.g. for World Police). Qualifications: Twenty-five years' research and teaching in the field of international politics in Europe and Asia, from the point of view of America.

4. Air Power is the only loot of the war open to Britain and America. Air Power is the overwhelming Diktat of the future peace settlement. The United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe have an enormous stake in the current game of international politics for a) information on pending policies regarding use of Air Power; b) for its own history.

5. It is suggested that Ambassador Winant might find a way to bring the historian into the discussions of the E.A.C., as colleague to the Military Air Adviser, or in some other capacity.

BRUCE C. HOPPER
Historian

Addendum: Illustrative of the historian's queer position:

i) Our request for sanction to consult documents in Air Ministry (concerning U.S.A.F.) was refused in Washington.
ii) Captain Parish, historian for SHAEF, has access to all documents, including all the directives, minutes, and notations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Place Cards for Retired Reunion

[redacted]

Lieut. General Carl Spaatz ..... Preserver of Olympian Detachments

Ambassador J. H. Vincent ..... Mariner of Political Destinies

Lt. General Louis H. Brereton ..... Chaser of the Airborne Legions

Maj. General Ralph Royce ..... Hostage unto the Philistines

Retired Curtis ..... Grand Vizier of the Equipoise

Brig. General G. C. McDonald ..... Keeper of the Troubled Silence

Retired Strain ..... Shepherd of the Celestial Strafers

Retired Fowler ..... Keeper of the Disappearing Etiquette

Colonel R. D. Hughes ..... Target Discriminator Furious

Retired Stovall ..... Grand Primer of Self-Starting Ribaldry

Retired Douglass ..... Pipeline for Granular Dishes

Retired Callahan ..... Keeper of Careless Raptures

Retired Littauer ..... Refurbisher of Old Styles

Retread Willis ..... Newspaper in Memphis for Military

Retread Bagby ..... Guardian of the Winged Reptiles

Retread Hall ..... Retoucher of the Heavenly Portraits

Retread Heinrichs ..... Keeper of the Ever-ready Conscience

Retread Avery ..... Old Pilots' Gift to Hollywood

Retread Nalt ..... Grand Inquisitor of the Captives

Retread Codman ..... Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of King Cole

Retread Lassen ..... Keeper of Forgotten Quietudes

Retread Simpson ..... Procurator for Harrowed Air Waifs

Retread Dewitt ..... Brokeroid Intelligentsia

Retread Milton ..... Cupbearer to the King of Maine, Old Potatoes

Retread Armour ..... Keeper of the Happy Outlook

Retread Hopper ..... Keeper of Judgements in Suspension

Dear .....

The Razzia Retread (Les Étoiles Errantes d'Issoudun) is "laid on" for 7:30 p.m.,August 23,1944.

Place: Chateau Retread(Maison Lefgendre) at 27 Grosvenor Crescent Mews,Off Grosvenor Crescent,Hyde Park Corner.Tel. Sloane 7841

Sponsors: General Spaatz(Generalissimo of all the Retreads)

Ambassador Winant(Envoy Magnificus of Retreads)

Purpose: Pour arroser notre entrée victorieuse dans la belle France que nous aimions jadis,et que nous aimerons toujours.

Organiser une association pour perpétuer l'esprit des Retreads pour ceux de la derniere guerre comme pour ceux de la présente guerre.

Rafraichissements dignes seulement d'anciens pilotes seront servis.

If you are able to attend,please initial your name, and fill in the number of your squadron,1918, on the enclosed list, and return same to this office. Are there any other anciens pilotes (who flew combat in France) now available in this theatre ?

Sincerely,



Retread (1918) Reunion

CHATEAU RETREAD

Tuesday

23 August 1944

Zero Hour Without Doubt

1 TOAST TO THOSE IN ABSENTIA
2 MUSICAL FANTASIA: ISSOUDUN TO USSTAF
3 CINEMA VOICI PARIS!
4 EXTRAVAGANZA SEMANTICS FROM RETREADS' RETREAT IN SHANGRI-LA
5 A NOBLE THOUGHT ..... GENERALISSIMO SPAATZ
6 ANOTHER NOBLE THOUGHT ..... AMBASSADOR WINANT
7 NOBLE THOUGHTS CATCH AS CATCH CAN . TOASTS AD LIBITUM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

May 21, 1943

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

Dear General:

I cabled you today regarding Bruce and the matter will have been settled when packet arrives, but I thought the slight cause you.

Very sincerely yours,

David.

Lieut. Gen. William J. Donovan,

Hopper, Bruce 11,806

Office of Strategic Services,
x Eighth Air Force
London, May 20,1943.
x Carter, Gen

Colonel William J.Donovan,

Chief, Office of Strategic Services,

Washington,D.C.

My dear Colonel:

It is my hope that one day I shall have the satisfaction of reporting to you orally on my year in the Baltic as your Eminence Gris. There is so much to explain,so much to remember,so much to forget. My black note books are full.

I am happy to say that I regard the Minister as a warm friend, which,I believe, is a mutual feeling. Being armed only with moral authority ,I continued to wear a white toga. As I was somewhat known in Sweden,through writings, I immediately became conspicuous in spite of myself. The Nazis labelled me the "personal envoy of President Roosevelt." They circulated tales, on four occasions months apart, that I was showing maps to indicate the route the Russians would take in their advance to Narvik. They proclaimed that my mother was Russian; that I was the anonymous author of the anti-Nazi book on Finland," We Refuse To Be Choked;" that I was the "most dangerous man in Sweden" with my gospel of American optimism,etc.

At times,I seemed to be working " pour le roi de Prusse." But the rewards came in due course from the Swedes themselves. The Minister wrote to David that my work in psychological warfare was "an outstanding contribution to America's war effort." I gave fifteen public lectures, and about twentyfive talks to private groups. Enclosed please find some of the reporting done at Uppsala. I served as a sort of Attaché for Cultural Relations at the Universities, and in several towns ,notably Göteborg and Örebro. I have left traces in Sweden, as an exemplar of Americanism; and I have ,I feel, hundreds of genuine Swedish friends who agree with me that the only overwhelming propaganda is Truth.

One of my chief regrets will always, the number of people who placed faith in me as a means of transmitting their big news out to American authority, when the time comes. There must be a non-diplomatic channel in Sweden. It took me a year to create one, with end points in Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and Italy. Some of these will close. Others I have managed to keep open through Baltic connections.

I was willing and eager to carry on with it, enlarging the function of psychological warfare, and improving the cover of Cultural Relations. In March I came to London to report to David, and to establish some means of communication for dynamite news, if it should come. Of course, I had one line via the British; I was the way station for them for intelligence from Finland. Also, I had for months been working on a scheme to be realized through the Swedish Air Lines at the proper moment. One of my self-assigned chores in London in March was to assist Per Norlin, General Manager, and Larsson, Chief Engineer, of the Swedish Air Lines, obtain permission to go to America, where they still are.

The proposal from General Baker, to make me Official Historian of the Eighth Air Force, came to David while I was here. I prepared a memo for him, which I enclose. I then saw General Baker, and made a memo on the interview, also enclosed. David and I agreed that General Baker's offer was something which should be accepted, provided you were willing. You replied to David's cable; at least your courteous touch was in the cable, agreeing to the transfer.

Now, Colonel, I never abandoned a man, or a post, that I can remember. I could not accept the idea of leaving the club which I joined in January, 1942. David assured me that you would like the idea of having me in the Eighth Air Force, with or without a commission. In Sweden I let it be known that I was temporarily transferred to London, as I was loath to consider as abandoned a whole year's time investment, aside from the expenditure of my salary and the per diem allowance in the case

Since arrival I have spent the time surveying the records at Wide Wing, Pinetree, and Ajax, and getting acquainted with the large staff in each place. I am shortly to go to the combat units, to bunk several nights at a stretch with the fighting chaps, in order to get the flesh and blood feeling of the Air Force.

Today I had another interview with General Baker, which I have written out as a letter to Davis, copy enclosed.

That brings the story up to date. I can only add that while in the Baltic I did my "damndest" in accordance with my only general instructions, my last conversation with you before leaving Washington. The results are not all intangible; some give me, at least, great satisfaction. I hope to remain in the Club.

Sincerely always,

Bruce C. Hopper

Bruce C. Hopper.

Office of Strategic Services,

London, May 20, 1943.

Lt. Col. David Bruce,

Office of Strategic Services, London,

Dear David:

Herewith a report on my interview with General Eaker this morning. I found that the General had anticipated the fears which assailed me after I had surveyed the working conditions in the two main Commands, and after spending a day examining the records, methods, etc. of the R.A.F. historian, who has been continuously in office since the last war. I found, further, that General Eaker is around the corner ahead of me, and rather expected me to come back with exactly the story I presented this morning.

I offered a little preview as follows:

The history of the Eighth Air Force can be done on either of two levels, but not on both. Between the two there can be no compromise.

1) On the level of the Commanding General, with his confidence, with the dignity of scholarship, to make an impartial, enduring record. That requires access to secret documents, to all directives, so that the historian will be able to follow operations through with understanding from inception in the High Command to execution by the combat units.

2) On the level of Public Relations and journalism, to produce a non-confidential type of record, such as the R.A.F. permits casual writers to publish for current interest.

I emphasized my view that there could be no compromise between the two levels, because unless the historical files are confidential there can be, for the sake of security, no rightful access to secret directives, and the historian would not have the full confidence of the General.

If General Eaker had in mind the first type, history based on complete documentation, and presented through the funnel of tests by

scholarship, then I would require as assistants young men who have already been trained in research, and in the selection of what is significant from the avalanche of detail. (For instance, I find many of my former students in uniform here in London, and at Wide Wing, Ajax, and Pinetree) . That is, the assistants must be capable of confidential work at every level; and especially must they know history in order to appreciate the significance of Air Power with its impact on politics at the peace settlement.

There should be assigned to me a Number 1 assistant, with a secretary, at Wide Wing, to begin at once the organisational narrative of the Eighth Air Force from its inception to date, and to begin the centralisation of documents. There must be an assistant at Pinetree and one at Ajax, devoting full time to the task of creating a type of history adapted to the pattern of Air Power, and therefore transcendant over army mentality of the drill book, and somewhat removed from the idiosyncrasies of rank. I reported that I had been notified of the arrival of a historian for H.Q . E.T.O. ,who wanted to see me. I called on him yesterday, and came away with misgivings about jurisdiction, etc.

When I got to this point the General took over the conversation, and spoke as follows:

His view of the preparation of the history, he said, was in accord with mine. He wanted history on the high level, not on the level of public relations. He would show the complete files of directives, and everything else which the historian needed or wanted. He wanted a scholarly work, and he didn't mind if the historian produced nothing for three months. Considering the importance of the Air records for the future ,he did not want the historian of the Eighth Air Force to be subject to the "call" of others, which might be the case even as a full Colonel.

He then asked what I thought would be the response of yourself and of Colonel Donovan to a suggestion that I continue as of O.S.S., but at O.S.S. assign the assistants I need. I replied that I was sure that both the Colonel and you give such a proposal very serious

consideration, as the O.S.S. has a splendid organization in its Research and Analysis which is very much interested in Air Power, the future, and the peace settlement. He then said he would write to Colonel Donovan, and would see you. (I believe he is to be away until Monday).

The General was very interested in what I had to tell him about R.A.F. methods, and advised me to keep on with Mr. Nerney, the official historian, who is to conduct me personally to Wales to examine the complete files and records. He said he had always been curious as to how the R.A.F. was preparing records for the future, and knew they must have something special. I explained that R.A.F. history was long ago taken out of military hands. The chief historian, Mr. Nerney, has as first line assistants a number of historical narrators, all of them distinguished scholars, some triple firsts at Oxford or Cambridge. I met one, named Richards, who has spent twelve months on his history of the Battle of France, a document of 300 pages, and more than one hundred thousand words. This document is turned over to the historian to serve as raw materials for The history. When these historical narrators are sent to the field away from England (Richards is leaving shortly for Africa) they are put into uniform for the sake of convenience in transport amongst the lower echelons. But the historical narrators are civilians, appointed by the Cabinet. The whole Historical Section of the Air Ministry heads up under the Historical Committee of the War Cabinet, on which the three services are represented. Mr. Nerney explained that the only way to keep history pure as history is to keep it apart from both the press and military rank, and to vet only such press releases as pertain to history.

General Baker has thus made up his mind . I rather believe he had already made up his mind when he suggested six weeks with me on loan from the O.S.S. to determine whether a civilian status or a military commission would be better for the historian. What delights me most is that the General gives orders that homage shall be rendered to the grey-eyed Muse of History; let those who will burn their incense

before the perfumed jade ,Publicity,with poisonous honeysuckles in her hair.

The General bade me to call on him frequently, and to come any time I liked (which is merely a matter of checking in his schedule with his aide, Captain James Parton, a former student of mine)

There is one chap I would like to get,Steve Stackpoole, one of my students, later confidential secretary to President Conant for a number of years, and now a lieutenant in the Air Force,in North Ireland, without much to do. He would be excellent as part of the military personnel, especially to centralize the documents.

General Hunter,Fighter Command, whom I knew slightly at Issoudun under General(then Major) Spaatz's command, expressed a view to me last Saturday:"In the past nations have made air power support land and sea power. The Germans started a new role for Air Power, and then abandoned it. The nation that first makes land and sea power support Air Power because of its cheapness in an age of advancing science, its speed, and its dictate in politics, that nation will lead the way into the new era."

I agree with this completely. And I hope so much you and the Colonel will see the way clear to extend the Research and Analysis of O.S.S. into the Eighth Air Force . At least I am now sure that General Eaker's program for the historian can not be fulfilled by any one,even a Brigadier General, who is subject to Army calls as distinct from Air Force. His program is: 1. History;

A. Factual,in accordance with A.N.
B. Factual and Interpretative for general readers.

2. Train officer personnel to represent the interests of Air Power in post-war affairs.

3. Promotion of Anglo-American collaboration in its most delicate sector, the Air during the war, and civil transport in post-war.

Sincerely,

Bruce G.Hopper.

Copy to Colonel William J.Donovan.

Hopper, Bruce 11,282

19 Trevor Place,
London S.W. 7.
Thursday morn,
7 Sept.1944.

General Donovan,

Dear Bill:

I am delayed in departure for Headquarters this morning by the failur of my batteries; hence time for a note as you are expected back. Knowing your interest in everything I enclose a carbon of my entry in my Private Journal as of last night, along with an excerpt of the last article I did for Hamie Armstrong before joining you. Have you read that Hamie is coming over to assist Gil Winant, with the rank of Minister ?

A wise old man(Senator Joseph Dixon of Montana) once said to me: Queer thing is one goes on preparing for something called life only to awaken one day to discover that the lif for which he had been preparing had passed him by. So it might be with so much of our post-war plans. The faits accomplis multiply. From this Cave of Adullam, where I accept history from warriors hampered by fugitive secrets, and in other words crack peanuts with a sledge hammer,-from here it begins to resemble Alaies in Blunderland, especially in Eastern Europe.

Off to labor in the vinyard now,

Bruce C. Hopper

Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1941
article by B.C.H.
"The War in Eastern Europe"

It is interesting to recall that President Wilson in 1918 proclaimed that the treatment accorded to the Russian people would be the acid test for the victors. That test was met by putting Russia behind a cordon sanitaire. The acid test may again be the treatment accorded the Russian people who have suffered longer, and more intensely, than any other great nation except the Chinese. By their Homeric labors to "build Socialism", and by their equally Homeric resistance to the Nazi invaders, the Russian people would seem to have earned the right to enjoy President Roosevelt's four freedoms. A purely Russian national state, based on modified Bolshevism but moving in the direction of true economic democracy, as devised in principle by the Bolsheviks in 1936, would seem, in the eyes of the writer, one with which Britain and America could fully cooperate. Should that come to pass, then the British-Bolshevik alliance, supported through to victory by America, may prove to be not just a war marriage for the purpose of defeating the Nazis, but the initial step in a process to bring Russia back into the community of Christian nations. In formulating our policy we should not take any action that might block or impede the attainment of this satisfactory result.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Many of the questions here raised cannot be answered before the military outcome of the Nazi-Bolshevik war is known. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that the United States ought to formulate in its own mind the policies which it should follow in each of the various contingencies which may arise. Day-to-day decisions should conform to a pattern and they should add up, at the end, to make a coherent whole.

Even at this early date, and even in such a bewildering complex situation, one still is able to make a few general statements. One of them is that the nightmare of a Nazi-Bolshevik coalition is over. Another is that Russian Bolshevism may be regarded as offensively dangerous to the world as a whole only when, in alliance with German Nazism, it unites the two wings of world revolution. A third generalization is that when German and Russia do not adjoin each other they are likely to be friendly to each other and remain at peace; and that when they are contiguous they gravitate into war. And fourth is the possibility that out of the crucible of war may emerge a Russian national state which, even though retaining Bolshevik leadership, will abandon world revolution.

Hopper, Bruce 11,282

Private Journal. 6 Sept.1944.

Tripartite Politics.

1. Why the Soviet declaration of war on Bulgaria ?

Probably to clear the base for freedom of action in Yugoslavia, where civil war threatens upon the withdrawal of the Germans. Contrary to assumptions here, Mikhailovich seems to have a much stronger following than Tito the Croat. It is unlikely that Serbs, in the mass, would accept the leadership of a Croat. Should Mikhailovich prove the stronger it would not be difficult for Stalin to shift his support (despite the granting of the Order of Suvorov, 1st Class, to Tito). In which case, Britain may have backed the wrong horse.

2. Why did Stalin refuse to succor the Polish insurgents in Warsaw, only a few versts away, and at the same time refuse to sanction delivery of supplies by British and American airplanes ?

Difficult to say. What Stalin gains is that the Germans continue to kill off the Polish underground movement which is loyal to the Polish Government in London and not to the Lublin Committee. Over the years of war Soviet raiding parties have burnt buildings and pillaged German war supplies in Poland. In each instance the Gestapo would crash down on the local village, killing indiscriminately. In that way many of the underground Poles were killed, although the Germans were not necessarily aware of it.

Stalin is settling affairs with his own unilateral peace conference, which is the Red Army. Rumania is settled on terms not ungenerous. Finland will probably get off at small cost in territory. Bulgaria simply must obey. That leaves Poland as unfinished business, and the most difficult because of the sympathy of Britain, supported by the United States. Stalin is now in a terrific hurry. If General Patton's tanks roll to Germany's eastern frontier the Poles are less likely to accept a compromise with Moscow.

During one of his two conferences recently with Mikolajczyk Stalin swept his hand over the map, and said "This you should have." His hand had touched Stettin and Breslau. Mikolajczyk pointed out that the areas covered contained many millions of Germans. Stalin replied: "Leave them to me." Since then the Poles have been puzzled as to whether Stalin meant he would transport Germans to Siberia or act as protector to the new Polish state boundaries.

3. The tripartite set-up ?

The Russians know we fear any manifestation of collusion between Britain and America, and consequently hold a strong hand. How to coordinate British and American policies without arousing Russian suspicions will tax our ingenuity.

Should we lose the game with Russia, and should the Nazis force Germany into the Nibelung, then the Anglo-Saxon pressure on Sweden for relatively small economic reasons will seem like folly against the backdrop of huge political stakes, including a build-up for war again in twenty years.

Private Journal. 6 Sept.1944.

4. General. and Misc.

Britain and America seem unable to make up their minds whether to be superior or inferior vis à vis Russia, whereas all that may be required is demonstrated equality.

The Russians are the emergent people in this period of history. The Battle of Stalingrad decided that the Soviet system, and not the Nazi, would carry over into the new era.

Any cooling of the collaboration between the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians revives fear of the nauchmar of the 1930's,- a revolutionary bloc from the North Sea to the Pacific- but instead of a German-Russian alliance it would be a Russian-German combine. The precaution would be to keep the Russians in our camp, even at great cost, and not risk the disasterous mistake of 1919(e.g. barring the Russians from the Paris Peace Conference, behind the "cordon sanitaire").

In the sparring for position the Russians have evidently refused to enter the Allied shipping pool, on the grounds, that the ships would be used against Japan! Question: Our use of Russia's Far Eastern air bases? Our own air bases in Ukraina?

Madame Kollantay, who is very favorably disposed toward Captain Carl Florman, seems to be receptive to the reopening of Sweden's Aerotransport line to Moscow, over Riga and Veliki Luki.

In this hard game of global political strategy only the Russians seem to know what they want, and how to get it.

It is our task, every day, to sift what is permanent in value from items of fugitive significance. For this we need every ounce of political experience we can muster. Our danger is to possess vast power without the wisdom to utilize that power for our purpose of peace, or prevention of another world war/. What we win by the technical superiority of our armed forces, and by the élan of our troops, airmen and sailors, we tend to lose politically. We are more gifted in short range planning than in long.

Long range planning would include imagination regarding possible coalitions amongst the vanguished who inevitably tend to flow together like drops of mercury. E.G. Are the French, when the elation of liberation lies down, likely to consider themselves vanguished because what they receive will not come up to their expectations?

Is the native Russian brat'stvo likely to supercede social revolution as a result of Russia's victory in the field ?

What are the events, decisions, and actions today which dictate the pattern of the map and institutions for decades to come ? The atmosphere is electric with portentous events. The warriors have no time for it; they are unaware of the political mistakes.

Russians, for all their reputation, are not nearly so baffling as our own people who feel free to pronounce dictums about Russia without knowing the far horizon of the steppe nor the smell of an izba.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

April 1, 1943

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

To: Brig.-Gen. William J. Donovan
From: Lieut.-Col. David Bruce, Dicd

Herwith I am sending you a copy of the reports of Bruce Hopper.

Another copy has gone directly to the SI Branch, and we have retained one in our files.

[illegible]

COPY

I

NOTES ON DOCUMENTS FROM STOCKHOLM

The following enclosures include materials prepared by or for me over a period of several months, in Stockholm. There are added (Part VII) certain letters relative to Estonia, which are included because of their political significance and the influence of the writers. The names of some of the authors of enclosures are witheld for security reasons. Likewise the names of certain persons quoted are witheld under pledge of confidence. I suggest special study of:

II Germany, Enclosure No. 7, the Tarnow papers.
III Norway, Enclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3.
IV Finland, Enclosures Nos. 1,2,3, (in collaboration with my assistant, Herbert Beck)
VI Views on Pease, Enclosure No. 2 (scholarly work by Dr Hans Schaeffer)
VII Estonia, Enclosure No. 9 by Dr Rei (unpublished)

Submitted in three copies, origional to remain in London oOffice; two copies to be sent to Washington by separate shipments.

B.E.H.

Contact, Jr. Colonel Donovan, from Bruno Hippler
Source: Liberal German who was very influential in Nazi Peace Settlement
Also might interest President Roosevelt, yes? B.C.H.

LIST OF PROBLEMS CONFRONTING A FUTURE PEACE SETTLEMENT.

Rec'd. 1/22/43

I. Territorial Questions:

a) Reestablishment of States liquidated by force (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Danzig, Memel, Austria)

b) Frontier revisions.

c) Formation of larger territorial blocks of States.

d) Treatment of minorities.

II. Possessions Outside Europe, and Raw Material Questions.

III. Restitution or Compensation for Confiscated property and Exceeded Occupation Charges.

IV. Joint Reconstruction of Devastated Territories.

V. Economic Questions:

a) Trade Exchange.

b) Exchange Stabilization.

VI. International Social Policy (Standard of Living).

VII. Security Problem (different alternatives):

a) Temporary Occupation of certain countries.

b) Unilateral armaments and disarmaments.

c) Industrial limitations.

d) Control of raw materials.

VIII. International Organization (different alternatives):

a) Reestablishment of the League of Nations.

b) Formation of a world federation.

c) Joint executive power.

d) Security guarantee by certain Great Powers.

No reference to contents which follow.

Hopper, Bruce 10,101
Peace Settlement

SOME VIEWS ON THE COMING PEACE. 2nd 1/22/43

In attempting to draw a picture of how the coming peace ought to be shaped in order to last over the longest possible period, one must first consider certain hypotheses regarding the general conditions under which the respective parties will meet one another for negotiations. It is obvious that the peace terms will come to be dependent on whether the one of the two belligerent groups has won a decisive victory or both parties are so exhausted that they are no longer capable of continuing the military operations or have wasted their economic resources to an extent to compell them to enter into negotiations in an attempt to bring about a so-called compromise peace. Especially in the neutral countries, a compromise peace is often held to be the ideal method of settling a war. This is not always true, however. A compromise peace which is concluded because of exhaustion and with an opponent whose intention to observe the peace terms cannot be trusted often means nothing but an armistice which the one and later also the other party will employ for rearmaments intended for a new war. (Amiens, 1802). Only a compromise peace involving a method for future collaboration accepted by both parties may prove to be a lasting one, and such a peace is usually possible only if both parties have confidance in one another, that is to say, when the peace-disturbing element has been removed. This is why the allied Powers in 1813 and 1814 were right in declining all of the so-called peace offers made by Napoleon after their victory at Leipzig and after their march into France, but they could come to an agreement with Napoleon's successor Louis XVIII, without any terms humiliating to France, concerning the restoration

of

of Europe, a restoration which without essential changes remained in effect for more than fifty years, or longer than any earlier or later peace settlement has lasted on the European Continent.

In order to establish some fundamentals for a future peace settlement one will consequently have to attempt picturing the actual situation that would prevail, and one must also try to conceive the type of governments likely to negotiate with one another. However, since a lecture cannot deal with every eventual possibility it is necessary to limit this discussion to such possibilities which somehow appear most likely.

I have therefore taken as a basis for my study the presumption that at a given moment the Allies will have attained such a great superiority in military, political as well as economic respects that the Axis Powers are made to realize that they cannot carry on the war with any prospect of success, and that at that moment there is in Germany a group sufficiently strong to take over the powers from the present government and to introduce peace negotiations before a further deterioration in the military situation would make the defeated party still more depe dent on the terms of the victorious party.

Perhaps one also ought to study the reversed case, namely the possibility of the Axis Powers winning the war and determining the future fate of the world, among other things in order to shed light on the difference between the two views. There is sufficient material for such a study in the speeches made by the German leaders and in the articles written on the subject. As a matter of fact, a lecture on the so-called new order would be necessary as a supplement to my present analysis.

There are two other circumstances, seemingly of a more technical nature but yet by no means without importance for the peace treaty, which I must consider as prerequisites. The one is the question when, i.e., how long a time ought to lapse after the suspension of hostilities before the commencement of peace negotiations, and the other is where, i.e., in which country and in which city the peace negotiations ought to be conducted.

To deal first with the simpler of those two problems, namely the question of locality, everybody having had an opportunity to be present at such international conferences knows what a great influence on negotiations in progress is exerted by the general local atmosphere, and what a difference it makes, for example, if the conference has to perform its work in one of the belligerent countries, particularly in one which has been devastated and occupied for a long time by the ultimately defeated party, or if the negotiations may be carried on in a neutral country where both parties from the outset may negotiate on a much more equal footing.

I only wish to recall that when President Wilson and Lloyd George were not inclined to approve the very far-reaching proposals made by Clemenceau, the latter always arranged an information tour to the parts of the country destroyed during the war, and the immediate impression thus gained always had such a strong effect on the participants that Clemenceau's terms were accepted. When, later, after the Dawes and Young plan, the international committees had to interpret the meaning of some clause in the Peace Treaty, the question was always whether the interpretation was to be "dans l'esprit de Versailles ou dans l'esprit de Londres ou dans l'esprit de la Haye".

After the present war there will, unfortunately, not be many neutral States left, and those which do exist are hardly sufficiently strong and influencial, nor so much liked by both parties, as to make it likely that the peace conference will be held in one of their Capitals. I can neither conceive Stockholm or Geneva as the conference city. Nor would it be so fortunate for Sweden or Switzerland to be the seat of such negotiations. It may be of great importance, however, also in which of the belligerent capitals the peace-concluding parties are to meet. A peace conference in Washington would have greater prospects of arriving at a well-considered and hence lasting result than a conference to be held in Warsaw, Moscow, or Brussels.

As regards the question concerning the proper time for concluding peace, one must not overlook the fact that there are important reasons for creating as soon as possible after the last shot has been fired the new solid foundation on which peaceful trade and a revival of the multilateral international relations may develop, as well as for postponing the establishment of the rules which are to stabilize the world for a long time to come until the agitation caused by the war has had time to calm down to a certain extent and the misunderstandings on either side have been alleviated by the resumption of personal contact between the representatives of both parties.

In Paris and Versailles, as well as in the other suburbs where the different peace agreements were signed (Trianon, Neuilly, St. Germain-en-Laye) and where the French set the fashion and had the strongest position, the first alternative was chosen, i.e., attempts were made as soon as possible to regulate the new world order as much in detail as possible, and the one-sidedness of one's own views

was

was further stressed by the exclusion of the other party from any influence on the terms of the peace treaty. When, at last, the defeated nations were invited to Versailles and the other Parisian suburbs, their representatives were kept locked up in their hotels and any form of unofficial conversations with the representatives of the victorious Powers was forestalled. In this way, however, one failed to solve all the problems which were later to present themselves. It then became necessary to appoint committees which later on had to negotiate with the defeated nations. It was then proved that reasonable proposals could hardly be based on the fundamental theses set down in the actual peace treaties, for these had been established in a post-war atmosphere still prevailing at that time and without collaboration with the defeated parties. (Dawes-Young.)

A different method was employed at the time of the Vienna Congress where the negotiations were allowed to drag on and the defeated party was permitted to participate as an equal in both the political and social program of the congress. This method proved to be more effective. Perhaps the Vienna Peace would have been of shorter duration if the congress had danced and tattled less. By this more human style of negotiating it became possible also for the defeated party, represented, moreover, by a man of Tayllerand's size, to express their views and to participate in the creation of a more evenly balanced peace document.

Other social classes than those represented at Vienna having since come into power, it is of course not possible to conceive any revival of the Vienna atmosphere of 1814 with its political drawing-rooms and ball rooms. There are also other fields, however,

where

where victorious and defeated parties may meet to learn anew to appreciate one another. The alleviating function exercised by the society life in Vienna might possibly be assumed this time by a joint interest in humanitarian relief and reconstruction work. It is to be hoped that this will be the case and that thereby, and with the effective participation of the neutral States concerned, an atmosphere may be created in which after a certain transition period reasonable and lasting peace terms could be fixed. Such a more practical empiric method would also correspond better to Anglo-American thinking, which this time is likely to dominate the peace conference, than the logical-juridical method of Versailles, etc., which was the result of the then existing French supremacy. Such a transition period will also be necessary in order that new Governments, sufficiently consolidated for constituting a proper negotiating party, may be formed in the defeated countries.

As a fourth presumption and prerequisite I therefore like to assume that it will take one or perhaps even two years before the definitive peace terms may be agreed upon between the two parties, but that in the meantime incessant collaboration in humanitarian and economic matters will be going on between them and the neutral States.

If in this way one arrives at a separation of the problems which will have to be regulated between the two parties, i.e., the transition regulations and definitive peace terms, already the handling of transition problems must have as its primary purpose to assist the new Governments in the defeated countries in gaining such a strong and secure position among their own peoples that their undertakings

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in the definitive peace treaty guarantee its fulfilment and durability. Insofar as these Governments gain a foot-hold in their own countries and succeed in relieving them of their present status of oppression, terror, and lack of justice and in introducing systems permitting the will of the people to find a freer and clearer expression, the scope of the definitive peace terms will come to depend thereon. These terms may come to be very different depending on whether the defeated nations are making use of their regained freedom for condemning the conception of their former leaders of violence and justice, or whether they continue, this time without being forced thereto, to cherish the same views and to pursue the same methods as these. In the latter instance there will be many more mechanical measures required in the peace treaty for account of the victorious Powers in order to render preparations for a new war impossible than would be the case in the former instance. Or, in other words: during this transition period the defeated nations will have it in their own hands to reply to the question - about which even today there is a great difference of opinion in the Allied countries, as may be represented by Vansittart on the one side and the Atlantic Charter on the other - whether the Nazi and Fascist governed peoples should be identified with their present leaders and thus held responsible for their deeds, or whether the world, after the removal of these leaders, may count upon these peoples' voluntary and loyal collaboration.

What is happening during the transition period will therefore be almost as important to the terms of the definitive peace treaty as the military outcome of the war.

In the following, mainly the German situation will be dealt with. The Italian is somewhat simpler, despite the fact that dictatorship has reigned in Italy for almost double the time, for the Catholic Church and the circles connected with it as well as certain bourgeois liberal university circles constitute a kernel around which a new Government may crystalize; also the dynastry has in the Crown Prince, who for a long time has been an opponent to Mussolini, a person who may retain continuity and at the same time guide the people in a new direction.

Everything is much more difficult in Germany as the Nazis have been much more thorough in eradicating all of the former leading authorities and have retained in important positions only persons who, at least outwardly, have submitted to their ideology. The new Government, therefore, must not only tear down - or at least rebuild - everything the Nazis have in the past ten years introduced in German administration, German economy, and German education; it must not only find new men for the public posts now held by the National Socialist Party all the way from the top of the State down to the most humble public offices, but the new Government will also have to create for itself a circle of new collaborators who have not been infected by the Nazi spirit and on whom the Government may rely when it comes to carrying out its tasks so superhumanly difficult in themselves. The nature of these tasks will be dealt with later on. For the present only the following are mentioned: Demobilization of the army, maintenance of calm and order, conversion of economic life from war to peace production, safeguarding food supplies for the people, liquidation of the Gestapo and other party organizations. This list

alone

alone, which is byno means complete, indicates the enormous work awaiting the new Government. According to earlier German experiences and in view of the growth of brutality during the Nazi regime and the war, the new Government in Germany will be in constant danger of attack and even of being murdered by fanatical opponents and perhaps also by disappointed followers. Much readiness to make sacrifices will be required, as well as much wisdom and energy for assuming such a post. The circle available for the formation of a new Government is today much smaller than it was after the collapse in 1918. At that time there existed an organized Social Democratic Party with highly responsible leaders and very moderately governed labor unions, then there were Liberal and clerical circles having evidenced firm and consistent opposition against certain mistakes made by the Imperial Government, and at that time there was also within the free professions a great reserve of educated people on whom the new Government could support itself and by whom at least the key positions in the more important branches of the administration could be filled. Moreover, the old public servants were to a great extent rather unpolitical or at least no actual partisans, and they were fully prepared to follow a new leadership on the condition that the Government protected the country's interests and acknowledged their own privileges.

This time the situation is entirely different. There exists no organized opposition; of the many people who would surely quite soon place themselves at the new Government's disposal there could be no telling who would do so out of conviction, who would be opportunists, and who might be the agents of secret organizations inimical to the Government. Among the several hundred thousands

thousands of men and women who for almost ten years have been schooled by the Gestapo surely a great number will continue their tricks also against the new national Government. Emigrants could only in small numbers be employed in government work, at least during the first period, since the people will probably rely only on the true understanding of such public servants who have gone through the same sufferings and shared the same fate as they.

In spite of all these difficulties I am convinced that there will be men prepared to assume the responsibility and that it will also be possible for them presently to choose their collaborators suitable for the tasks mentioned. They will be able to carry out their tasks, however, only if they have at their disposal the means requisite for ensuring for the entire population food, work, and civic security during the transition period. This they would only be able to achieve if they may trust the victorious Powers to to everything possible for supporting and raising their reputation among the people.

It will thus be seen that a new German Government - in order to achieve its purpose and, on the whole, to assume the responsibility - must place certain demands on the victorious Powers which the latter would have to comply with just as much in their own as in the interest of the German people, simply because complying therewith is the condition for maintaining calm and order in Germany and for bringing about a Government with which the victorious Powers could negotiate. The other alternative for the victors, i.e., occupation of the entire Germany, would probably mean a prolongation of the war for several months and would be possible for rather a limited

limited period only. The latter alternative could doubtless be neglected as being impracticable.

These prerequisites for the new German Government work, to the realization of which the victory Powers must lend their assistance, are partly in the economic, partly in the political, and partly in ethical-psychological fields. The fact that I am dealing first with the economic prerequisites does not mean that I consider these to be more important than the others but that they are comparatively more obvious; moreover, they have already been considered and prepared by the inter-Allied States.

One of the first conditions for a lasting peace is the lifting of the blockade as soon as an armistice which definitely excludes any resumption of hostilities has come into effect, and as soon as a new German Government sufficiently strong for negotiating on behalf of the German people has been established, in order that the means may be created for the purchase of the most essential commodities.

It would not be enough, however, merely to remove the blockade barrier for procuring bread and work for the German people. Practically all large stocks of food and raw materials would surely at the end of the war be in the hands of the Allies. Moreover, the German Government would probably at that time possess neither international means of payment nor suitable export commodities, just as it would not enjoy the necessary international credit. It would thus be dependent on having its requirements delivered by the Allies.

For the present it is absolutely impossible to predict just what quantities and commodities would be required. Everything will depend on to what extent German industry may still be intact at that time,

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on the supplies of raw materials then to be found within the country, and finally on how long a transition period would be required for German economy again to be in a position to have its needs covered through the previously normal channels.

The question as to how these deliveries ought to be paid for during the transition period is of special importance in view of its psychological consequences. It is generally recognized these days that it is meaningless to accumulate great international obligations the repayment of which cannot be expected. The best method from a psychological viewpoint, which would likewise contribute most effectively to a consolidation of the political position of the new Government, would be to deliver these goods free of charge, for humanitarian reasons, and to treat Germany, both with regard to quantities and payments, in the same way as the destitute Allied countries so that requirements alone and not past behaviour be made the decisive factor. Should this not be possible owing to the feelings prevailing in the victorious and especially in the previously occupied countries, it might be conceivable that arms and war materials, which Germany would in any event have to hand over to the victory Powers, be accepted as payment for the deliveries of food and raw materials. It might also be advisable to proceed along the "lease and lend" line, especially if there be reserved for Germany's own current needs the corresponding value of normal exports during the years to follow and if, in payment for these transitional deliveries, there be earmarked either such additional exports which Germany may be able to accomplish within the framework of an international reconstruction program or her exports during a more distant future period.

Even if the German Government was to be given all these deliveries free of charge and thus placed in a position to prove before its people that the victors had no intention to impoverish them, there would remain for the Government yet another very difficult economic problem on whose successful solution its popularity and tenure would be highly dependent, namely the problem of the monetary value.

This problem is exceedingly difficult to solve, since the method employed at present of moulding the monetary value in conformity with commodity prices by fixing maximum prices would have to be abandoned in part during a period when the old authority breaks down and is replaced by new authorities who will not be prepared to apply the death sentence on any violation of existing maximum prices. Nothing would be more trying on the nerves of a nation having the experiences of the German people than the fears for a new inflation, and nothing would be more apt to cause such fears than demobilization measures. It must be realized that for a considerable period, which may last for many years, most war expenditures will continue to assert themselves and new expenditures will develop, while at the same time company earnings, on the taxation of which depend a large portion of the state revenue, will decline or disappear altogether. In this instance it will be impossible to avoid budget deficits. Similar circumstances will, of course, develop in other belligerent countries as well as in most neutral countries, but the problem will be particularly difficult to solve in Germany where already before the war the currency was kept at an absolutely artificially high rate and where the banks, the savings banks, the insurance companies, and other enterprises were compelled to invest practically all their liquid funds

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in State loans and Treasury notes. The printing of paper-currency will for some time remain Germany's sole source of financing.

Moreover, with the suspension of hostilities all the notes issued during the war and having been in circulation within the Army and in the occupied territories will begin to flow back to Germany proper to exercise the inflationary influence which they could not do so long as they were spread over a so much greater area.

It is difficult to imagine how the victory countries would be able to assist the future German Government in maintaining the monetary value until a definitive monetary reform could be brought about. It could hardly be expected that they would be prepared at that stage to place at Germany's disposal a sufficiently large amount of gold for the establishment of a new currency that could count on the confidence of the people. The least which could be done to aid the German Government, however, would be to collect the Reich Mark notes in circulation outside Germany to prevent them from being repatriated in order that at least this special pressure on the monetary value be removed until a more quiet period. (Banks of issue and Reichskredit-Kassenscheine.)

In the internal political field the new Government would be facing five major tasks:

1) demobilization of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and repatriation of prisoners of war and foreign workers;

2) dissolution of the Gestapo, SS, SA, and other party organizations based on violence;

3) reestablishment of law and justice;

4) the purge within administration and jurisdiction already mentioned;

5) reestablishment of ethical principles of the education of the youth.

Reestablishment of a Democratic form of Government.

Also with respect to internal politics the situation after this war will be entirely different from what it was in 1918 and 1919. After the first World War it was possible already within a little more than two months after the actual revolution to elect a new populer representation and to invest power in a Government which had the support of its majority, as well as within another three months to draft and adopt a new constitution. This time there will be a nation which for more than ten years has not had the least facility to form its own political opinion or to express its own views, a nation whose political suffrage has been nothing but a farce since only one party has been recognized and any votes cast for other persons have been declared null and void, a nation which has not owned a free press or a free radio, a nation which has not had any free right of organization but where every individual according to his trade and his position in industry has been compelled to belong to the organization established by the Party without having had the slightest influence on the composition of the board of the organization or on its work.

The reestablishment of all these rights and liberties of the individual must be the aim, but before these may again be invested in the broad masses an education work, or rather information work, will have to be done to remove the traces of the violence regime of the past ten years.

For this reason the new Government for a certain length of time ought to govern the country without parliament and on the basis of extensive personal powers. The Government may, perhaps, appoint

appoint a committee of persons of generally recognized reputation and transfer on this committee the right of determination, from which date the ordinary democratic forms of government may be reinstated.

Compulsory organizations like "Arbeitsfront" and "Kraft durch Freude" also ought to be allowed to exist for a certain time but under new leaders and given new tasks. If, for example, free rights of organization were to be restored immediately, circles inimical to the Government might avail themselves of such rights for fighting the Government and for sabotaging Government measures, just as happened before the National Socialists came into power.

The most difficult task will doubtless be the dissolution of organizations like the Gestapo and SS which for ten years have been practically independent of any existing law and have been at liberty to do whatever they liked or their superiors demanded. The Government could not bring them to justice and sentence them to death or to long terms of imprisonment even if their crimes should justify such decisions. For this is a question of hundreds of thousands of people, and according to experiences of the past one can never punish a greater number than perhaps 5,000 to 7,000 people for deeds committed jointly. With regard to the rest attempts ought to be made to devise methods for restoring them to civic occupations and living conditions. The most asocial elements could possibly be migrated to uncultivated countries where their energy could be employed for colonization work. Such a measure would require a suitable land area which the Victory Powers would be wise in making available for the purpose.

Before all this could be done, however, it would be necessary to deprive these war-experienced youngsters of their weapons. This will by no means be an easy task. Only a regular military power would be sufficiently strong to quench possible resistance. This means that also the new Government would have to obtain the support of at least a certain part of the Army and that it would have to select out of the Army suitable groups for the building up of an absolutely reliable police force of its own.

For this purpose the armistice terms must be made compatible with the honor of the Army. If this is not done there will be the risk of the Army assuming a hostile attitude toward the Government and siding with the national-radical elements in order to overthrow the Government or render it powerless. In such an event the victory Powers would be compelled to occupy the country and practically resume the war. The present situation in France and also the Ruhr occupation of 1923 are illustrations of such a development.

Already when drafting the terms of the armistice the victory Powers therefore ought to consider these two views and thus grant the new Government the right to build up out of the Army a reliable police force sufficiently strong and sufficiently equipped to keep all subversive elements in check, as well as to treat the Army and the national honor on the whole in such a forbearing way that there will be a sufficient number in the Army willing to place themselves at the Government's disposal.

On the whole, the victory Powers ought to do everything possible to strengthen the new Government's authority in order that it may create respect among its own people. Only if it be treated by the

victory

victory Powers as an absolute equal and if it be allowed to participate as an equal in the great international reorganization tasks may the new German Government acquire for itself the confidence of the people themselves which it requires for its difficult undertakings. The victory Powers in their own interest ought to provide the new Government with an opportunity to prove certain obvious successes in foreign policy so that it becomes clear to the people that the road to peaceful cooperation on which the Government has departed will carry farther than the method of violence previously pursued.

The same principles ought to be realized also outside the administrative field. German scientists, German artists, and German sportsmen immediately upon the suspension of hostilities ought to be invited to participate in the international cooperation as equals. Young Germans should be given an opportunity to meet the youth of other countries. They should be allowed to see and hear for themselves that the intentions of the others do not aim at annihilating or oppressing them but that they are welcome to peaceful competition and understanding. The whole of the artificial atmosphere of ignorance of the true intentions of the outer world and all of the resultant distrust and convulsiveness in the attitude of the German people must be dispersed by new contact man to man. To all sorts of people, and especially to all young people, there must be opened up from out of the cul-de-sac of Nazism a road leading out in the open and out to a better future.

The foregoing are merely a few examples of the spirit which must govern the victory Powers in their negotiations with the new German

German Government and their treatment of the German people. The armistice and the transition period will constitute a great experiment designed to provide the reply to the question whether it will be possible to obtain for the victory Powers complete security against a resumption of hostilities without creating an inferiority complex among the German people. Only if this experiment proves successful and confident cooperation can be realized between the two parties during the transition period, may a later definitive peace treaty be constructive and lasting.

Such a policy would require of the victory Powers not only wisdom and understanding for the other party's vital necessities but also a great deal of political tact. Even in situations where their own national spirit may be involved, which will doubtless occur, for example in connection with possible attempts against occupation troops, the victory Powers will have to pay attention to the prestige of the new Government leaving their own demands in this respect to come second. There will always be the danger of the new Government being looked upon by its own people as some sort of a puppet Government, established for the primary purpose of running the errands of the victors. The victors must do everything possible to avoid all that could support such a conception.

It may be argued against this whole plan that it would be absolutely Utopian to believe that the Governments of the victorious countries would be strong enough to carry out such a moderate policy vis-à-vis the defeated enemy. As public sentiment after four or five years of war would surely come to demand an entirely different treatment of the former opponents. There is much in this argument, and it is likely that there will be many renegades in all of the victory

victory countries and notably in those which have been exposed to long occupation. There will surely also be many people demanding that the defeated nations be held responsible for the crimes committed by their former leaders.

There are, however, also certain signs supporting the hope that the Governments may be able to escape having to follow the intentions of these voices and that they would retain their freedom to pursue a moderate and reasonable policy vis-à-vis the new Governments of the defeated countries. Already there are solemn declarations having been made by all of the Allied Governments, including Russia, to the effect that the punishment for past crimes will fall only on the originators (instigators) who would be tried before special Allied courts but that their countrymen will not be held responsible.

The second and perhaps more important reason for the likelihood of a reasonable Government policy after the suspension of hostilities is intimated in Churchill's latest speech. Should the war in Europe end somewhat before the war against Japan, then the Allied Governments will retain their extraordinary powers during the critical years of transition and will not be so dependent on their parliaments and public opinion as during normal times.

PREREQUISITES.

1) Victory for the Allies

2) New Governments in the defeated countries

3) A suitable locality for negotiations

4) Postponement of the definitive peace treaty

5) That the defeated nations employ the transition period for amending their political system

6) That the victory nations employ the transition period for strengthening the position of the new Governments by aiding them by providing food, work, and civic security

7) That both parties during the transition period work together on humanitarian and reconstruction problems.

X Report
X Finland

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan

DATE: March 18, 1945

FROM: Frederick Oechsner

SUBJECT:

SECRET

Returned herewith is the letter from Stockholm inclosing the manuscript prepared by a young Finn who is at present aid-de-camp to Marshal Mannerheim.

This document seems to be particularly skillful in its arguments.

F. O.

Harper, Israel 98/3
Report
Finland

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Stockholm, February 6,1943.

Colonel William J.Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington,D.C.

My dear Colonel:

The enclosed Manuscript was handed to me by George Enckell, a young Finn who is master of six languages and is at present aid-de-camp to Marshal Mannerheim. The meeting was arranged by a Swedish friend, member of the Riksdag, at Enckell's request, and took place in the former's apartment.

Enckell immediately brought up the question of a separate peace between Finland and Russia,and said three factors were involved: 1) Food ; 2) Getting rid of the German troops in Finland;3) Guarantee .

When I asked what the Finns would do should troops of the United Nations come to the north of Finland he answered that the Finnish army was only thirty kilometres from the point of Russian breakthrough outside Leningrad, and having done nothing about that why should the Finns oppose the United Nations, especially the Americans, if they came from the north.

He said the Marshal has been intensely concerned about the foreign relations of Finland during recent weeks, but had not committed himself one way or the other in regard to the supposed effort on the part of some groups to draft him for the Presidency (elections ,February 15 , He reported that the most favored successor to Witting in the Foreign Office is undoubtedly Ramsay.

As to the Japanese too part in which the Pearl Harbor film was shown he said that all knowledgeable Finns felt an immense chagrin over the affair.

He asked : " Would it be to America's interest to have Finland make a separate peace now, or later,when the timing might be more propitious ? And wouldn't the Russian army follow immediately on the heels of withdrawing Germans as they retreat from the Festung Europa to the Festung Deutschland?" To these I could not answer,even academically.

Finally, he said that the Marshal often wonders what his [illegible] good friends in Britain and America might be thinking of him now; and wants them to know that he is not a Nazi, has never been a Nazi, and never [illegible]

When I got up to go Baskell pulled the enclosed manuscript out of his pocket, and asked if I would be interested in reading it. I replied that I could receive it only if it were offered without strings, and that I could not promise to forward it. He then dramatized the handing over by retaining a grip on the paper, saying: " Well, I am delivering to you, I am delivering it to you." Meanwhile, he looked me in the eye, and shrugged. From that I gathered that he was carrying out a commission from which he, himself, was merely the agent.

On reading the manuscript I decided to send it on to you as something of interest both for its contents and its manner. As you will see there are five basic assumptions, all of them unreal except the last:

1. That both sides in the war have reached the all-out stage; that a change in favor of the Allies is unlikely if not impossible, but a change in favor of the Axis is possible through the collapse of Russia.

2. That Russia, in pursuance of a century old intent to conquer all Europe will proceed to do so while the Allies are engaged with Japan.

3. That Germany would respect small nations in Europe, and not interfere outside Europe, even though commanding the raw materials and labor power of Europe.

4. That the Anglo-Saxon governments could, if they wished, could influence their people, and marshal them into the course of abandoning Russia to German hegemony of the Continent.

5. That Germany is prepared to desert Japan in return for peace with the Anglo-Saxon powers.

As you will note the manuscript was prepared January 6, 1941 [illegible] a likeness to the German offer to Britain before the invasion of Russia [illegible] additional sop to Finland and other small states.

It is probably that this manuscript was prepared for presentation to the Swedish government(at least one of my trusted advisers believes [illegible] If so, it could not have been written by any one of the caliber of [illegible] or Ryti, as they are too much aware of the realities to believe that [illegible] neutrals can influence a volte face in Anglo-Saxon war policy. My advisers suggests that it may come from the hand of some minor Finn, such as [illegible] who is still impressed by Germanic power; or it might be from a German [illegible] one intended to intimidate the Swedish government and to fan the Swedish [illegible] fears of Soviet Russia.

I send it along as one type of planted manuscript; I am assuming [illegible] a collection.

This anonymous manuscript also serves to indicate a growing function for me as the pipeline toward which non-diplomatic information will increasingly gravitate with the turn in the tide of the war. As you know I have been hampered by the lack of definitive function, and have been forced to assume the rôle of student in post-war planning, etc. without mandate. Herschel Johnson has assured me that you understand the situation, and want me to carry on. David's letter likewise indicated that my apprehensions as to your expectations were unfounded.

I can not, of course, write of my activities in detail. I am in contact with certain Germans who have visited me on their arrival in Sweden. They are still wary, fearing that Die Sache might be betrayed through talking too much. Their chief concern seems to be to have some one they trust in Sweden through whom they can transmit when the time comes. Also I hold periodic conversations with former German labor leaders , now in Sweden, and manage to get along through marked improvement in my own German. I have an Estonian professor , at present lying low on my advice, who is primed and eager to be of service to the cause(He uses both German and Russian fluently). The [illegible] show signs of interest in us; one has sent an emissary to me, along with literature and maps . I am to see him February 8 in a neutral home. One [illegible] has come, a heart sick professor, who will unburden later. Also a [illegible] socialist, who wants to serve, within the limits of discretion at the [illegible] As assistant I have an Englishman, 57 years old, Herbert Beck, who has lived most of his life in Russia and Finland. Thus far I have used him mostly [illegible] comb the German press with me, and to read through the Russian bulletins [illegible] Swedish newspapers . In that way my use of German, Russian, and Swedish is facilitated daily. I have other uses for Beck, later; I believe him to be [illegible] loyal and discreet.

On January 25 I spoke in Göteborg on "The Pacific Face of America." On February 18 and 19 I will give two lectures at Uppsala University on: "America-Land of Optimism," and " American Optimism in Foreign Relations." On February [illegible] I will talk on the Pacific before the American Club, at which occasion some members of the Foreign Office are to be invited (not confirmed yet). And on February [illegible] I will speak before the British-American-Swedish Society of Stockholm, subject not yet decided.

In early March I should like so much to meet you or David in London, as there are items which I can neither write nor cable.

Warm ..... Greetings , and Cheers, always,

Bruce C. Hopper

From Finnish Secret (a German through Finn?) 6.I.1943.

To Colonel Donovan. from [illegible]

After the creation of the second front in North Africa simultaneously with the at least partially successful Russian counter-offensive the war seems at the first glance to have reached its culmination. In any case it has to be ascertained that the climax of the armed efforts of all countries seem to be close at hand and the possible alternatives of the great war are more easily comprehended in the light of its perspective. The present situation could be compared in certain respects with a race in which Germany with her allies tries ultimately to reach the utmost limit of Russia's power of resistance before the war efforts of the Allies force her to engage considerable forces in the elimination of the second front. The idea of the "European stronghold" takes more and more distinct shape. The estimation of its factors, which will be referred to below, does not justify the supposal that the European front were on the verge of collapse. But at the same time the firmness of this front means the prolongation of the war to a far-off future where the mutual losses of all belligerents balance victory and defeat. On the basis of the results of the previous great war it can be asked whether such a decision would be more unfortunate than the complete victory of the other party.

At this moment superficial criticism easily imagines the victory of the Anglo-Bolshevist alliance to be more probable. From the point of view of a small country which as Finland sees the greatest danger threatening Europe in the form of a communistic world revolution, the complete victory of either belligerent thoroughly upsets the political and economical balance in Europe. In the choice between complete destruction through Bolshevism on the one hand and the creation of a new Europe on the other hand, Finland can naturally only decide in favour of the latter alternative.

The first alternative stands out for us mercilessly clear. A crushed Germany would mean the strengthening of communism not only within the boundaries of the USSR of 1940, but in the first place in Poland, in the Danube countries and on the Balkans where the soil is everywhere most favourable for the spreading of Bolshevist ideology. The Soviet Union would certainly not delay after a victorious war in occupying those positions which would safeguard it against a new attack: the Rumanian oil districts and at least the northern part of Finland. In the light of the experiences of the present war it is not worth while to doubt that the Soviet Union had not understood the geo-political importance of the entire North Scandinavia (Narvik - iron) and would act accordingly.

England and America seem to be naive enough to believe that they would after Germany's defeat still have sufficient power and will to organize the European affairs in accordance with the Atlantic Charter and simultaneously win back the positions taken by the Japanese. Weakened by the protracted war and with communism gaining more and more foothold in their social structure as well as in the whole of Europe, they will not very likely be able to prevent the victorious progress of Russian influence. The war against Japan requires as its necessary condition the complete regrouping of the Anglo-Saxon forces which gives the Soviet Union a possibility to gain time. The allies need the Soviet Union in their war against Japan, but they must pay for her terms with European sacrifices. If the wearing out of the Soviet resources on the one hand and the fact that the Russo-Japanese contrasts are easily to settle on the other

hand are taken into consideration,it is more than likely that the Soviet Union will betray the anti-Japanese front. It may be useful to recall that Stalin's farewell words to Matsuoka at the station of Moscow after the signing of the Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact were: "Let us pull the same way,we are both Asiatics". In the end England would thus never remain the victor,but the "fruits" of victory would be divided between the USA and Japan,who would finally conclude peace with each other. Through her alliance with Communist-Russia,England is thus digging a grave not only for Germany but also for the whole of Europe,herself included.

As to the reorganisation of Europe in this case it is near at hand to compare the arising situation with the year 1918,when the participation of the Allied forces in spite of their great efforts was restricted to the execution of the Versailles terms of peace with regard to the Central Powers while their measures concerning Eastern Europe remained insignificant. Japan's fighting to-day among the enemies of the Allies is a proof of their ever decreasing influence in Europe which denotes the supremacy of the Soviet Union and its ruling ideological power,Bolshevism,on the European continent. This supremacy cannot be of short duration and of a temporary nature. It reflects,on the contrary, the continuous Eastern pressure in the history of the last centuries.The Russia of Peter the Great was merely a country of only 10 million,while already the empire of Czar Alexander I.,with its population of 30 million,and that of Nicholas the Second with its population of 160 million formed a decisive factor in European policy. Taking the great fecundity of the Slavic race and the continuous withering of the civilized European nations which will be promoted by the great economical and political crises into consideration, the fate of Europe would seem gloomy in the light of the view we have just dealt with. In spite of their great ordeals,the various people comprising the USSR would, protected by their low social standing and primitiveness,get through the post-war difficulties easier than the civilized European nations.

The second alternative - the complete victory of the Axis - would first of all mean the breaking up of the British Empire both through loss of territories and through the fact of the Dominions becoming independent. Even in this case Japan would seem to inherit most,although the USA would be included among the successors. The remains of the proud Empire would hardly deserve that name. Economically the victory of the Axis would imply an autartic continental block which would for the most part avail itself of the Russian and African resources with Germany as the leading country. It would without doubt mean comparative prosperity to the continental nations which being dependent on Germany's economical leadership would,however,get into a still closer political dependence upon Germany both with regard to their foreign and home policy. Especially from the point of view of the smaller nations the future doesn't promise anything good in this respect. The longer the war is protracted,the firmer becomes Germany's hold on Europe and the harder it will be for her to give up the political, economical and military assets the task of which is to guarantee Germany's supremacy in Europe in the event of future crises. This possibility would mean the [illegible] the change in the evolution during the 19th century on the basis of the [illegible] principles. The influence of this evolution culminated in the ideology [illegible] world war resulting in the creation of new nationalistic states,though [illegible] was grossly violated when the final frontiers were drawn up (Rumania, [illegible] first of all Czechoslovakia). Although Finland need not in her present [illegible] feel her national existence threatened in the event of a German victory [illegible]

however, fell solidarity with the small civilized European nations whose right of self-determination she so well understands.

In viewing Germany's complete victory over England, Finland would regretfully have to ascertain the loss of her best export country, the collapse of which reduces the whole of Europe to poverty and simultaneously puts an end to European influence in the East Asiatic world. In this resp st Hitler has never concealed his opinion as to the importance of a British world-power, and he is said to have made notable proposals regarding this matter which bear witness to considerable foresight. England's short-sighted foreign policy cannot be sufficiently regretted, having been unable to rectify the injustices of the Versailles peace treaty, and in deliberately avoiding a peaceful settlement up to the last.

The third alternative appears to be the continuation of the war for many years without either of the belligerents gaining supremacy. The durability of the "European stronghold" on the one hand and the exhaustion of the Allied strength on the other hand will be viewed in this respect.

Because of the weakening of the military power of Soviet Russia it can with good reasons be taken for granted that military factors will not play a decisive part in this test of endurance and that Europe's possibilities of self-sufficiency and the ability of the Allies to supply their own fronts beyond the seas will form the most important factor. The question is thus merely whether Europe will be able to produce the necessary amount of cereals and raw materials and to settle labour problems and on the other hand whether the war at sea can maintain its present achievements and improve them to some extent. The question is also which party's morale better stands the test.

The question of bread supply seems very simple. The utilization of the fertile regions of Western and Southern Russia so that they produce the 10-15 million tons of cereals which make up Europe's need seems to be a question of mere organization the solution of which can be regarded as more or less settled. In maintaining bread rations reduced Europe will be able to get over next winter satisfactorily and to reach, beginning with the autumn of 1943, a state comparatively near to autarchy. As to the labour question, Germany has already mobilized 7 million foreign workers to replace the number of labourers, amounting to 10 million, which the war has disengaged from productive work. The discontinuance of all unimportant industry and the continuous rationalization have for their part made the satisfying of the demands of war industry possible. Europe has at her disposal the population of Poland and that of the former Russian areas amounting to about 70 million among which Germany has a sufficiently great labour reserve. With regard to the European raw material situation calculations prove that no sudden crises are to be expected. It can on the contrary be said that Germany's recent occupation of territories have further improved the position of the "European stronghold". We can thus make sure that the possibilities of Europe are by no means to be considered too small as compared with the enormous Allied resources and that she can successfully stand a siege of [illegible] duration. A compromise peace where all parties concerned have suff[illegible] looms in the background.

Some significance must be applied to moral factors, yet the[illegible] over or under estimated. The whole world has been thoroughly mi[illegible] strength of Russian morale. This time, owing to false informatio[illegible] gate within a short time Germany's moral collapse after the [illegible]

nish people are a good example of how great the elasticity of a modern nation and society can be. With a special view to Germany's tenacity in this respect her political refugees abroad have very likely rendered their foreign patrons a bad service in describing Germany to be on the verge of collapse. It is probably more in accordance with the truth to suppose that Germany's home front is on the contrary the most steadfast in Europe. Its tenacity is founded upon the experience of the last world war, upon the knowledge of the extreme severity of the peace terms, and upon the hard post-war years.

Of the three alternatives which have been outlined above, the last one seems to be the most probable. Let the European war end as it may, it will in any case bring about great economical and political upheavals -"Untergang des Abendlandes" - the greater, the longer the war lasts. In the overwhelming bankruptcy of the European nations the neutral countries will also share in the post-war trials side by side with the belligerent nations.

In view of these perspectives it is most unfortunate that the factors outside Europe which at this moment in still greater measure characterize the activity of the anti-European front have so little knowledge of the historical, economical and psychological aspects of the European battle. This incompetance also marked the pre-war years which can with good reason be called the period of the hegemony of the Great Powers. It is regrettable that the so-called neutral minor states in Europe could not, in spite of their number and internationally remarkable contribution, impose their will in the final settlement of war and peace. Passivity was the most characteristic feature of their foreign policy. If they had joined previously in a united front in favour of peace, their actions for the rectifying of the injustices of the world after the Versailles peace treaty and for the preventing of a new world war would have, no doubt, resulted in a compromise. But even during the great war and in spite of many an important state having abandoned neutrality, the remaining neutral countries still have certain possibilities of contributing towards the extinguishing of the European conflagration by offering their mediation to the belligerents. By laying in the scale their entire economical and military contribution they could help the belligerents to approach each other in order to conclude a compromise peace on reasonable grounds. This would mean a separate peace between Germany and Italy on the one hand, and the British Empire and the USA on the other hand and complete liberty of action to crush the Soviet Union finally and also complete freedom or even support of a United Europe to the English-speaking world to bring the war in Asia to an end favourable to the white race. The belligerents would in this case be compelled to make concessions and sacrifices. Germany should be given free hands with regard to Eastern Europe according to her demands, in return for which she would have to content herself in the reorganization of a new Europe with the nations' right of self-determination as leading principle. The greatest difficulty lies after all in the attitude of the USA, because this country does not yet in this stage perceive the urgent need of a European peace as a means of winning the Asiatic enemy and preserving the hegemony of the white race.

Although the number of neutrla countries is small, their military-political and economical position is such that the nations at war are bound to listen to their words. Finland, too, can, thanks to the attitude she has adopted in this great conflict, act as one belonging to the neutral countries. The influence of the Catholic church, a potential ally of the neutrals, must not be forgotten.

It has been consistently declared in Finland that our country fights her [illegible] We have only one enemy, who is simultaneously the enemy of all Europe. [illegible]

towards the internal organization of Europe is also distinctly defined in conformity with this in the speech of the President of the Republic on December 6,1942,in which the European peoples' right to independent life was expressly emphasised.

The fact that Finland's attitude and the significance of her fight has lately been metwith increasing understanding in Sweden has to be regarded with satisfaction. The existence of an independent Finland is recognised as a vital condition to Sweden herself. Considering especially the growth of Sweden's war potential, Finland hopes to be allowed in the future to effect and develop the military and political co-operation between both countries,which plan existed already before the war. Both Sweden and Finland have paid dearly for its non-existence. On the other hand, the Finnish people now understand and appreciate Sweden's neutrality. There is no reason to doubt that Sweden would desist from it. That is guaranteed by the recent repeated declarations by the Swedish government and military leaders.

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Report on Finland.

The general feeling in Finland towards the war has undergone a remarkable change with every day that the Germans have failed to capture Stalingrad. Prior to the launching of the assault on that city, the Finns were confident that Hitler could vanquish the Soviet Union by the end of the current year. Now, however, there appears to be an uneasy and growing doubt concerning the Reich's ability to defeat the Russians at all. In fact, according to reports from older soldiers arriving in Helsinki on leave, the present feeling among the Finnish troops at the front is that the Nazis have already lost the war.

Personal friends, and former pupils of mine coming home for a few days leave and calling to see me claim that the soldiers at the front are rapidly approaching a stage of open revolt, and that they are absolutely disgusted at the weakness and stupidity of a government which compels Finland to fight on Hitler's behalf. Instances are common of whole companies refusing to advance when ordered to do so, the explanation given being that Finland has regained all she lost in the winter campaign of 1939-1940, and that there is consequenly no reason for them to assist the government in precipitating the country to complete ruin, or by providing useless cannon-fodder for German interests. Such expressions are by no means confined to soldiers and non-commissioned officers, but have been heard with increasing frequency from men of high rank.

The quality of food supplies to the forces has become very bad, and is said to be becoming worse and worse. In the Petsamo district the Finnish soldiers have not seen meat for months, their daily diet consisting of macaroni (supplied by

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the Italians) and black bread. In the South, again, the principal diet for weeks at a stretch consisted of horse-flesh soup, cabbage, black bread and a little synthetic honey in the mornings. Many women with sons at the front, have told my wife that their boys are constantly writing and asking for bread to be sent them. The Germans, on the contrary, are well fed, and their provisions all come from the Reich. This difference in the feeding of the two different sets of troops is also very naturally a constant bone of contention with the Finns.

Such under-nourishment has resulted in diseases of various kinds becoming rife among the younger soldiers, particularly recruits, who also suffer terribly from boils. Eighteen-year old recruits (1924 class) were called up for service on October 27, and it was then reported that the 1926 class would shortly follow. In accordance with the procedure adopted in the winter campaign of 1939-1940, the authorities make a practise of screening losses from their own people. Two months before I left, however, Corporal O. Svartström, who was then employed at the H.H.Q. told me that Finnish dead then amounted to between 60,000 to 65,000. Corporal S., who is a cousin of General Heinrichs, told me that they wanted to get rid of him at G.H.Q., owing to his too evident pro-British sympathies. Three weeks later, his wife came and told me that he had been sent to the front. Svartström also assured me that if British or American troops ever landed in Petsamo, about half of the Finnish troopswould revolt and refuse to fire a shot at them. I have tried to "tap" many people on this question, and found that about half adhered to Svartström's opinion, while the other half were confident that the Finns would fight any force which attempted to effect a landing. Personally, I think that Hitler's continued non-success in Russia, and the recent smashing defeats administered to his armies

armies in North Africa, have very greatly increased the odds in favor of Finnish non-resistance.

Growing dislike of the Germans has again recently been fanned by Finnish soldiers coming on leave from the North informing their people that they would not get any salted salmon this winter. This great Finnish delicacy, they state, has been bought up by the Germans and will be surreptitiously shipped to the Reich. Finnish anger is slow to kindle, but when it starts to burn there are no limits to it. That the Nazis are fully aware of this is evident from the strict orders issued by the German Command in Finland to their soldiers. Under threat of the severest punishment, they are ordered to refrain from quarreling with, or even answering back any Finn who may accost or insult them. They must also show the greatest care in their attitude to the civilian population.

In spite of all precautions, however, hand-to-hand conflicts between Finnish and Nazi soldiery are growing in frequency and intensity. Nowadays, one never sees the soldiers of the two countries fraternizing, or even walking the streets together.

How far matters have gone in this respect may be judged from the fact that at the time of my departure, it was told me by Dr. Varis of the Invalids' Hospital, Helsinki, that there were already over 20,000 illegitimate children in Finland, with German service men as their fathers. A sergeant who was demobilised some month ago (Mr. Estlander, prokurist, Finska Sjöförsäkrings AB) had already told me that all soldiers at the front were obsessed with the idea that Germans were occupying their marital beds at home. Mr. Estlander is a brother-in-law of Mr. Freese, managing director of the Finska Sjöförsäkrings A/B., and a good friend of ours.

Hospital

Hospital nurses also complain of the arrogance displayed by German patients, and the constant and impossible demands being made by them. One of the ridiculous stories being spread by German propaganda declares that Hitler is so enamoured with the courage of the Finnish race, that any German soldier marrying a Finnish girl receives Rmks.10,000 as a wedding gift from his Fuehrer. Hitler, it is affirmed, considers that a combination of German and Finnish blood would produce the finest type of manhood ever yet seen. Unfortunately, there are many stupid Finns who believe such bosh, and appear to have forgotten what Hitler had to say about them in their first campaign against the Russians. Among many other things he was constantly describing them as the descendents of Mongols.

It is to the housewives and mothers of Finland, however, that the Germans will have to look for any future trouble. While those of their men who are exempt from military service appear to be content to loll in their chairs and absorb unlimited supplies of barefaced, lying German propaganda, their poor wives and mothers have to spend hours in queues for a few vegetables or a handful of smelts. It is in queues that one already hears the growing murmur which will shortly swell to a roar which may overthrow a pro-Nazi government and sweep the last German out of Finland. Another couple of defeats as those suffered by the Germans at Stalingrad and in North Africa assisted by the growing antagonism of Finland's women, may well quickly turn the tide of Finland's destiny, and future policy.

The labouring class continue to remain very antagonistic to Germany, and friendly to the United Nations. This also applies to big industrialists, shipping circles, small holders and landless men. It is more in the middle class circles that we have to look for sympathizers of Nazism and these predominate among older schoolboys, undergraduates, teachers, the

clergy

clergy (including that old hypocrite Archbishop Kaila), the new type of army officer, salesmen and saleswomen, professional men, clerks, managers and -last but by no means least - the underpaid staffs of the Finnish Press. Many Finnish papers are today being entirely subsidized by the Nazis, and although the authorities must be fully aware of this, they are powerless to intervene. In the official Finnish News Agency, known in Finland, by the letter STT, or FNB, there is E.A. Berg Phd., as managing director. Although a likeable personality, he is heart and soul with the Germans, and probably gets paid by them for publishing anything they wish him to do. During the 1939-40 winter campaign, the STT issued a report to the local papers that at a session of the Diet the question had been raised concerning making peace with the Soviet. Although this later was proved to be a fact, all messages abroad on the subject were stopped, the local papers were forbidden to publish the item, and Berg was sentenced to two months imprisonment on a charge of endangering the safety of the State. The extraordinary part of this story is that immediately on his release, Berg was reinstated as chief of the official News Agency. As far as I know, such a thing has never occurred before. The chief of the Swedish section of the STT, Woldemar Sundman (a fervent friend of Britain's) told me that the Germans had informed the government they wanted Berg reinstating- so naturally it was done. While the Swedish section of the STT is wholly at heart on our side, the Finnish section is wholly Nazi-minded. Hans Metzger, official press attache to the German Legation, and also second in charge of all Gestapo activities in Finland, is a great friend of Berg's.

Nobody appears to know who the actual Gestapo chief in Finland is, although I know for a fact that Metzger is second

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in charge. Although there may be no actual head at all, other than Metzger, I at one time thought it possible that it might be a man named Nietz, who lives in the new Tullbommen block of buildings, Åbovägen 90.

Nietz is a typical square-headed Boche with the usual protruding ears, small of stature, with cold, pale-blue eyes, he poses as a journalist. As far as I have been able to find out, he never sends a Press message to Germany, but at the same time lives with his wife and daughter in a luxurious flat. All the Germans in Helsinki are extremely polite and servile to him. It would be of interest to find out more about Nietz.

As previously mentioned the three representatives of the DNB in Helsinki are Hildebrandt (chief), Heinrich Bergmann (formerly expelled from Norway on a charge of espionage), and Friedrich Ege. At the request of Berlin, the Finnish government has agreed to all DNB messages being telephoned to Berlin twice daily, uncensored.

The head of the State Information Bureau is Major Heikki REENPÄÄ, who in times of peace is head of the Otava publishing concern. Although I know that the Americans have him down on their list of Nazi sympathizers, I consider personally that in his heart he is as freindly to Britain as he always has been formerly. Only a few days before I left, I chanced to meet him in the street. He stopped, and when I told him I was leaving, said: "I am very, very sorry you have to leave. I sincerely hope the Old Country wins this war, but not before the Bolshevists have been beaten". Lieutenant Vainö Väänänen is chief of the propaganda section of the S.I.B. Although he plays a comparatively small role in the organization, he is as Nazi-minded as it is possible to be. He is married to an American girl, who appears to be as pro-Nazi as her husband.

Both

Both the Vähäkaens are fervent disciples of Donald Day, American correspondent in Finland to the Chicago Tribune. Day has gone quite "native" and is besides one of the most ardent pro-Nazis in Finland. The USA Legation is aware of his activities, and that he publicly abuses Roosevelt and the British Empire. Day is a most dangerous man to United Nation interests, and is energetically working in Nazi interests. He is a close friend of Germany Legation officials, and appears to have plenty of money to spend freely. Peter Sjöblom is Finnish by birth, but an American citizen. He represents The Associate Press in Finland, and being very young, has become a mere lap-dog of Donald Day's. The latter has converted him to Nazism, and imbued him with a dislike for Britain. The associated Press Head Offices in the U.S.A.should certainly be informed that they are being hoodwinked by Sjöblom. He is much too young and incompetent for such a responsible post, and is, moreover, misleading American opinion by his messages.

The State Police is to all intents and purposes under the orders of the local Gestapo. The dismissal of Bruno Aaltonen from the post of second in command was a typical example of German domination in Finland. Aaltonen was born and educated in the USA, was a brilliant police official known in many European capitals and, altogether, charming personality.

His position seemed assured, and everyone was confident that on the retirement of the last state police chief the post would be offered to Aaltonen. Instead, the Gestapo complained to the Finnish Minister of Home Affairs, Horelli, that Aaltonen had pro-Anglo-Saxon sympathies, and that he must be removed without delay. They further drew attention to the fact that A. having been born and educated in the USA. With their usual servility the Finns hastened to comply with German orders, and A. is at present serving as a lieutenant at the front.

front. Aarne Anthoni, a junior police commissary, was appointed to the post of head of the State Police, and A. Kauhanen, a former assistant of Aaltonen's was appointed his assistant. By such means, the Nazis removed the last important pro-British sympathizer from the police force, and assured themselves that the S.P. should be in charge of fervent German sympathizers. Both Anthoni and Kauhanen should be placed on the British blacklist as people who must later be removed.

German families are regularly arriving in Finland, and it would appear that the Nazis intend obtaining a firm grip on the country now that they have the chance to do so. German furniture removal vans are constantly to be seen being unloaded from the German ships arriving at Helsinki, or passing through the streets.

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Summarized Information.

The Finnish nation are heartily sick of war and see that they have been led into a position which spells ruin. They consider that their only chance of retaining independence if Germany is beaten, now rests with America. Consequently they are desperately anxious to prevent any break with U.S.A.

The Finnish government realises that they have made a colossal mistake in bringing in Germany. They would do anything to hop out of the war if they could, but the Nazis have established too strong a grip on them.

I have been assured that Ryti and Tanner are among those who at heart remain pro-British. Hackzell and von Fieandt are among those who have become nazified. One bank director said to me: " I should be surprised if Germany ever has the face to

to show himself in Britain again".

The soldiers are approaching a state of open revolt, as at the front they are convinced that Germany will be defeated by Russia, not even taking Britain and the U.S.A. into consideration. Hatred of the Germans is growing daily.

Many Finns now abstain from reading their own papers, as they say they are sick of constantly reading lying German reports, and misleading statements. Swedish periodicals, such as NU are no longer imported, and a very limited number of copies of certain Swedish papers are allowed. German newspapers, and propaganda periodicals are to be seen in every bookshop and are on sale at every street corner.

The bombing raids over Helsinki are too sporadic, and few and far between. If two planes were sent over the town, or even in its neighborhood, say at seven in the morning, and kept cruising round and round at a great height, all traffic and business would be stopped. These two planes could then be relieved by another two, and so on. This would entirely dislocate daily life and keep people in the cellars, shops closed, traffic stopped, gas closed down, water supply cut off, etc., for a whole day at a time. A week of this would have a disastrous effect, as the Finns get badly rattled by raids.

Crime and immorality are increasing at an alarming rate.

Anti-German abusive inscriptions are frequently to be met with on walls and hoardings. During the spring, the "V" sign was particularly noticeable.

Motor buses arriving from the country are constantly bringing large supplies of meat, butter, eggs and flour in parcels addressed to the different government ministers. Such parcels are not allowed to be inspected.

Tanner

Tanner recently ordered two housewomen from every Elanto store to appear for voluntary labor on a Sunday at his estate. Such work is in Finnish known as "talko". Hundreds of women were driven to his estate in Elanto lorries, gathered in all Tanner's potatoes, and were rewarded with a lunch.

An effort on the part of the Germans and their friends to prohibit the import of American films, was recently negatived by the Board of Censors. Many American films, and a very few British, are still being shown.

The State Alcohol Company appears to be the source of much Nazi propaganda. That such propaganda is officially regulated is evident from the fact that whatever the weekly story happens to be, it always seems to spread on a Tuesday. Just before I left, the weekly story was that the American Legation was nothing more than an Anglo-Saxon espionage organization working in the interests of the Soviet Union. The sooner the Americans could be got rid of the better.

Meakin and Bro, on the other hand, appears to have a staff comprised of pro-United Nations sympathizers.

State alcohol prices have now, in many cases, risen to seven times more than what they were in pre-war days. Drinking is still very heavily indulged in.

The food position is daily growing worse. Many people have given up eating at home in favor of getting some kind of a meal at a cheap restaurant.

Soldiers at the front bitterly complain at their parcels from home being opened and many of the contents (particularly cigarettes) being stolen.

Popular German marching tunes have now been adapted to Finnish words but many Finnish soldiers refuse to sing them.

No Finnish citizen (military or civilian) is allowed to travel to the North of Finland without obtaining a special

permit

permit from the local German military authorities.

An unconfirmed rumor circulating in town before I left credited the Germans with refusing to let any more flour (rye) be sent to Finland. They proposed to send baked bread instead, charging a higher price for same.

More and more Finnish firms are producing charcoal gas stoves for use on motor cars. These are all sent to Germany.

After the two big raids on Helsinki before I left, August 28 and October 4, the Finns were openly saying that the raids had been so effective that they could only have been carried out either under the guidance of RAF pilots, or by the RAF itself. Another story was that the attack had been led by a Canadian officer.

Up to the time of my leaving, October 27, there had this year in all been 78 "alerts" in Helsinki, lasting a total of 37 hours and 6 minutes. The longest "alert" was 4 hours 34 minutes, the shortest 5 minutes.

The "Karjala" gunboat was recently sunk off Kotka by enemy action. Few of the crew survived.

Most of the vessels comprising the German fleet in Finnish waters are stationed in a small bay about fifty kilometers west of Åbova.

President Ryti and his family are for the present living at Villa Campbell as a precaution against bombing. The villa is situated on the town side of the little bridge (in the vicinity of Föliskn) which one has to cross in order to reach Munkkiniemi. Many disgusted Finns express the view that Ryti has lost his nerve, and is satisfied to let pro-Nazi foreign minister Witting take his orders from von Blucher, the German Minister in Helsinki.

Old Field-marshal Mannerheim (according to what one of

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the Enckell family told me) really hates the Germans as heartily as ever, if not more so. On being presented by Hitler with an armored car, he at first refused to drive in it, declaring that he, Mannerheim, had no need of an armored car for driving among his soldiers in.

Vaino Tanner bought an estate in Sweden immediately prior to the outbreak of the winter campaign of 1939-1940, and is reported to have transferred a considerable sum of money to that country.

Notwithstanding the enormous assistance given to Finland by Sweden, there is still a bitter campaign against the Swedes being waged in the former country. Remembering what Britain has done for Finland, one can only assume that gratitude is a word omitted from all Finnish dictionaries.

The following are known to be staunch friends of Britain and the U.S.A. :

Professor O. Reuter - Teacher of English at the University, Turuntie 45B,25. Tel.46946

Birger Grahne - Teacher of English at Gillieaus' school and at the Naval Cadet Barracks. G. told me that most of the cadets were pro-English, and that great trouble was caused when 20 of them were recently compelled to travel to Germany for instructional service on German E-boats operating in the English Channel. Grahne's address is Mechelingatan 2 a, lv. Tel.49400

L. Gillieaus - Head of the Gillieaus school, and at present a press correspondent with the forces. Fältskärsgatan 8A. Tel. 43971.

Robert [illegible] - [illegible] Kalu [illegible], [illegible] (no tele[illegible]). This man could be of inestimable value in the gathering of information and spreading of propaganda, among the working classes. A Finn by birth, he was a Tsarist officer at the outbreak of the Red Revolution. He fled to Finland although a highly educated man has had a bitter struggle to keep his head up. Although anti-Bolshevist for a considerable time, his sympathies are now entirely with the United Nations, particularly with Russia. His bitter experiences in Finland have led to his developing an unbelievable hatred for the Finns. He is now working as foreman at the German sausage factory of [illegible] & Co. His hatred of

Germany

Germany is on a par with his dislike of the Finns. Mixes with the revolutionary elements of Helsinki, and has great influence with them. A bon-vivant of the old school, and generally in need of money.

Yrjo Kellinen - Runeberginkatu 28 B, 46 Tel.44500. This is another man who might prove of considerable use. A bachelor, aged about 50, he hates the Germans and admires the British. A personal friend of V. Tanner's, he occupies the position of Department chief in the Cooperative Associations Publishing section, with offices in what used to be the Grand Hotel. I have always found him perfectly trustworthy and honest in anything he has undertaken. Is a prominent member of that group of Social Democrats which is secretly but constantly working in United Nations' interests. A very good man.

Juho Hämäläinen - Managing Director of Suomen Kiinteistöpankki Oy., P. Esplanaadinkatu 2, Tel. 35494. Has recently come much to the fore, and was a member of the last Finnish delegation to the U.S.A. An enthusiastic Social Democrat, he has during the last years acquired considerable wealth. Has a great affection for Britain and everything British. Recognizes that a German victory would be a crowning disaster for Finland. Works enthusiastically in the United Nations' interests, and is one of a group of pro-British Social Democrats who daily lunch together at the Kämp. If he cannot undertake a thing, he will tell you so, but would never let one down. Has come under the suspicion of the State Police recently, and has been warned to be careful.

This short list only includes men absolutely to be relied upon.

Those working in local interests are naturally legion, but the following few names belong to individuals who should be particularly noted.

Rolf Witting, Minister of Foreign Affairs

- Mörne II, Minister of Home Affairs,

Tauno Jalanti, Chief of Foreign Trade Relations Committee of F. U.

Dr. A.W. Borg - Chief of the Finnish News Agency.

Dr.

Dr. Henrik Ramsay, Minister of Supplies (A traitor of the deepest dye)

Aarne Anthoni, Head of the State Police.

A. Kauhanen, Second in command of the State Police.

V. Väänänen, Head of Radio propaganda at the State Information Bureau.

Alex Mattson, His assistant.

V.J. Vatanen, Edita one of the Nazi papers, and is known to be in the pay of the Gestapo. Drunkard and liar, he broadcasts "Review of the War". These broadcasts are prepared to Nazi orders, and are misleading and absolutely one-sided. Should occupy a prominent place on black-list.

On the 22nd of October, 1942, I happened to meet Mr . Eljas Erkko, Finnish Foreign Minister at the time of the 1939-1940 winter campaign. E. had come to Stockholm on a special mission for his government. He is an extremely wealthy man, being the owner of the largest Finnish paper "Helsingin Sanomat". He was brought up and educated in the U.S.A. He is married to an English woman (formerly a Miss Sutcliffe) and his sympathies have always been pro-American and pro-British. Having known him for years, E. was very candid in his conversation with me. After expressing his deep regret at the treatment meted out to me by the State Police - who had offered me a choice between internment and leaving the country for the duration of the war - E. said that such a step had naturally been taken at the request of the Gestapo.

E. said he had been demobilized from the army, and that on his return to Finland (he was in Stockholm for five days) he intended again entering political life. He bitterly complained at the government short-sighted policy in forbidding the press to publish anything but German propaganda news, and so misleading the people with regard to the true state of affairs. He claimed that the entire system of Finnish censorship wanted revising, and when the Finnish nation realized how they were being hoodwinked, there might well be trouble.

He intended launching an intensive campaign for more freedom being allowed the, at present, muzzled Finnish press.

PRESENT DAY CONDITIONS IN HELSINKI

Although the Finns are fighting in a spirit of grim determination and self-sacrifice, there can at the same time be no doubt of there being an ever increasing feeling of distrust and doubt concerning the justification and outcome of the present conflict. Any Englishman living among the Finns as long as I have cannot help feeling sorry to see so progressive and hard-working a people inveigled into a position from which at the moment there appears little chance of escaping.

A couple of sentences once written by A.J. Cummings of the "News Chromicle" have recently oft recurred to my mind. As far as I can remember, these read as follows: "In the World War the Finns made the mistake of backing the wrong horse, but succeeded in escaping the consequences very easily. For their own sake, it is to be hoped that they will not commit the same blunder again."

Although very few Finns are likely to have personally read such a prophecy on the part of one of the leading political writers of the day, the warning voiced by him appears to coincide with present feeling among more sober-minded Finns. Before I left, a friend of mine occupying a prominent position in the affairs of the country, made the following significant remark: "In the 1939-1940 winter campaign we had the sympathy of all nations except that of our enemies and Germany. To-day, we appear to have lost the sympathy of everyone except the Nazis."

Economic

Economic and other conditions are usually a barometer to the trend of public opinion, and I will now try to briefly outline conditions in Helsinki at the end of October, the time of my departure.

The Finns have always been known as an extremely tough and loyal race prepared to courageously endure privation and hardship in the cause of their country. Now, however, the time has come when they can no longer abstain from grumbling at a continuation of the war, and increasingly bad economic conditions.

Take the case of Finnish housewives, whose lot is no more enviable than that of the women in the officially occupied countries. Although there has as yet been no actual starvation the food available is lacking in both sustenance and variety.

Practically everything is rationed, even to vegetables, and last winter many people were unable to obtain potatoes for weeks at a time.

Even though bread and butter rations were slightly increased from the first of November, lack of meats and fats is slowly but surely undermining the constitution of the town population. According to a measure introduced since I left Finland, only invalids and expectant mothers are to be allowed any meat at all until further notice.

The women of Helsinki and other towns spend the greater part of their day standing in queues for the most common of foodstuffs, while the workers have great difficulty in obtaining anything owing to the shops being sold out by the time they get to work for the day.

Even the hardest of times have their comical side, and many families have gone so far as to surreptitiously rear pigs and poultry for the Christmas fare in bathrooms and cellars. Such cases are as yet few and far between, but it

shows

shows the anxiety with which people are facing another winter of war. For many months such a luxury as white bread was unobtainable, and so-called cakes were made of rye flour with a coating of synthetic jam for flavor. Owing to there being practically no petrol for fishing boats, fish has also been scarce, and women have stood in queues for hours in order to obtain a kilogram of smelts.

The only fruit obtainable has consisted of home-grown apples of inferior quality, and even these were sold at a prohibitive price. Housewives complain that it is often impossible to obtain goods in exchange for ration cards, and the only meat my family and I had tasted for months was a little salted Danish pork. We existed mainly on vegetables and salted cod. It should be mentioned that such bad conditions only apply to Helsinki and other towns, as in the country districts the farmers and other residents are living under conditions savouring more of normal times. The people of Helsinki complain bitterly at the policy being adopted by the Ministry of Supplies, which, in an attempt to stem soaring prices, has in most cases fixed such low prices that the farmers refuse to bring their products to the town markets. Such a short-sighted measure is a great encouragement to "black-market" dealers, who are carrying on a thriving trade among the wealthier classes. The old system of barter has also been revived. A doctor recently offered me a tin of Ovaltine in exchange for six kilograms of oatmeal.

Tobacco is now rationed at two packets of twenty-five each per week, or an equivalent amount of cigar and pipe tobacco. Prior to the introduction of rationing, it was very difficult to obtain cigarettes at all and as much as 120 marks were

was paid for a packet nominally costing ten marks. Ten marks has even been paid for a single cigarette. Civilians also often gather outside barracks in order to buy cigarettes from the soldiers, who are allowed a more liberal ration.

Another form of lucrative business is carried on by what one might describe as "alcohol touts". Soldiers in uniform are forbidden to buy spirits in any of the State Alcohol Monopoly shops, and there is a certain class of individual who makes a respectable income by loitering in the vicinity of liquor stores and undertaking to buy spirit for soldiers in return for a remuneration of a shilling a bottle. Such touts frequently earn twenty to thirty shillings per day.

Although Finland is one of the greatest timber exporting countries in Europe in normal times, there is an appalling shortage of fuel in all the more congested centres. Germany has failed to deliver the coal promised, and an over-strained transport system prevents the regular delivery of wood fuel. Apartment houses are only heated at irregular intervals, and in some cases it has been impossible to have a hot bath at home for months at a stretch. The Ministry of Supplies has now issued an "ukase" to the effect that houses may only be heated by special order. Needless to say, such orders are few and far between. It is also impossible to use gas-stoves much, as the gas used per household is strictly rationed. Any householder exceeding the fixed amount is liable to a fine. The Ministry of Supplies has further issued an order by which all windows had to be caulked and sealed by October the fifteenth.

Most private cars have been either requisitioned or stored for the winter, as petrol is only available in certain privileged cases, such as for the foreign diplomatic corps. All

other

other motor vehicles are driven on charcoal gas. All Helsinki motor busses have been commandeered for the army, or converted into lorries for delivering wood fuel to apartment houses. Even in the case of trams, it has been found necessary to raise fares by about fifty percent, and to do away with many intermediate stopping places in order to save current.

Just before leaving Finland it became impossible to have footwear re-soled or re-heeled with leather; a very inferior kind of synthetic rubber being used instead. Even so, the repairing - or not - of one's boots and shoes rested entirely with the cobbler, and very often the latter refuses to accept repairs on the ground that the footwear in question is still wearable for a week, or so. Repairs are only accepted on a certain day in the week, and a special license has to be obtained if anyone wishes to purchase a new pair of boots or shoes. No one with a serviceable pair may put in an application, and, in any case, the latter has to be signed by two witnesses, testifying to the fact of the applicant only having an unserviceable, or worn-out pair of footwear. The women are taking to shoes with paper uppers and birchwood soles and heels.

Prior to the present world-crises, Finland was one of the largest paper exporting countries in Europe, and the "News Chronicle", for instance, obtained practically all its huge requirements from a firm in Central Finland. Now, however, a grave shortage of paper is beginning to be felt throughout the country. Daily newspapers have decreased in size, and ordinary wrapping paper, in spite of the dearth of goods, is becoming very short. Some shops have already resorted to asking customers to bring their own wrapping paper with them. Ordinary jute and hemp sacks have long since been replaced by so-called "kraft-paper" sacks, which are used for potatoes,

cereals

cereals, cements etc. What will happen now that paper has become short, I really do not know.

Remarks passed by people standing in queues are always interesting, and here are a few specimens recently heard by my wife and self - A youth absorbed in a penny-dreadful, while men and women argued about the length of time it would take Germany to overcome Russia, suddenly closed his novelette and said: "What's the good of arguing. Britain will prove the victor in the long run, as she has always done in the past". When German soldiers pass the queues, they are greeted with muttered abuse, and such remarks as "there go the swine who are responsible for our having to stand in queues", or "if this is a sample of Hitler's New Europe, the sooner we get the old one back, the better", "our men are living under frightful conditions at the front, while these bullies swagger about the town and molest and seduce our wives and daughters", "what is the good of our singing Vapaa Suomi (Free Finland) when we are as much an occupied country as Denmark, Norway, Finland and Belgium", "we have disgraced ourselves in the eyes of our other northern brethren", etc.

Education has been sadly neglected since the outbreak of the Winter War in 1939. At a conservative estimate, children have lost about a year's education in the last three years; owing to their evacuation to the country on account of enemy bombing; their schools being required for the billeting of newly arrived German troops, or on account of there being an insufficient supply of fuel to keep them warm; and the children being required for voluntary labor in the agricultural districts.

Owing to the existing terrible shortage of goods of all

descriptions

descriptions, shops have often been forced to fill display-windows with empty cartons, if not to close down altogether. I recently asked a friend of mine, whose wife keeps a grocery store, how he managed to keep going. "Very simple", was the reply, "all goods not on cards we sell to "black-market" and so manage to pay rent and wages. But the more goods are rationed, the more difficult this becomes." Of course Helsinki also has its class of individual who thrives in times of crises. Some people are making fortunes by speculating in "valuta", particularly in American dollars and Swedish crowns. The latter were some time ago being sold at as high a rate as forty-eight Finnish marks to the crown. Others laid in large stocks of materiab, food and tobacco, and are gradually disposing of them at prohibitive prices. Meat cards, which permit one to obtain 4d of meat per month, are often worthless owing to there being no meat obtainable. A suggestion which always calls forth a laugh is that women should be placed on meat cards, as then practically every delicacy will have been rationed.

In former days the people of Finland were particularly noted for their honesty, but even this admirable trait has been sadly effected by the war. Crime steadily increases, and many shops have been "gutted" during the hours of darkness. Thieves have not limited themselves to jewellery and other valuables, but even display a preference for robbing dairies of butter and cheese, both of these commodities commanding fantastic prices on the "black-market". When I left Finland, such prices had risen to Fmks.320 for dairy butter, Fmks.300 for pork, per kilogram, and eggs fetched Fmks. 15 apiece.

Hooliganism is also rife, and men returning home slightly the worse for the evening's wear, are frequently set upon and robbed of their valuables, while in the case of women, their

handbags

handbags are constantly being torn from their grasp. In order to cope with this growing menace, a form of special constabulary service was recently introduced. Every male citizen between the ages of 16 and 60 (not already on military service) is obliged, in company with another resident from the same block of flats to patrol a certain beat between the hours of 21 and 3 in the morning. These six hours are divided into shifts of two hours each. The regularity with which such a patrol has to be undertaken, of course depends on the number of eligible men residing in the block of houses to be patrolled.

In general, the population of Helsinki is extremely dissatisfied with the progress of the war, and all Finland is beginning to realize that, in spite of A.J. Cummings' prophetic warning, they have again backed the wrong horse. A spirit of despair and defeatism is daily becoming more apparent, and in order to cope with so threatening a tendency, the Germans and local authorities are busily engaged spreading rumors of an impending peace between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Few people, however, fail to realize that this is but another example of unlicensed Nazi propaganda. Bombing raids have not had much effect on the morale of the Helsinki population until more recently, i.e. after Britain's declaration of war on Finland. It must be confessed that Russian airmen appeared to be chary of dropping bombs on the civilian population, and occasions when one or two bombs were dropped were few and far between. The two most effective raids took place August 28 and October 3 of the current year. The first raid lasted four-and-a-half hours, the latter only one hour fifty minutes. In the second, shorter raid, the German Army stores, State Railways Repair Shop and a few smaller objectives

were

were completely destroyed, while a third bomb evidently intended for the Stadium fell close to the Consumptive Hospital.

At once the cry went up: "there were English planes among the Russian, as no one but the RAF could bomb with such deadly accuracy. In the last big raid, I heard a Finnish officer say: "I hope they give us a thoroughly sound bombing, as that is what we deserve for fighting in Nasi interests." In the current year, from January 1 to the time of my departure, October 27, Helsinki has in all had 78 "alerts" and "alarms", lasting in all 37 hours, 6 minutes. As far as I know not a single enemy plane has been brought down over the Finnish capital, in the present campaign.

I can say without fear of contradiction that the B.B.C. broadcasts in Swedish and Finnish are being increasingly listened to by the Finns. They are becoming sick of the constant boasting and lying of the Reich's transmissions, and now anxiously listen for the news from London. The general complaint about our broadcasts in Finnish, however, appears to be that while the first of the two nightly broadcasts could not be improved on (it is confined to military reports), the second broadcast of the evening is lamentably weak. You people in Britain must not forget that the Finns are not allowed to hear the truth, even about their own country, and what they would like to hear would be what is actually taking place behind the [illegible] lines. Swedish mothers' meetings in the North of Britain, or a [illegible] sailor's adventures with a convoy in the Arctic, are simply waste of time and of no possible interest to the war-weary people of Finland.

Helsinki boys coming on leave from the front are constantly grumbling at the [illegible] food they receive, and one and all express the wish for the war to be brought to a conclusion as quickly

quickly as possible. Unfortunately, a weak government has let things go too far, and the Germans appear to now be complete masters of that foolish, but gallant, little nation.

E FOREIGN SERVICE

OF THE

D STATES OF AMERICA
Bruce Hooper,
Stockholm.

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To Colonel William J.Donovan,

Office of Strategic Services,

Bldg, Constitution Avenue,

Washington, D.C.

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Personal der zuverlässigen und energischen" Politruks", das zusammen mit dem inzwischen besser geschulten regulären Offizierskorps das stählerne Rückgrat der Roten Armee bildet, und ebenso im Elan ihrer revolutionären Tradition. Die Sanrculottes der Sowjetunion werden sich bestimmt noch besser schlagen als die Sansculottes der französischen Revolution . Das russische Volk wünscht keinen Krieg, es hasst den Krieg. Stalins Regierung will den Frieden bewahren,sie wünscht den Krieg ebensowenig. Sie will am liebsten ihre kolossale Aufbauarbeit ruhig fortsetzen, ein Krieg kann diese nur stören. Sie ist gerade jetzt mehr als je überzeugt, auf friedlichem Weg die Sowjetunion zum wirtschaftlich und sozial stärksten Land der Welt machen zu können. Wie früher ist sie aber bewusst vom Interventionskomplex. Sie traut keinem der grossen bürgerlichen Länder und wird sich deshalb auf keine Allianz einlassen , bevor sie selber angegriffen wird. Stalin fühlt, dass Hitler die Sowjetunion mit Krieg überziehen wird, er weiss, dass acht von den zehn deutschen Feldmarschällen bereits an der russischen Westgrenze stehen. Er wird aber nicht selbst angreifen wegen der moralischen Bedeutung eines reinen Verteidigungskrieges für die russischen Massen. Stalin ist überzeugt, dass der Krieg kein Krieg der Maschinenarmeen bleibt, sondern ein Riesenkrieg der Millionenmassen ganzer Völker wird, noch grösser als jeder Krieg zuvor. Sein erstes strategisches Ziel wird sein die Vernichtung der zufälligen technischen Überlegenheit der deutschen Armee, des militärischen Plus der Deutschen. Bodenverluste spielen dabei keine Rolle. Die strategische Entscheidung erwartet er von dem schliesslichen Einsatz aller Kräfte , der russischen Armeen, die dann dem deutschen Heer mehr gleichgespielt sind, und der inzwischen mobilisierten Reserven der USA und des britischen Weltreichs. Am Endsieg dieser Gruppe zweifelt er nicht.

Nach seiner Rückkehr von Moskau im Mai 1941 bemühte sich der Verf. vergeblich das Svenska Dagbladet zu veranlassen ihn als ständigen Korrespondenten nach Russland zu senden. Ein ähnlicher Versuch bei der Göteborgs Handels-och Sjöfartstidning missglückte ebenfalls. Die Ablehnung erfolgte in beiden Fällen [illegible] wegen der hohen Kosten teils-- wohl in der Hauptsache---aus Furcht, im

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im antirussischen Schweden und im bef[illegible] Anstoss zu erregen. Im Herbst 1941 suchte er dann das Svens[illegible]adet zu veranlassen, ihn als Korrespondenten nach den USA zu schicken. [illegible]s scheiterte wieder an der Kostenfrage. Auch seine Bemühungen, schwedische Bankkreise für diese Entsendung zu interessieren, wobei auf die besonderen Interessen Schwedens und Finlands an der späteren Regelung des Friedens unter dem grossen Einflusse der USA hingewiesen wurde, stiessen auf kein Verständnis. Man will sich anscheinend nicht vorzeitig mit Nazideutschland stossen. Einstweilen arbeitet der Verf. an der zweiten Auflage seines Buches "Hitler- Epoche oder Episode? ", das aber nicht erscheinen wird, bevor diese Frage auf dem Schlachtfeld entschieden ist.

öffentlichten Artikeln mitgeteilt wurde, war folgendes: Die Sowjetunion ist ein in den Grundzügen fertiger sozialistischer Staat, der auf festem Fundament ruht und nach festen, aber ständig verbesserten Regeln bereits ziemlich gut funktioniert. Die Fortschritte von 1937 bis 1941 - zwischen den beiden Besuchen des Verf. sind ungewöhnlich gross auf allen Gebieten. Die sozialistische Industrie ist technisch durchaus modern. Die Landwirtschaft ist völlig sozialisiert und in technischer Hinsicht weit mehr mechanisiert als die Landwirtschaft irgend eines anderen Staates. Industrie und Landwirtschaft sind bereits sehr leistungsfähig, sie steigern ihre Produktionskapazität rasch weiter. Die Stahlproduktion - 20 Millionen metrische Tonnen im Jahr- ist schon grösser als die Stahlerzeugung im kaiserlichen Deutschland 1913 war ((etwas über 19 Mill. T.). Das grosse Ideal für Wirtschaft und Kultur der Sowjetunion ist jetzt die Vereinigung der technischen Effektivität der amerikanischen Wirtschaft mit der alten "russischen Breite". Die kolossale, einseitige Begünstigung der Rüstungsindustrien und die grossen Rüstungen überhaupt halten einstweilen die Versorgung der breiten Massen mit Konsumartikeln noch stark zurück. Das schlimmste aller sozialen Übel, die Massenarbeitslosigkeit, ist aber für die Russen beinahe schon ein unbekannter Begriff. Das Leben der russischen Massen bewegt sich also noch auf einem tiefen Niveau, es ruht jedoch auf dem Fundament des Gefühls der sozialen Sicherheit. Das Regim steht fester als irgend eine andere Regierung in der übrigen Welt. Das bürgerliche Russland ist tot. 79% der Bevölkerung sind entweder schon unter diesem Regim geboren oder waren 1917 noch nicht zehn Jahre alt. Das Denken der Massen ist völlig von den Lehren des Marxismus- Leninismus beherrscht. Die Elemente einer fünften Kolonne sind von Stalin bereits im voraus durch die bekannten Erschiessungen vernichtet worden. Selbst die furchtbaren Leiden bei der Sozialisierung der Landwirtschaft zu Anfang der 1930er Jahre fallen schon in Vergessenheit. Bauernrevolten sind ausgeschlossen. Im Kriegsfall werden die Völker der Sowjetunion eine geschlossene Phalanx bilden, die jeder Armee entschiedensten Widerstand entgegensetzen wird. Die Rote Armee ist erstklassig. An Material, Kriegserfahrung und Durchschnittsbildung dürfte sie aber hinter der deutschen zurückbleiben. Sie besitzt andererseits eine besondere Stärke in dem 40 bis 50 000 Köpfen zählenden

das S.O.S. für die Völker der Sowjetunion und vielleicht auch für andere. Unterhaltungen mit Volkskommissaren und Beamten wurden diesmal- im Gegensatz zu 1927- ausnahmslos verweigert. Dagegen stellte die "Voks", deren leitende Beamten auch für ausführliche Unterhaltungen zu haben waren, alles gewünschte Material zur Verfügung und besorgte spezielle Gutachten von hochstehenden Fachleuten über den Aufbau der Sowjetwirtschaft, die Regeln für die Betriebsführung und die Kontrolle, über die Bevölkerungsfrage u.s.w. Auch der Besuch der Stalin-Autowerke, die seit Sept. 1939 für Ausländer gesperrt waren, wurde gestattet.

Während seines Aufenthaltes übergab der Verf. dem Marx- Engels- Lenin- Institut einen bisher unbekannten Originalbrief Friedrich Engels' als Geschenk. Auf die Frage, was man als Gegengeschenk anbieten dürfe, erbat er sich eine kurze Notiz über seine Gabe in den Moskauer Zeitungen, Sie werde ihm dienlich sein können für den Fall, dass er später ständiger Vertreter einer schwedischen Zeitung in Moskau werde. Nach längerem Schweigen wurde die Notiz plötzlich am 15. Mai abends im Moskauer Radio verlesen und am nächsten Tag in Istwestija, Prawda und Krasnaja Sweszda mitgeteilt. Gewissen Andeutungen war zu entnehmen, dass die Notiz dem Politbüro zur Genehmigung vorgelegen hatte und auch von Stalin vorher gelesen worden war.

Nach seiner Rückkehr schrieb der Verf. erst einen längeren vertraulichen Bericht für das Svenska Dagbladet, der auch dem schwedischen Aussenminister zugänglich gemacht wurde. Danach veröffentlichte er in der Zeitung vier Artikel, von denen zwei auf Deutsch in der grössten schweizerischen Zeitung "Neue Züricher Zeitung" abgedruckt wurden. Weitere Artikel über die Aussenpolitik und die militärische Stärke der Sowjetunion wurden nach dem 22. Juni 1941 als "nicht opportun" nicht mehr veröffentlicht.

Der Gesamteindruck des Verf. war recht günstig, jedenfalls beträchtlich günstiger als die Auffassung der meisten in Moskau lebenden Diplomaten und Journalisten. Unter den Diplomaten bildeten jedoch - nach ihren Äusserungen gegenüber dem Verf.- Botschafter Steinhardt, Gesandter Paasikivi und der deutsche Botschaftsrat Hilger (dieser ist in Russland geboren und von Haus aus Ingenieur).

Was in dem vertraulichen Bericht und in den publizierten und in den nicht mehr ver-

[illegible] vom Süden her, Schweden, [illegible] besser gerüstet, werde dagegen einer solchen Gefahr weniger ausgesetzt sein. Der Krieg kam 15 Monate und die Besetzung Dänemarks und des Landes der Schiffe und Fische, Norwegens, 23 Monate später.

In Stockholm, wo der Verf. seitdem wohnt, beschäftigte sich er in der Hauptsache mit der aufmerksamen Beobachtung der politischen und später der militärischen Ereignisse. Wegen des besonderen Interesses in Schweden an Finland und der Sowjetunion studierte er wieder wie früher eingehend Politik und Wirtschaft [illegible]. Im Febr. 1941 veröffentlichte er in der Stockholmer Zeitung Svenska [illegible] einen längeren Artikel über das neue Sowjetgesetz für die Heranbildung [illegible] und jugendlicher Russen, die in militärisch organisierten Schulen als [illegible] ausgebildet werden und danach den rasch wachsenden Bedarf der sozialistischen Industrie an Arbeitskräften decken sollen. Diese interessanten Informationen [illegible] zugleich eine bedeutsame Ergänzung der russischen Vorbereitungen [illegible] drohenden Krieg. An sich stellen sie eine konsequente Fortführung [illegible] sozialistischen Ideen dar. Die wichtige Frage der Beschaffung von neuen [illegible] auf dem Weg der vom Staat vorgeschriebenen Rekrutierung [illegible] der freiwillige Zustrom von Arbeitskräften zur Industrie [illegible] vom Lande her infolge der verbesserten Lage der Kolchosen [illegible] aus den Städten infolge des stärkeren Besuchs der höheren [illegible]

[illegible] reiste der Verf. als Spezialkorrespondent des Svenska [illegible] die Verhältnisse wieder an Ort und Stelle zu studieren [illegible] drei längere Unterhaltungen mit dem amerikanischen [illegible], ferner Gespräche mit dem englischen Botschafter [illegible] Botschafter Grafen von der Schulenburg, dem finnischen [illegible] Reihe anderer Diplomaten. Schulenburg [illegible], Hitler habe ihm bei seinem kürzlichen [illegible] erklärt, er denke nicht an einen Krieg [illegible] Frage des deutschen Botschafters, [illegible] Ernennung Stalins zum Vorsitzenden [illegible] habe, antwortete der Verf., das sei

zur Verabschiedung des Kabinetts zu veranlassen. 1936 waren die deutschen Truppen, die das Rheinland besetzen sollten, vorsorglich mit versiegelten Befehlen für den Rückzug versehen worden für den Fall, dass Frankreich und England mit Militärgewalt einschreiten würden. Es geschah aber nichts dergleichen und der vertragswidrige Kupp gelang. Vor Hitler hatte dagegen der Curtius- Schoberische Plan einer deutsch- österreichischen Zollunion den gefeierten Pacifisten und Pan-europäer Briand zu der Drohung gebracht: " L'Anschluss c'est la guerre!". Wie konnte man da erwarten, dass direkte schwerste Vertragsbrüche einfach hingenommen werden würden ?

Im Sommer 1936 hielt sich der Verf. gelegentlich einer Badereise nach Piestyan (Slowakei) und Luhatschowitz (Tschechei) in Polen auf, wo er Gdynia, Warschau und Krakau besuchte,, ausserdem längere Zeit in der Tschechoslowakei (Prag), ferner in Ungarn (Budapest), in Österreich(Wien), in Lichtenstein (Vaduz), in der Schweiz (Zürich und Locarno), in Frankreich (Paris), und in England (London). Er suchte durch persönliche Anschauung seine früheren Studien über die Politik und Wirtschaft dieser Länder zu vertiefen. Von London nahm er den überwältigenden Eindruck mit, das britische Empire werde, aus seinem Schlaf gestellt, der Welt und Hitler zeigen , dass es unüberwindlich ist, wenn es will. Der Verf. hat seit seinem kurzen Besuch nie mehr einen Zweifel gehabt, dass das wirklich grosse Reich auch einem neuen gewaltigen Sturm siegreich überstehen werde. Auch in den kritischen Tagen vor und nach Dunkerque, als beinahe alle zweifelten, hielt er unangefochten an seinem Glauben fest.

Im Sommer 1937 studierte der Verf. erneut die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse Norwegens, das er schon früher mehrmals besucht hatte. Damit hatte er sich in den meisten europäischen Ländern umgesehen. Nur die Balkanländer (Rumänien, Südslawien, Bulgarien, Griechenland und Albanien), die baltischen Staaten (Estland, Lettland und Litauen) und Portugal hat er nicht besucht.

Am 21. Mai 1938 , am Tage des Höhepunktes der ersten tschechoslowakischen Krise, verliess der Verf. auch Kopenhagen und damit Dänemark in der bestimmten Überzeugung, die ungerüstete Lebensmittelfabrik Dänemark sei in dem Zeitpunkt, der unvermeidlich geworden sei, nicht sicher vor einem gewaltsamen Zu-

darin ebenso wenig wie früher zu irgendeiner Partei. Hindenburg tat schliesslich den Schritt, den der Verf. im letzten Leitartikel seiner Zeitschrift mit deutlichen Worten als durchaus möglich bezeichnet hatte, er handelte am 30. Jan. 1933 genau so wie 1925, entgegen allen Hoffnungen seiner - diesmal demokratischen - Wähler. Merkwürdigerweise gingen jetzt die Deutschnationalen zusammen mit Hitler in das neue Kabinett hinein. Seit der Tagung der nationalen Opposition in Harzburg im Herbst 1931 und auf Grund ihrer reichen Erfahrungen bei späteren Verhandlungen mit den Nazisten waren sie noch kurz vorher ausserordentlich misstrauisch gewesen. Zur Zeit der Präsidentenwahl im Frühjahr 1932 waren sie in ihrem tiefen Hass gegen Hindenburg und in ihrem starken Argwohn gegen Hitler sogar bereit, unter gewissen Bedingungen Brüning selber zum Präsidenten zu wählen, wenn er das gewollt hätte. Nachdem die Nazisten im ersten Halbjahr 1933 die praktischen Proben ihrer Regierungskunst vorgewiesen hatten, konnte kein Zweifel mehr bestehen, dass Deutschland neuen noch schwereren Zeiten entgegenging. Ohne Hoffnung und ohne Illusionen verliess der Verf. am 7. Juni 1933 völlig freiwillig Berlin und nahm Aufenthalt in Kopenhagen (Dänemark). Hier lebte er in den nächsten Jahren teils von den ihm noch zur Verfügung stehenden Sparmitteln teils von Verdiensten bei grösseren Börsengeschäften, die er für eigene und fremde Rechnung an der Stockholmer Börse vornahm. Um Politik kümmerte er sich in diesen Jahren sehr wenig, er hielt sich abseits, er nahm keine Beziehungen zu Emigranten auf und liess seine zahlreichen Verbindungen mit politischen Freunden und Bekannten in Deutschland einschlafen, um die betreffenden Persönlichkeiten nicht zu gefährden. Abwarten war das einzigmögliche.

Davon machte er eine Ausnahme, als er im Febr. 1934 das Buch "Hitler.- Episode ?" in schwedischer Sprache veröffentlichte. Es war ein wirtschaftsbericht über die Ursachen des Zusammenbruchs der Weimarrepublik und zugleich eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten für den Nazismus. Er unterschätzte ohne Zweifel diese Möglichkeiten, weil er den Willen Grossbritanniens und Frankreichs zum entschlossenen Widerstand überschätzte. Noch 1934 aber vor dem Tode Hindenburgs hätte ein englisch-französisches Ultimatum mit entsprechenden militärischen Vorbereitungen genügt, um Hindenburg

Abonnenten, deren Zahl anfänglich rasch [illegible] gehörten Anhänger der beiden Oppositionsgruppen, auch eine Anzahl Monarchisten. Die grosse Mehrzahl waren jedoch Vertreter der Intelligenzschichten, die den verschiedensten Parteien angehörten, u.a. eine Anzahl jüdischer Ärzte, Advokaten und Richter. Der Start der Zeitschrift war schon in jene Zeit gefallen, wo die wirtschaftliche Krise immer schärfer wurde, der politische Kampf seine rohesten Formen annahm und die Stimme der Vernunft verhallen musste. Gegen Ende 1931 wurde bereits die Gefahr akut, dass die Zeitschrift eingestellt werden müsse. Deutschnationale Führer wünschten die direkte Anlehnung an ihre Partei, Gregor Strasser wollte den Anschluss an seine Partei. Der Herausgeber bestand jedoch in beiden Fällen auf der Bewahrung des bisherigen sachlichen Standpunktes und seiner persönlichen Unabhängigkeit. Das war nicht durchzusetzen, und da die Krise sich noch mehr verschärfte, stellte er im April 1932 die Zeitschrift ein. Im ganzen waren etwa 80 Nummern erschienen.

In den Jahren 1930/32 war der Herausgeber bekannt geworden mit den Hauptführern der Deutschnationalen (Hugenberg, Oberfohren, Quaatz, Bang, Schmidt u.s.w) und der Nationalsozialisten (Göbbels, Epp, Frick, Hess, Greg. Strasser, Röhm, Rosenberg, Dietrich, Hanfstängl u.s.w.). sowie des Stahlhelms (Bundeskanzler Wagner, Duesterberg und Müller-Brandenburg). Ausserdem hatte er Verbindungen mit bekannten älteren Generälen (Graf Waldersee, von Crammon, Rauch u.a.), mit heute als Gesandten tätigen Diplomaten der Wilhelmstrasse und mit dem Kreis um General Schleicher. Mit Hitler wurde der Herausgeber bekanntgemacht gelegentlich eines Besuches bei Hess im "Kaiserhof" in Berlin im Frühjahr 1932. Es kam dabei zu keinen näheren Gespräch. Die unmittelbare Folge war aber, dass alle Bekannten in Hitlers Partei nicht mehr zugänglich blieben. Möglicherweise war Order gegeben worden. Man sagt, Hitler sei ein Menschenkenner. Nach zweimaligem längeren Besuch in München in der ersten Hälfte des Jahres 1932 hatte der Verf. freilich auch eine so gründliche Kenntnis von der Partei gewonnen, dass er einigermassen zu wissen glaubte, was von ihr als Regierungspartei zu erwarten sei. Seine eigene Auffassung war damit nicht vereinbar.

Nach Einstellung der Zeitschrift lebte der Verf. noch bis Ende Mai 1933 in Berlin als Privatmann. und beobachtete die Entwicklung der Dinge. Er gehörte

[illegible] Anfang Oktober 1930. Bei einem [illegible] bat Kern um nähere Mitteilungen darüber, [illegible] der Reparationsfrage vorstelle. Der Frager [illegible] Dr. Blocher ein mündliches Exposé, worüber [illegible] wurde schliesslich folgender Rat gegeben: [illegible] die amerikanische Hochfinanz, die riesige [illegible] verantwortlich ist für [illegible] moralisch verantwortlich ist für [illegible] Anleihen, und über diese, aber ausser [illegible] Anleihen, und über diese, aber ausser [illegible] gegen die Reparationspolitik [illegible] zum Kampf gegen die Reparationspoli- [illegible] Reichstag. Die Reparationen müssen, so [illegible] werden, wenn das in Deutschland investierte [illegible] in Deutschland investiertes [illegible] werden sind, werden die Reparationen nicht sehr bald [illegible] Gefahr, dass auch die privaten Aus- [illegible] Abschreibung ist die vorläufige [illegible] Abschreibung ist die vorläufige [illegible] formelle Moratorium". Der Heraus- [illegible] Diese Bedenken auch in seinen Ar- [illegible] ist der Herausgeber nicht be- [illegible] die Regierung Hoo- [illegible] freilich [illegible] Verständnis [illegible] Unterschrift [illegible] die letzten [illegible] Ausgabe [illegible] die letzten [illegible] in den festen

sollte rein sachlich sein. Eine solche [redacted] war damals in Deutschland sehr ungewöhnlich. Ein alter Monarchist meinte deshalb auch einmal, die Zeitschrift sei eigentlich etwas wie "Seiner Majestät (d. h. der Reichsregierung) getreue Opposition". Andere gingen soweit, direkt den Verdacht auszusprechen, Brüning finanziere mit Reichsgeldern die Zeitschrift, die solle scheinbar schärfste Kritik üben, in Wirklichkeit aber helfen, den Weg zu bahnen für eine weit aktivere Politik der Regierung. Das war nicht richtig- leider. Der Herausgeber gestattete jedoch auch dem getreuen Anhänger der Regierung Brüning, dem Historiker Professor Fritz Kern an der Universität Bonn, mehrfach Artikel in der Zeitschrift zu veröffentlichen. Kern war eng befreundet mit Reichsminister Treviranus und bekannt mit Brüning. Einer dieser Artikel, "Hitler - der Sturzbach", öffnete Kern sofort die Tür zu Hitler persönlich. Kern erklärte sich auch mehrmals bereit, den Herausgeber sowohl mit Reichskanzler Brüning wie mit dem preussischen Ministerpräsidenten Braun bekanntzumachen, vielleicht könne dadurch, so meinte Kern, eine Zusammenarbeit zustandekommen. Der Herausgeber lehnte ab mit der Erklärung, er schätze zwar Persönlichkeiten wie Brüning und Braun sehr hoch, die Republik sei ihm viel lieber als irgend ein neues Experiment, er möchte ihr aufrichtig helfen, er glaube aber nicht, dass er durch persönliche Unterredungen den politischen Willen der beiden Männer wirklich so beeinflussen könne, wie er es für absolut nötig halte; hinter ihm(dem Herausgeber) stehe übrigens keine politische Macht, die Einfluss direkter Art ausüben könne, er könne sich nur auf seine persönliche wissenschaftliche und politische Überzeugung und seine nationale Gesinnung berufen. Kern habe ihm selber, so fuhr die Ablehnung fort, schon gesagt, man halte die Ansichten, welche die Zeitschrift vertrete, für geradezu verrückt, sie seien gänzlich unrealistisch, so könne die Politik der Reichsregierung niemals geführt werden. Was habe es da für einen Zweck, dass der "verrückte" Herausgeber jene persönlichen Beziehungen aufnehme? Die sachlichen Gegensätze seien zu schroff, er selber interessiere sich nur für die Sache.

Andererseits benützte der Herausgeber die Besuche Kerns immer wieder dazu, Treviranus und dessen Freunde vor der kommenden Wirtschaftskatastrophe warnen zu

ursprünglich nicht, die beiden Artikel abzudrucken, sie tat es erst, nachdem der Verf. den Ton gemildert hatte, ohne den sachlichen Inhalt wesentlich zu verändern. Sie erregten trotzdem grösstes Aufsehen, weil sie den Zusammenbruch der deutschen Wirtschaft deutlich voraussagten. Es wurde betont, dass es sicher nicht bei dieser einer wirtschaftlichen Katastrophe verbleiben werde, diese werde sich vielmehr im weiteren Verlauf in eine politische Katastrophe für die Weimarrepublik verwandeln. Das Endergebnis werde infolge der Verständnislosigkeit der Reparationsgläubiger, vor allem Frankreichs, höchstwahrscheinlich eine nationalistische Diktatur sein.

Ende 1929 nahm der Verf. seinen Abschied von N.D.A. und F.Z. Er siedelte im März 1930 nach Berlin über, wo er sich publizistisch betätigen wollte. Im Herbst 1930 startete er die politische und wirtschaftliche Wochenschrift" Das Freie Deutschland". In gewissem Sinne war Maximilian Hardens Zeitschrift " die Zukunft" ihr Vorbild. Die Redaktion war frei von jedem anderen Einfluss als dem des Herausgebers, der nur solche Ideen entwickeln liess, die entweder seiner Auffassung voll entsprachen oder doch nicht weit davon entfernt standen. Artikel über Innenpolitik schrieb er meist selbst. Mitarbeiter für Aussenpolitik war der ehemalige schweizerische Politiker und Diplomat Dr. E. Blocher, ein ausgezeichneter Kenner der modernen europäischen Geschichte. Die politische Linie der Zeitschrift ging im allgemeinen etwa parallel der Politik, welche die sog. nationale Opposition, Deutschnationale und Nationalsozialisten, wirklich oder auch angeblich verfolgten. Die Zeitschrift war aber völlig unabhängig von beiden Oppositionsparteien. Wie ihr Titel schon besagte, kämpfte sie für eine Befreiung Deutschlands von den Lasten des Versailler Vertrages, in erster Linie von den Reparationslasten. Als Mittel zur Erreichung dieser Ziele wünschte sie aber unter keinen Umständen die Anwendung von Gewalt, Krieg, sondern nur stärksten passiven Widerstand. Der Herausgeber war überzeugt, dass ein neuer Krieg nur allzu leicht zu einer neuen revolutionären Katastrophe für die bürgerliche Welt führen könne, er müsse mit allen Mitteln vermieden werden. Alle Mitarbeiter aus dem Oppositionslager wurden daher sehr kurz gehalten und ihre Beiträge nicht selten hart zensuriert. Antisemitismus wurde nicht, ebenso persönliche Angriffe schärfster Art auf Mitglieder der Reichsregierung (damals Brüning) oder der preussischen Regierung nicht erlaubt. Die Opposition -ed.

weiterkämpfen für ihr Ziel , den Aufbau einer sozialistischen Wirtschaft, und sehr wahrscheinlich damit allmählich vorwärtskommen . Ein Zurück gibt es nicht mehr. Auch die Landwirtschaft wird sozialisiert und mechanisiert werden . Im Kampf um die die Nachfolgerschaft Lenins(der damals noch wogte) wird der realistische Stalin siegen. Er ist überzeugter, ehrlicher Kommunist, aber auch nüchterner Realpolitiker. Er hat den harten Willen , der nötig ist für die Durchführung einer so gigantischen Aufgabe wie der Organisation einer sozialistischen Wirtschaft in einem zurückgebliebenen Riesenland. Der Aufbau einer grossen modernen Industrie wird auch erstmals die eigenen militärischen Machtmittel Russlands auf die Höhe neuzeitlicher Kriegführung bringen. ---- An diese Reise schlossen sich Verhandlungen an mit der Frankf. Ztg. wegen der Übernahme eines Korespondentenpostens in Moskau ,sie scheiterten an der Geldfrage.

In den Monaten Sept., Okt.und Dez. 1929 machte der Verf. als Spezialkorrespondent der N.D.A. eine Reise durch Deutschland, die Schweiz, Italien, Spanien, Frankreich, Belgien und Holland. Er schrieb eine Serie Artikel über seine Eindrücke. Bei seinem Aufenthalt in Rom (Okt.1929) ersuchte er den dortigen deutschen Botschafter(und späteren Aussenminister der Kabinette Papen, Schleicher und Hitler) Freiherrn von Neurath, ihm eine Unterredung mit Mussolini zu vermitteln. Die Absicht war , Mussolini für eine Aktion in der Reparationsfrage zu interessieren .M. bemühte sich damals , Sympathieen in Deutschland zu gewinnen. Das sollte ausgenützt werden. Italien solle, so war der Meinung, die Abschreibung der Reparationsfrage ins Rollen bringen durch die Erklärung , eine andere Lösung sei überhaupt ausgeschlossen,jeder weitere Aufschub sei unheilvoll für die ganze Welt. es verzichte deshalb selber sofort auf seine eigenen Reparationsansprüche. Eine solche Aktion hätte natürlich Mussolini viele Sympathieen in Deutschland eingetragen,sie hätte aber auch, was die Hauptsache gewesen wäre, die Regierung der Weimarrepublik zu einer viel aktiveren Politik in der Frage getrieben. Neurath lehnte die Vermittelung des Gespräches ab. Er meinte , Italien sei selber arm , es brauche die Reparationsgelder.

Zu der Artikelserie , die der Verf. damals veröffentlichte, gehörten zwei Aufsätze über die Verhältnisse in Deutschland .Die Redaktion der N.D.A.wagte es

Auf Ersuchen der Frankfurter Zeitung wurde er im Mai 1918 aus dem Heeresdienst entlassen und übernahm den Stockholmer Korrespondentenposten des Blattes für Schweden, Finnland, Dänemark und Norwegen. Ab 1919 hatte er auch über die Sowjetunion zu berichten.

Der Verf. bekleidete den Stockholmer Posten der F.Z. bis Ende 1929. Im April 1923 wurde er auch City Editor der konservativen Nya Dagligt Allehanda in Stockholm. Im Mai 1924 wurde er Schwedischer Staatsbürger. In der N. D. A. schrieb der Verf. 1923/29 u. a. eine grosse Anzahl Artikel über die Reparationsfrage, er vertrat darin von Anfang an den radikalen Standpunkt , dass die wirkliche Lösung dieser enorm wichtigen Frage nur ihre völlige Abschreibung sein könne, weil eine andere Lösung nationalökonomisch nicht mehr möglich sei.

In den Jahren 1929/29 unternahm der Verf. mehrere Auslandsreisen als Spezialkorrespondent der N.D.A. So hielt er sich zu Anfang des Jahres 1919 einige Wochen in Weimar auf , wo er viele Gespräche mit Deutschen und Österreichischen Politikern hatte. Er wurde auch Zeuge der historischen Szene, bei der Friedrich Ebert zum ersten Präsidenten der deutschen Republik proklamiert wurde.

Im September- Oktober 1927 besuchte der Verf. als Gast des deutschen Botschafters Grafen von Brockdorff-Rantzau die Sowjetunion. In Moskau hatte er Unterhaltungen mit dem Aussenkommissar Tschitscherin, dem heute noch tätigen Volkskommissar für den Aussenhandel Mikoyan ,dem Vizekommissar der Finanzen Bronsky, dem leitenden Mitglied des Gosplan(der Planwirtschaftskommission)dem Parteilosen Kuzmin sowie mit anderen Volkskommissaren und hohen Beamten. Der Umgang mit Volkskommissaren und Beamten war damals noch sehr frei. Als Ergebnis der Reise veröffentlichte die N.D.A. eine Serie von elf Artikeln und die Frankf. Ztg. vier Artikel. In den Artikeln der F. Z. brachte zum ersten mal ein Weltblatt eingehende Darlegungen über den ersten Fünfjahresplan . Es wurde darin auch der Gedanke stark unterstrichen, die Sowjetregierung werde konsequenterweise genötigt sein zu einer radikalen Sozialisierung der Landwirtschaft . Diese Auffassung war damals in Moskau selber noch sehr umstritten. Die 15 Artikel gaben ein ungeschminktes, realistisches aber objektives Bild von den Zuständen in Russland. Das abschliessende Urteil lautete: Trotz enormer Schwierigkeiten wird die Sowjetregierung rücksichtslos

wo er in Milano u.a. Zeuge der Demonstrationen wurde, die der damalige Chefredakteur des sozialistischen Avanti , Benito Mussolini, gegen den Krieg veranstaltete.

Nach Erledigung dieses Auftrages kehrte er in die Handelsredaktion der F. Z. zurück. Als i. J. 1913 eine Tranche der neuen internationalen Anleihe Russlands in Deutschland emittiert werden sollte, erhielt der Verf. auf seinen Antrag von der Redaktionskonferenz der F. Z. die Vollmacht , diese russische Emission in Deutschland zu bekämpfen. Er begründete den Antrag teils mit dem Hinweis , der Erlös sei bestimmt für den Bau neuer strategischer Bahnen, die gegen Deutschland gerichtet seien, teils mit der Erklärung, er könne als Nicht-Jude es nicht verstehen, dass die F. Z. , von der immer gesagt werde, sie sei ein jüdisches Blatt, nicht die Gelegenheit benützen wolle ,dem antisemitischen Zarismus und seiner Pogrompolitik einen ordentlichen Denkzettel zu geben. Damit war der geringe Widerstand gegen den Antrag gebrochen. Die rücksichtslose Kampagne erregte grosses Aufsehen. Die russische Regierung entsandte sofort ihren Finanzbeirat an der Berliner Botschaft Narkow nach Frankfurt, um die Redaktion der F.Z. "umzustimmen". Der Chef der Handelsredaktion überliess es dem damals erst 25jährigen Verf. den Vertreter der Zarenregierung abzuweisen. Auch die Intervention des deutschen Auswärtigen Amts hatte keinen Erfolg.

Der Verf. beschäftigte sich schon damals wie später eingehend mit wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Fragen Russlands und wurde 1914 von der F.Z. in Aussicht genommen für den neu zu errichtenden Posten eines nationalökonomischen Korrespondenten in St.Petersburg. Der Plan verfiel,als der Krieg im August 1914 ausbrach. Der Verf. meldete sich sofort zum Eintritt in das deutsche Heer. Nach seiner Ausbildung bei der damals modernsten Waffe, der schweren Artillerie, kam er Ende 1914 an die Westfront, wo er 22 Monate verblieb. Er tat erst Dienst bei einer 21cm-Mörserbatterie,wurde aber schon nach einigen Monaten überführt zu den neugebildeten Beobachtungstruppen der Artillerie(Artilleriemesstruppe). Auf Grund einer theoretischen Arbeit über das trigonometrische Schiessverfahren der Artillerie im Stellungskrieg wurde er im November 1916 vom Armeeoberkommando V als Hilfslehrer an die neue Artillerie-Messschule in Köln versetzt. Im März 1917 trat er als Lehrer zum neuen Artilleriemesstrupp an der Schiessschule Beverloo(Belgien) ein

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P.M. Vierter Teil. Persönliches über den Verfasser.

Der Verfasser des P.M. ist 1888 geboren in Deidesheim bei Speyer, Rheinpfalz (Bayern) und dort aufgewachsen in einem Hause mit demokratischen Traditionen. Der Grossvater hatte aktiv teilgenommen an der badisch-pfälzischen Revolution 1848/49. Der Vater war Rechtskonsulent und führte als Stadtrat kommunalwirtschaftliche Reformen durch (Bau einer Wasserleitung, eines Elektrizitätswerkes und eines Kanalisationssystems). Der Verfasser wurde frühzeitig von seinem Vater mit politischen Fragen bekanntgemacht. Bei seinem Abgang vom humanistischen Gymnasium wollte ihn der Rektor als Stipendiaten für das bayerische Maximilianeum gewinnen (eine Anstalt gestiftet für die Spezialausbildung von Studenten der Universität München zu bayerischen Staats- und Verwaltungsbeamten), während sein Religionsprofessor, ein päpstlicher Monsignore, ihm den Eintritt in das Collegium Germanicum der Jesuiten in Rom vorschlug. Beides lehnte er ab und begann 1907 in München Philosophie, Rechtswissenschaft und Nationalökonomie zu studieren. Nach Ablegung eines juristischen Examens ging er vollständig zum Studium der Nationalökonomie über. Sein bedeutendster Lehrer in diesem Fach war der liberale Professor Lujo Brentano, der als junger Wissenschaftler ein Standardwerk über die englischen Trade-Unions veröffentlicht hatte und nunmehr als einer der ersten Vertreter seines Faches galt. Sein Spezialstudium setzte der Verfasser an der Universität Freiburg (Baden) fort. Hier war sein wichtigster Lehrer Professor von Schulze-Gävernitz, der Standardwerke über den "Britischen Imperialismus" und die russische Grossindustrie geschrieben hatte. Die Doktorabhandlung des Verfassers behandelte ein damals aktuelles Problem der deutschen Finanzwelt, die Umwandlung von Kreditgenossenschaften in Aktienbanken und die Aufsaugung von Provinzbanken durch die Berliner Grossbanken. Auf Empfehlung seines Universitätslehrers erhielt er im April 1911 den Posten eines Redakteurs in der Handelsredaktion der Frankfurter Zeitung. Im Winter 1911/12 glückte es ihm zusammen mit drei anderen politisch stark interessierten Studienkameraden, die Aufstellung seines Freiburger Lehrers als demokratischen Kandidaten zum deutschen Reichstag durchzusetzen; der Kandidat eroberte den Sitz, der bis dahin 40 Jahre ununterbrochen von einer anderen Partei gehalten worden war. Im Herbst 1911- bei Ausbruch des Tripoliskrieges- wurde der Verf. von der politischen Redaktion der F.Z. als Spezialkorrespondent nach Norditalien gesandt.

TO:

Mrs. Clement 11/14

A 673

This came in today from Bruce Hopper. Mr. Murphy would like a translation sent to the Colonel if it would be of interest to him.

M. O'Donnell

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

A 674

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd BA NOV 17 1942

Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
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	11/17	11/18	JRH	[illegible]

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SECRET

correspondent in Russia. He had the same lack of success with the Goeteborgs Handel-och Sjofartstidning. Both of these refusals were due, partly to the high expense which would be involved, but mostly to the repercussions which he would occasion in anti-Russian Sweden and in Finland. In the fall of 1941 he asked the Svenska Dagbladet to sent him to the USA as correspondent. This failed because of the financial question. Likewise, his efforts to interest Swedish banking circles in a mission to the United States wherein he would represent Swedish and Finnish interests in a post-war accord largely influenced by the United States were in vain. Apparently the circles involved did not wish to provoke Nazi Germany prematurely. At the present time, the writer is preparing the second edition of his book "Hitler -- Epoch or Episode?", which will not be released until this question is answered on the field of battle.

or 50,000 of devoted and energetic "Politruks" who together with the better trained Officer Corps form the "elite" of the Red Army. The "san-culottes" of the Soviet Union will undoubtedly fight better than the "sans-culottes" of the French Revolution. The Russian people wish no war, hate war. Stalin's regime wishes to have peace, and has no desire for war. It would prefer to continue its colossal labor unmolested, a war can only impede it. It is now more than ever convinced that, in a peaceful manner, the Soviet Union can become the strongest country in the world, from the standpoint of economy and social organization. It does not trust any of the great bourgeois countries and will make no alliance, before it is actually attacked. Stalin feels that Hitler will bring war upon the Soviet Union, and knows that eight of the ten German Field-Marshals are near the West German border. Stalin, himself, will not attack because of the moral condemnation by his people of any war of aggression. Stalin is convinced that the war is no more war of machines but a gigantic struggle involving millions, and greater than any conflict in history. His first strategic aim will be the destroying of the technical superiority of the German army. Losses of soil are not important. The strategic decision depends on the combined efforts of the entire Russian striking power, plus the mobilized reserves of the [illegible] British Empire.

"On his return from Moscow in May of 1941 the author tried in vain to [illegible] the Svenska Dagbladet to make him a permanent

completely modern. Agriculture has been completely socialized and is technically in advance of that of any other country. Industry and agriculture are now in a position to produce, and production increases apace. The steel production - 20 million metric tons a year - is already greater than that of the steel production of the Kaiser's Germany in 1913 (somewhat over 19 million tons). The great ideal for economy and culture of the Soviet Union is now the coordination of the technical potentialities of American economy with the old Russian concept of "amplitude". The colossal, one-sided favoring of the defense industries and of defense projects still prevent a completely adequate food supply for the masses. The worst of all social evils, mass unemployment, is, however, an almost unknown phenomenon to the Russians. The life of the Russian masses rests on the profound concept of social security. Bourgeois Russia is dead. Seventy-five percent of the population was born under the present regime or were no more than ten years of age in 1917. The psychology of the masses has been entirely remoulded by Marxism and Leninism. The potential fifth column was eradicated by Stalin's purges. Even the frightful sufferings undergone during the socialization of agriculture in the "30's" are being forgotten. Peasant revolts are out of the question. In the case of war the people of the Soviet Union will present a united front. The Red Army is first-class. From the standpoint of material, military experience, and average training, it is, however, behind Germany. Besides, it also boasts a special force of 40,000

regarding his gift. This might be of value to him in the event that he should be made regular correspondent of a Swedish newspaper in Moscow. After a long silence, the news was announced on the 15th of May over the Moscow radio, and published the following day in the Izvestia, Pravda, and the Krasnaia Zvezda. It was to be assumed that the item had been first examined by the "Politbuero" and by Stalin.

After his trip the author wrote a long confidential report for the Svenska Dagbladet, which was also made available to the Swedish Foreign Minister. Later he published four articles in the newspaper, of which two appeared in German in the largest Swiss newspaper, "Neue Zuercher Zeitung".

The total impression carried away by the author was quite favorable, in any case much more favorable than the reports issued by diplomats and journalists assigned to Moscow. Among the diplomats, those whose opinions formed the most glaring contrast to the writer's were Steinhardt, Litvinov, and the Russian-born German diplomatic adviser, Hilger.

The following is the gist of the confidential report and of the published and unpublished articles: "The Soviet Union is a socialist state, complete in its main features and which rests on a firm foundation, functioning according to sound and constantly improving principles. The advances accomplished between 1937 and 1941 - between his two visits - have been considerable in all realms. Socialistic industry is

first-hand knowledge. Among others, he had interviews with the American envoy, Mr. L. Steinhardt, also conversations with the English envoy, Sir Stafford Cripps, with the German ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, with the Finnish representative, Paasikivi, and a number of other diplomats. Schulenburg informed him, on May 6th, that he had been assured by Hitler during his recent visit to Germany of the fact that he had absolutely no intention of waging war against Russia. When the German envoy asked him concerning the meaning of Stalin's statement that same day to the president of the Council of the Peoples' Commissars, the author answered that this was to be interpreted as an S.O.S. for the Soviet Union and perhaps for other lands. Interviews with Peoples' Commissars and officials were this time - in contrast to his visit in 1927 - refused in every case. However, the VOKS, who were available for extensive conferences, place all the desired material at his disposition, and instructed specialists in various subjects to accord him special attention - these included experts on Soviet economics, industrial management and control, population problems, etc. In addition, it was made possible for him to visit the Stalin Automobile works which since September 1939, had been closed to foreigners.

During his trip, the author presented the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute with a hitherto unknown original letter of Friedrich Engels. When he was asked what he would like in return, he requested only a short news item in the Moscow papers

conviction that unarmed Denmark, in the inevitable European war to come, was in danger of a mighty attack from the South; Sweden, much better armed, was in much less danger of such an attack. The war came in 15 months and the occupation of Denmark and the Land of Ships and Fishermen, Norway, 23 months later.

In Stockholm where the author had lived since then, he occupied himself mostly with observing political and later military events. Because of Sweden's special interest in Finland and the Soviet Union he made a thorough study of Russian politics and economics. In February, 1941, he published in the Stockholm newspaper, Svenska Dagbladet, a lengthy article on the Soviet law regarding the training of large corps of youthful Russians, who were educated in military-style schools and later absorbed by industry, with its rapidly growing needs for man-power. These interesting measures made for a significant amplification of Russian preparation for the war which threatened to break out. They represented an application of Socialist theories. The important question of the harnessing of new man power had to be solved by state conscription of men, since the voluntary influx of workers to the factories had declined, due to the improved conditions in the collective forms and the increased attendance by city-dwellers of the higher schools.

On the 16th of April, in 1941, the author went as a special correspondent of the Svenska Dagbladet to Moscow, to gain

customs union caused the inspired Pacifist and Pan-Europeanist Briand to threaten: "L'Anschluss c'est la guerre". Who could expect that direct and flagrant treaty violations could be committed without consequences?

In the summer of 1936 the author made a trip for reasons of health to Pistyan (Slovakia) and Luhanschowitz (Bohemia) and Poland, where he visited Gdynia, Warsaw, and Cracow, spent a considerable length of time in Czechoslovakia (Prague), Hungary (Budapest), Austria (Vienna), Liechtenstein (Vaduz), Switzerland (Zurich and Locarno), France (Paris) and England (London). Through personal observation he attempted to broaden his political and economic knowledge of these countries. In London he gained the lasting impression that the British empire would be startled out of its slumber, to convince the world and Hitler that it is unshakable. The author had no doubt after his brief visit, that the second World War would emerge victorious from the storm. Even at the critical days of Dunkerque, when everybody doubted this, his faith in the British empire remained firm.

In the summer of 1937 the author studied the political and economic conditions of Norway which he had formerly visited. Therefore he observed most of Europe. As for the Balkan countries (Rumania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania), the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and Portugal, he did not visit them.

In the midst of the Spring in 1938 the critical moment of the [illegible], the author left Copenhagen and Denmark, with the

year 1933 made their initial attempts at government, there could exist no doubt that Germany was to face difficult days. Without either hope or illusions the author in June 1933 quite of his own volition left Berlin to reside in Copenhagen (Denmark). His livelihood was gained by stock market operations undertaken for others and for himself in the Stockholm Exchange. He troubled with politics very little keeping himself aloof and establishing no connections with emigrants. He neglected to keep in contact with political circles in order not to endanger in any way the respective personalities. To wait was to him his only recourse. To this policy he made only one exception. In February he published in the Swedish language the book "Hitler: Epoch or Episode?". It was an analysis of the causes of the downfall of the Weimar republic and also an investigation of the possibilities of Fascism to develop in Germany. The book undoubtedly underestimated these possibilities because it overestimated English and French determination to resist. Even in 1934, or prior to Hindenburg's death, an English-French Ultimatum with the proper military authorization would have been sufficient to induce Hindenburg to dismiss his cabinet. In 1936 the German troops which were to occupy the Rhineland, were supplied with sealed orders for the eventuality of a possible retreat, in the case that France and England should present military opposition. Nothing of this sort, however, occurred and the coup was successful. Before Hitler the Curtius-Schobersche Plan for a German-Austrian

"Kaiserhof" of Berlin in the spring of 1932. He had no lengthy conversation with him at that time. The direct consequence of this was, however, that he was not given further access to party members. Possibly this order was given. It is said that Hitler is a connoisseur of persons. After a visit, which was twice as long at Munich in the first half of the year 1932, the author had gained a thorough enough understanding of National Socialism to be able to know what might be expected of it as a governing party. His own ideas were not in unison with the National Socialist Party.

After giving up his publication the author lived in Berlin until the end of May 1933, as a private citizen, all the while observing developments. In line with his policy, he did not join any party. Hindenburg took the step which the writer in his last leading article had emphasized as completely possible. He acted in January (30), 1933, exactly as in 1926, in direct contradiction to the wishes of his democratic constituents. Strangely enough the German Nationalists made a coalition with Hitler in the new cabinet. Since the meeting of the national opposition in Harzburg in the fall of 1931 and as a result of later dealings with the Nazis they had ample reason to be very suspicious of them. During the time of the presidential election in the spring of 1932 they were bitterly opposed to and extremely suspicious of Hitler, and even willing to support Brüning for president under certain conditions, if the latter was willing. After the basis and during the first half of the

 SECRET

the general moratorium.

The magazine was read by all the leaders of the opposition parties and by a number of the Reichstag members of all parties. The number of steady subscribers to the magazine was augmented by an ever growing host of persons, representing both oppositions, as well as a fair number of Monarchists. The great majority were representatives of the intelligentsia, belonging to a great number of parties, among others numerous Jewish physicians, of lawyers and judges. The beginnings of the magazine coincided with the period when the economic crisis was becoming increasingly acute, and the political issue most bitter, the voice of reason being determined to make itself heard. Toward the end of 1931 the danger became imminent that the paper would have to be suspended. The German National leaders wished it to support frankly their party. Gregor Strasser wished to make use of it for his party. The editor wished now as before to be entirely objective, and finally concluded by ceasing publication in April 1932. In all 80 numbers had appeared.

During the years 1930 - 1932 the editor became acquainted with the chief leaders of the German Nationalists (Hugenburg, Oberfohren, Quaatz, Bang, Schmidt, et al) and the National Socialists (Goebbels, Epp, Frick, Hess, Gregor Strasser, Roehm, Rosenberg, Dietrich, Hanfstaengl, et al). In addition he had connections with well-known older generals (Count Waldersee, Crammon, Hauch, et al.) with diplomats busy today on the Wilhelmstrasse and with the circle around General Schleicher. He met Hitler on the occasion of a visit to Hess in the

Dr. Blecher, received a verbal exposition, during which he
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took careful notes. He received the following advice:
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"Bruening's government must bring pressure on the American
"Bruening's government must bring pressure on the American
financial world, which had invested heavily in Germany,
financial world, which had invested heavily in Germany,
and to which Germany was morally indebted, to mobilize
and to which Germany was morally indebted, to mobilize
Hoover's government in the struggle against the reparations
Hoover's government in the struggle against the reparations
policies of the Versailles powers, especially France. The
policies of the Versailles powers, especially France. The
reparations must, and this is essential, be renounced, if
reparations must, and this is essential, be renounced, if
American capital invested in Germany is to be salvaged. If
American capital invested in Germany is to be salvaged. If
the reparations are not repudiated soon, the danger will grow
the reparations are not repudiated soon, the danger will grow
daily, and foreign investments will be lost. The best way
daily, and foreign investments will be lost. The best way
to repudiation is the preliminary suspension of payments by
to repudiation is the preliminary suspension of payments by
the formal declaration of a moratorium". The editor
the formal declaration of a moratorium". The editor
published these same thoughts in his articles. What Korn did
published these same thoughts in his articles. What Korn did
with his notes is not known. Indeed, American high finance
with his notes is not known. Indeed, American high finance
and Hoover's government were mobilized and the so-called
and Hoover's government were mobilized and the so-called
Hoover-moratorium was declared in the summer of 1931, albeit
Hoover-moratorium was declared in the summer of 1931, albeit
too late and in too mild a form. Hoover did not dare to
too late and in too mild a form. Hoover did not dare to
oppose Laval further.
oppose Laval further.

When in the middle of 1931 the bank crisis occurred, the
When in the middle of 1931 the bank crisis occurred, the
German proposal that revolving credits for foreign exchange
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be excluded from the moratorium, in order to enable German
be excluded from the moratorium, in order to enable German
banks to continue to subsist. The appropriate issue was sent
banks to continue to subsist. The appropriate issue was sent
to the Swedish banker J. Wallenberg, then in Berlin, as presi-
to the Swedish banker J. Wallenberg, then in Berlin, as presi-
dent of a sub-committee for the "Kepco", and the receipt of
dent of a sub-committee for the "Kepco", and the receipt of
the cable acknowledged with a letter of thanks. Some days
the cable acknowledged with a letter of thanks. Some days
later revolving credits of foreign banks were excluded from
later revolving credits of foreign banks were excluded from

in the magazine. Kern was a close friend of the Reichs-minister Treviranus and acquainted also with Bruening. One of these articles, "Hitler- The Dynamo", opened the door to his direct acquaintance with the "Fuehrer". Kern also offered to introduce the editor to Chancellor Bruening and to the Prussian Minister-President Braun, - Kern proposed to effect cooperation in this manner. But the editor declined, saying that although he esteemed Bruening and Braun a great deal, the republic was to him, above all, a new experiment, which he would like to aid honestly, but that he did not believe he could actually influence the two men by conferring with them. He further maintained that no political power stood behind him; he had only his economic and political convictions and his national consciousness. Kern had already told him, it is said, that the magazine's views were considered "crazy" and totally unrealizable, and that its policies concerning the government could never be put into effect. Why then should the "crazy" editor involve himself in these personal relationships? The material differences were too great, and he, himself, was not interested in the matter.

On the other hand, the editor availed himself of Kern's visits to warn Treviranus and his friends indirectly that a catastrophe was to come. Kern made his first visit at the beginning of October, in 1930. At a later visit a short time afterward Kern asked the editor how he would solve the question of Reparations. Kern, in the presence of the collaborator

an eminent connoisseur of modern European history. The political lines of the magazine in general paralleled the policy advocated by the so-called national opposition, the German Nationalists and National Socialists. However, the magazine was independent of these two opposition parties. As its name indicated, it fought for the freeing of Germany from the onus of the Versailles Treaty especially as regards reparations payments. As a means for the attainment of this goal, it absolutely opposed the use of violence or war, but advocated passive resistance. The editor was convinced that a new war would lead to another revolutionary catastrophe for the citizens: this must be avoided at all costs. Therefore, the work of all collaborators was severely inspected and censored. Anti-Semitism was not allowed and personal attack of an ugly nature upon the members of the government (Bruening was then president) or of the Prussian government was not permitted. The opposition must be purely objective. A position of this sort was at that time very strange for Germany. An old monarchist once said, therefore, that the magazine was somet ing like "an opposition true to His Majesty" (i.e. Bruening's government). Others went so far as to say that Bruening was financing the publication with state funds apparently to criticise national politics severely, but actually to pave the way for a far more active policy on the part of the government. That was unfortunately not the case. The editor allowed the faithful devotee of the Bruening government, the historian Prof. Fritz Kern of the University of Bonn, to publish a number of articles

- this was the most important consideration - to a more active participation in the solution of the problem. Neurath refused to arrange the interview. He was of the opinion that Italy was so poor that she needed the reparations money.

To the series published by the writer there belonged two essays on conditions in Germany. The Nya Dagligt Allehanda originally did not dare to publish both articles, and only did so after the writer had toned them down, without altering their contents substantially. They attracted considerable attention. It was emphasised in them that the conditions described therein would not merely end in financial ruin, but in political catastrophe for the Weimar Republic. The final result, because of the lack of understanding on the part of the creditors, especially France, would be the establishment of a national dictatorship.

Toward the end of 1929 the writer gave up his work with the Nya Dagligt Allehanda and the Frankfurter Zeitung. He moved to Berlin where he wished to do publicity work. In the fall of 1930 he founded the political-economic weekly "Das Freie Deutschland". In a certain sense Maxmilian Harden's magazine, "Die Zukunft", was a prototype for the publication. The staff entertained no opinions save those of the publisher, who only tolerated the expression of ideas fairly closely in line with his own point of view. He, himself, wrote most of the articles on internal politics. Collaborator for foreign politics was the Swiss statesman and diplomat Dr. H. Blocher,

enterprise as the building of a socialist economy in a backward and gigantic country. The establishment of a great industrial system would make possible Russia's participation in modern warfare." -- During this trip negotiations were carried on with the Frankfurter Zeitung concerning the establishment of a correspondent's post in Moscow, which had no success because of financial difficulties.

During the months of September, October, and December the author, as Special Correspondent of the Nya Dagligt Allehanda traveled through Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, France, Belgium and Holland. He wrote a series of articles about his impressions. During his stay in Rome (October 1929) he interviewed the German ambassador (and later Foreign Minister of Papen, Schleicher, and Hitler cabinets), Baron von Neurath, asking him to arrange a conference with Mussolini. The purpose was to interest Mussolini in action regarding the Reparations questions; at that time Mussolini was attempting to gain German sympathies. That was a point to be exploited. Italy - this was the plan - would initiate debt cancellation by announcing that no other solution was possible, and that any other solution would be impossible from the national economic viewpoint; he would first renounce his own debts. An action of this sort would naturally have made Mussolini immensely popular in Germany, and would have brought the Weimar Republic

Commissar Tschitscherin, the People's Commissar for Foreign Commerce, still active today; Mikoyan, the Vice-commissar of Finances; Bronsky, the outstanding member of the Gosplan (of the Economic Planning Commission) the "Partyless" Kogan; as well as with other People's Commissars and other high officials. Contact with Commissars and officials was at that time still easy. As a result of the journey the Nya Dagligt Allehanda published a series of eleven articles and the Frankfurter Zeitung published four articles. With these articles the Frankfurter Zeitung was the first newspaper of world-wide repute to publish extensive information on the Five-Year Plan. The thought was expressed also in these that ultimately the Soviet Government would be compelled to socialize agriculture. This opinion was widely accepted in Moscow itself at that time. The 15 articles gave an unbiased, realistic, but objective picture of conditions in Russia. The final conclusion: "In spite of enormous difficulties, the Soviet Government would regardless of anything pursue its aim -- the construction of a socialist economy, and would probably forge ahead. No recession could be possible. Agriculture would also be socialized and mechanized. The question of who would succeed Lenin would be won by the realistic Stalin. He is a thorough, honest Communist, but also a sober realistic politician. He possesses the iron will which is necessary for the realization of such an enormous

instructor in the new Artillery-Engineers (Artillerie Messschule). In March of 1917 he became school instructor in the gunnery school at Beverloo (Belgium), in the same subject. By request of the "Frankfurter Zeitung" he was released from army duty in May 1918 and took over the post of Stockholm correspondent of the paper for Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway. Beginning in 1919 he also reported on the Soviet Union.

The author was Stockholm correspondent until the end of 1933. In April 1932 he also became City Editor of the conservative Nya Dagligt Allehanda in Stockholm. In May of 1934 he became a Swedish citizen. During the years 1933-39 he wrote a large number of articles on the question of Reparations. From the beginning he propounded the radical point of view that only the complete renunciation of these debts would solve the problem; all else was impossible from the standpoint of national economy.

During the years 1919-39 the author undertook several trips as special correspondent of the Nya Dagligt Allehanda. He spent several weeks in Weimar, in 1919, and he there had several conversations with German and Austrian statesmen. He also witnessed the historical scene wherein Friedrich Ebert was proclaimed first president of the German Republic.

During September-October of 1937, as guest of the German ambassador Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, he visited Soviet Russia. In Moscow he had conversations with the Foreign

Frankfurter Zeitung, always reputed to be a Jewish paper, was not willing to fight against anti-Semitic Czarism and to administer a slap to the Russian policy of pogroms. With these arguments he put an end to all objections. The campaign attracted a great deal of attention. The Russian government immediately sent Markow, its financial adviser at the Berlin embassy, to Frankfurt, for the purpose of making the "Frankfurter Zeitung" "listen to reason". The head of the financial section allowed the 25 year old author to dispose of the Czar's representative. Nor did the intervention of the German Foreign Office have any effect.

The author at that time concerned himself, as he would later also, with a serious study of the economic and financial problems of Russia and was considered in 1914 by the "Frankfurter Zeitung" for the new post of national economic correspondent at St. Petersburg. This plan was never realized, since the war broke out in August 1914. The author then enlisted in the German Army. After his training in heavy artillery, he went to the Western Front in 1914 where he spent 22 months. At first he served with a 21 cm. Moerser Battery, but after a few months he was transferred to the newly formed "observation troops" (Beobachtungstruppen) in the artillery (Artilleriemesstrupps). On the basis of a theoretical work on gunnery in a war of position, he was sent in November 1916 to the Fifth Army Comand as auxiliary

imperialism and Russian industry. The doctoral dissertation of the author concerned the then current problem of the German financial world, the conversion of Credit societies into joint-stock banks and the absorption of the country banks by the Berlin banks. With the aid of a recommendation from his university teacher he received in 1911 the post of editor in the financial section of the Frankfurter Zeitung. In the winter of 1911-1912 he was successful, partly with the aid of three former university comrades, in being nominated as democratic candidate to the German Reichstag; the candidate was consequently elected to a seat which had been uninterruptedly for forty years held by a member from another party. In the fall of 1911, when the War of Tripoli broke out, the author was sent to North Italy as special correspondent for the political section of the Frankfurter Zeitung. During this time he was witness to the demonstrations organised to protest against the war, by the whilom chief editor of the Socialist "Avanti", Benito Mussolini.

After the completion of this task, he returned to work in the financial section of the F.Z. In the year 1913 when a portion of Russia's loan from Germany was to be floated, he received full authority from the F.Z. to fight against this German loan to Russia. He based his petition for this authority, partly on the argument that the money would be employed in constructing strategic railways against Germany, partly on the contention that as a non-Jew he could not comprehend how the

Biography — Paul

4/17/42

[SECRET]

× German
× Translation
× Hopper, Bruce

FIRST PART. Personal notes on the writer.

The writer of the P.M. was born in 1888 in Deidesheim bei Speyer, Rheinpfalz (Bavaria) and grew up in a home with democratic traditions. His grandfather had taken an active part in the Baden-Pfalz Revolution (1848-9). The father was a legal adviser (Rechtskonsulent) and as a city counselor was responsible for communal agrarian reforms (construction of an aqueduct, of an electric plant and a system of canals). At an early age his father familiarized him with political problems. Upon his graduation from college the rector wished to recommend him as a candidate for the Bavarian Maximilianeum (an institution devoted to the special education of students of the University of Munich, for state and administrative positions) while his professor of Religion, a papal Monsignorio, proposed his entrance in the Jesuit Collegium Germanicum at Rome. He refused both opportunities and in 1907 he went to Munich to study Philosophy, Law and National Economy. After successful completion of his law examination, he devoted himself exclusively to National Economy. His most eminent teacher in this subject was the liberal professor, Lujo Brentano, who as a young scholar had written a standard work on English Trade-Unions and was recognized as one of the pioneers in his field. He taught his specialty at the University of Freiburg (Baden). Here his outstanding teacher was Prof. von Schulze-Gaevernitz, who had written standard works on British

Hopper, Bruce 1323 E
Predictions for 1943

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN LEGATION

Stockholm
February 2, 1943

Colonel William J. Donovan
OSS, Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel:

The enclosed Predictions for 1943 were drawn up by a friend of mine who was in Dr. Bruning's cabinet, and in many ways his closest adviser. He was the wizard of the Reparations period, a very sound, and abundantly wise man with intimate knowledge of the politics of all Europe (including Sweden). I say this to indicate that the paper is not ordinary soothsaying, but something worthy of attention (he has sources, I believe, to document his judgements.) I have a number of important documents to forward to you, but prefer to do so from London* What would be best for me would be if you or David were to meet me in London in March. Can do? I long to talk to you.

Sincerely,

S/ BRUCE HOPPER

* I am expecting a very special report in early March.

COPY

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OF THE
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Sincerely,

Bruce Hopper

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Hoffman, Bruce 4523, E
× Predictions for 1943

PREDICTIONS FOR 1943.

I). The initiative which has passed to the United Nations will remain with them in spite of repeated attempts by Hitler to regain it. Such attempts will be directed against the weaker points.

2) Should no weak points be found on the United Nations fronts, then one is entitled to think that the neutral countries will be attacked.

3). Certain of such attempts may have some success, but they will not effect the final result.

4). A military decision will not be reached in 1943, either in Europe or Asia,

5). The situation for the Allies will in many ways be more favorable at the end of 1943, than it was at the end of 1942.

6). The Mediterranean route will probably be made secure for the United Nations in the first 6-8 months of 1943.

7). Germany will not be able to enjoy the fruits of her conquests in Russia,

8). Either in regard to oil from the Caucasus, or cereals from the Ukraine.

9). On the other hand, I don't believe that the Russians have sufficient strength to drive the Germans from their territory during 1943.

10). Germany's allies in Europe will have so exhausted themselves that the Reich will in practice no longer be able to depend on them for help.

11). In some of these countries e.g., Italy and the Balkans, the United Nations should by the end of 1943 have undertaken successful invasions.

12). I am of the opinion that the eastern Mediterranean will play a big role in this respect.

13). Some of the other countries occupied by Germany may be the objectives of attempted invasion e.g., France and northern Norway, although I don't believe that all such attempts will meet with success.

14). As little do I believe that such invasions could, in 1943, lead to the occupation of essential parts of Germany.

15). Germany will experience constantly growing difficulties in continuing the war, as her access to raw materials decreases, e.g. oils, phosphates and metals: falling production, and the destruction of railways and other communications. But, at the same time, I don't believe that Germany's economic situation will be brought to a state of collapse by air raids.

16). The U-boat war, at present Germany's deadliest weapon of attack, will be intensified to the utmost.

17). Through this some of the United Nations protective measures may be delayed and weakened at any moment which might be considered the most suitable.

18). I don't however believe that the U-boat war will be sufficiently effective

to starve England, break down British morale, or lead to any consideration of a possible peace with the Hitler regime.

(2). The war in the Far East will during 1943 continue to be carried on in a military manner, and by a process of slowly wearing down Japan's navy and mercantile fleet.

(3). On the other hand, an attempt to occupy the northern part of Burma may be made, and even succeed, so that the Burma road might again be opened.

(4). The dispatch of help to China, and even to Russia, will be increased.

(5). It can also be considered probable that air attacks from Chinese bases will be made on Japan herself.

(6). The morale of the German people will deteriorate.

(7). Strong inner political pressure, the fear of defeat, which has now replaced a certainty of victory, and a dearth of information concerning the real situation combine to prevent any possibility of there being organised resistance to the regime.

(8). The Hitler regime will prevent attempts by other circles to come to some peace agreement with the United Nations.

(9). Such attempts could not be made unless a certain part of Germany was occupied.

.....

Hopper Bruce 4323 c
* Poland

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Donovan

DATE: February 9, 1943

FROM: Mr. Oechsner

SUBJECT:

I am returning to you a Polish report from Dr. Bruce Hopper, regarding "What is to be done in respect to national murder?"

F. O.
Frederick Oechsner

SECRET

January 22, 1948

Mr. Oechsner:

Will you please return the attached when you have read.

WJD

From a Polish prisoner

For Colonel Donovan from Siegfried

What is to be done in respect to national murder?

When the horrors in occupied Europe reached their peak with the murder of hostages in France, the leading allied statesmen rose to solemnly pronounce the future punishment of the guilty. Did it help? No. Because it is still the same leaders of the Nazi administration, who give order to murder. This group is sure to be brought before the future Court, and they have nothing further to lose. On the contrary they will as far as possible force the German people into complicity in order that the already existing desperation may rise to a furor teutonicus so as to cover the Fuehrer.

Horrible reports have come from Poland during the last weeks. They have now been officially confirmed. The Nazi moloch receives hecatombs, often thousands of human beings are sacrificed in one day. The Archbishop of York recently rose in the House of Lords to call to account also those who carry out the horrible acts. Certainly this minimum of punishment must be pronounced by the governments. All the allied governments agree in this regard. Is this alone able to prevent further murder of nations? No. Let us say there are about 12 who have been stamped as the main guilty, but there may then be thousands of hard calculating habitues who will continue their work. Is the complicity of the whole Nazi party to be solemnly pronounced, the complete responsibility from the top to the bottom ?

This is unavoidable, Gestapo and the SS would first of all have to be declared collectively responsible. But this too would only be a weak equalization and no preventive general rule. On the contrary: the tendency of the party to draw the whole of the German people into new horrible actions will only grow.

Are we then to think like the Archbishop of Canterbury who sees no salvation through human power and to only send prayers to Heaven? No legal authority, no statesman will agree with this. One has to act in accordance with the actual circumstances.

The only real power in Germany besides the party is the German General staff. They are backed not only by the army, but by all decent, so far frightened Germans. This General Staff, with full recognition of the military state of affairs today let these horrible acts take place, while they intend to use the party as a scapegoat after the armistice. They don't talk about the sacrifices, even if these should amount to millions. Against this objectivity behind the mass massacres only one threat is effective, i.e. the annexation of German soil. All Decent Germans will then throw their influence into the matter, in order to prevent such a disaster, or at least try to ameliorate. Then the possibility of an allied victory is clear to every thinking human being even in the hedged in Germany. And indeed the General Staff is the one that sees it most clearly.

An

An international criminal court has hardly ever existed because it was not possible in the former feudal state and was not necessary in the civil state. The sanctions passed upon by the League of Nations are the first weak, but already required step; the announcement of coming punishment of those who committed the terrible crimes was another step. The preventive measures of the now actually announced international criminal court must moment possible be drawn up before the already commenced extirpation of whole nations - Jews, Poles, Greeks, Serbs, Norwegians has been made possible for the sadistic criminals. It is possible that the leading allied statesmen, for traditional reasons, will not be able to make up their minds to threaten with future punitive annexation in addition to making the party collectively responsible. Then there could at least be pronounced protracted occupation of large regions after an armistice has been concluded. This might also exert influence on the General Staff and the patriotic German elements, however not on the party.

For every former act of horror a 50-year occupation and for every future, perhaps even retroactive from September 1, 1941, an annexation of two sq. kilometers of German soil should be pronounced, for the caused starvation and deaths caused by epidemics half of that. This would be sufficient to place obstacles in the way of the national murder policy, not only by the Allies but by the Germans themselves.

No other means is possible. A great responsibility rests on the Allied leaders in this respect. If action is not taken at once, and the punishment is not solemnly announced, the Allied post-war help will only be for the benefit of the graveyards. Or the peoples of Europe will give in before that, as Vichy France.

Prof. Fr. Von Hayek: Was gegen Völkermord tun?

Als die Greuel im okkupierten Europa mit den Massenmorden in Frankreich ihren ersten Höhepunkt erreichten, erhoben sich die leitenden alliierten Staatsmänner, um feierlich die künftige Bestrafung der Schuldigen zu verkünden. Helf das? Nein. Denn es sind immer die gleichen Spitzen der Nazivertretung, die die Horde befehlen. Diese Gruppe ist den kommenden Gerichte ohnehin sicher, und sie hat nichts mehr zu verlieren. So will sie umgekehrt womöglichst das ganze deutsche Volk zur Mitschuld zwingen, um die bereits vorhandene Desperation zu einem die Führer schützenden furor teutonicus zu steigern.

Seit Wochen kommen grauenhafte Nachrichten aus Polen. Sie haben nunmehr amtliche Bestätigung erfahren. Hekatomben werden dem Moloch dargebracht, manchmal Tausende Menschenopfer an einem Tage. Der Erzbischof von York erhob sich kürzlich im House of Lords, um Verantwortung auch für die sadistischen Ausführer der Massengreuel zu verlangen. Gewiss muss dieses Minimum an Strafe von den Regierenden ausgesprochen werden. Alle alliierten Regierungen haben dem zugestimmt. Kann dies allein weiteren Völkermord hindern? Nein. Anstelle der bisher schon gestempelten Dutzende von Hauptverbrechern werden nun vielleicht deren tausend als kalt berechnende Habitués ihr satanisches Werk weiterführen. Soll die Mitverantwortung der gesamten Nazipartei feierlich ausgesprochen werden, eine totale Verantwortung von oben bis unten? Dies wird sich nicht vermeiden lassen. Gestapo und SS in den besetzten Gebieten wären zuerst als kollektiv verantwortlich bezeichnet werden müssen. Aber auch dies wird nur ausgleichende, noch nicht schwach vorsorgende Massregel sein. Umgekehrt: die Tendenz der Partei, das ganze deutsche Volk durch neue Greueltaten mit in Schuld zu ziehen, wird dann nur wachsen.

Soll man daher mit dem Erzbischof von Canterbury keine Rettung durch Menschenmacht hier sehen, nur Gebete zum Himmel schicken? Kein Rechtslehrer, kein Staatsmann wird dem zustimmen. Man muss nur den wirklichen Verhältnissen gemäss handeln.

Die einzige wirkliche Macht in Deutschland neben der Partei wird von der deutschen Generalität dargestellt. Diese stützt sich nicht nur auf die Armee, sondern auch auf alle anständigen, jetzt noch eingeschüchterten Deutschen. Die Generalität lässt heute bei klarer Erkenntnis der militärischen Lage die Greueltaten geschehen, weil sie so nach dem Waffenstillstand die Partei als Sündenbock benutzen will. Nach

den Opfern fragt sie nicht, und wenn diese auch noch Millionen zählen sollten. Auf solche scheinbar über dem Massenverbrechen stehende Leichtfertigkeit kann nur eine einzige Drohung wirkungslos sein, nach der Annektierung deutschen Reichsbodens als Strafe. Alle anständigen Deutschen werden dann ihren Einfluss in die Wagschale werfen, um solches Unheil abzuwenden, oder wenigstens zu mildern. Denn über die Begriffe einer alliierten Siegers sind sich jetzt auch in dem raffiniert abgeschlossenen Deutschland alle denkenden Menschen klar. Und am klarsten sind hier gewiss die Generalität selbst.

Ein Völkerstrafrecht hat bis jetzt kaum existiert, weil es in der früheren feudalen Welt nicht möglich, dann in der bürgerlichen nicht nötig war. Die Sanktionsvorgänge des Völkerbundes waren der erste schwache, aber doch schon notwendig gewordene Schritt, die Ankündigung der kommenden Bestrafung der Greuelschuldigen ein zweiter. Die Präventivbestimmungen des nun wirklich fällig gewordenen Völkerstrafrechts müssen jetzt schleunigst präzisiert werden, noch bevor die schon eingeleitete Ausrottung ganzer Völker - Juden, Griechen, Serben, Norweger - den satanischen Anführern auch nur zu einem Drittel gelungen sein wird. Vielleicht werden sich die leitenden alliierten Staatsmänner aus traditionellen Gründen heraus nicht entschliessen können, schon jetzt neben der kollektiven Parteiverantwortung auch mit kommender Strafannexion zu drohen. Dann liesse sich zumindest langwierige Okkupation entsprechend grosser Gebietsteile nach dem Waffenstillstand ankündigen. Auch dies kann auf die Generalität und die patriotischen deutschen Elemente eine gewisse Wirkung ausüben, nicht freilich auf die Partei.

Für jedes bisherige Greuelopfer sollte vielleicht eine dreissigjährige Besetzung, für jedes kommende, etwa sogar rücklaufig vom ersten September 1944 ab, direkt eine Annektierung von zwei Quadratkilometern Reichsbodens angedroht werden, für die Opfer verschuldeten Hunger- und Seuchentodes die Hälfte. Schon dies dürfte genügen, um den Führern des Satanismus nicht nur alliierte, sondern auch innerdeutsche Hindernisse in ihrer schon absolut beschlossenen Völkermordspolitik in den Weg zu legen.

Ein anderes Mittel gibt es nicht. Auf den Leitern der alliierten Völker lastet eine ungeheure Verantwortung auch in dieser Richtung. Wenn nicht sofort gehandelt, die Strafbestimmungen nicht sofort feierlich ausgesprochen werden, so wird die Nachkriegshilfe der Alliierten nur noch Friedhöfen zugutekommen. Oder die Völker gehen eben schon vorher, wie das Frankreich Vichys.---

Is it possible to insure an independent public opinion under Nazi occupation - morally and the day

In the 9th of April 1940 all the big newspapers were taken by the Germans, and from that day on all the big newspapers were under Nazi control; and as the German Sequent advised all the smaller local papers surrender, the same fate. But people still had their wireless sets and were able to listen in on transmissions from abroad, even if it was frowned upon by the Germans who even tried to disprove the possibility of listening. Thus the lack of a free press was not felt so acutely by the population.

But in August-September 1941, during a state of emergency, the Norwegian people were forced to give up their wireless sets. To most people this was a very hard blow - the moment. But it turned out to be a blessing in disguise. Because the more the people who take an interest in it can always manage to get the necessary military news from abroad. The "rumors" of internal news are astonishingly complete and reliable. And the loss of the wireless has taken away from the Nazis an important chance of influencing the population. - Of course there were quite a number of people who had no sets - and the young listen in on Gelo and transmissions for lack of anything else. But, above all, the loss of the radio has given the Norwegian people time and leisure for inner consolidation and constructive thought. The people has found out its own stand on the war front, and follow its own straight course in the unmoveable fight for freedom, irrespective of outward circumstances.

One of the most interesting traits in this period has been the possibility of forming and influencing public opinion. We will take one example to show how it has been possible even to completely change the view on one special future problem, namely how to deal with N.S. (Nasjonal Samling, the Quisling party) when the war is over.

When Norway was attacked N.S. treacherously joined the enemy and became his errand-boys with the special task of re-organising Norway on Nazi principles. This party probably counts about 30,000 members i.e. one per cent of the Norwegian population, but with the powers of German bayonets behind them they have been able to put themselves in almost all key positions in political, economic and cultural life and in central and local administration.

The general reaction in Norway of course was one of indignation and hatred, and the Quislings were even more hated than the Germans. But as it turned out that none of those sacred about Hague Convention of International laws, the innocent people were imprisoned and kept in concentration camps, that torture was used by the Gestapo and by the Quisling police as much as they had dreamt of, the flood of hatred grew, and people enjoyed picturing in detail to themselves and others how we should take revenge. Typical conversation in the Palace Gardens: "This elm belongs to the National Trust." - "Why." - "That is where Quisling is going to hang." Most Norwegians, even the most serious-minded, agreed that we had to have period of a week, or two or three days or at least 2 hours to solve the N.S. problem within our own ranks. Many good patriots had a pet Quisling whom they wanted to cut into thin slices. Legal procedure against these traitor seemed too mild. They sought have to suffer as they had inflicted suffering on others. It would be the only way of protecting our society against the influence of these people in the future.

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This primitive form of sentiment of justice which demanded punishment in a spirit of revenge was so wide-spread that such a would say anything also during the first year of occupation would be looked upon as lacking in national sentiment. Of course there were a few people who felt otherwise, but they were so few and feelings were so high that it was useless, even suspicious to say so.

After a year of occupation quite a number of people began saying: "Would it not be right to establish the state of law the moment the Germans have been defeated? Is it not unworthy of us to look forward to a period of lynching?" If you started to propagate these ideas, people would either think you were lacking in patriotic feeling or so blue-eyed and sentimental that you were not normal. But some minds were open to the idea. But from October 1941 a well founded reasoning and argumentation for this view was spread, and in the course of a year the majority of Norwegians have changed their views and want a settlement in legal forms. All agree that the punishment has to be hard and drastic but in legal forms. It was a tremendous help for the propagation of these ideas when one learnt about two enactments issued in London in January 1942. The first one was the agreement of 13th of January between representatives of the governments of eight German-occupied countries and the free Frenchmen in which is said: ".....as international solidarity is necessary to prevent that these atrocities (violations) should be combated thereby that the people rise to take revenge... and in order to satisfy the sentiment of justice of the civilized world....the signing representatives of (these)..... governments will place among their chief aims of war the punishment through the legal apparatus of justice of those who are guilty of or responsible for these war crimes, whether they have committed them, given orders or helped." The other one was a Norwegian provisional enactment of 3rd of January, 1942, which among other things decides that the mere membership of N.S. will automatically lead to the loss of "public confidence" which is defined as an extended loss of the rights of citizenship. Besides there are made very severe additions to the penal code touching upon the punishment of traitors and war criminals.

This work of enlightenment has been carried out without any of the usual technical means of propaganda, and still it has changed Norwegian public opinion in less than a year. Among the refugees one could register the growth in this view from month to month. Of course it is not possible now to give any idea of how such a propaganda works technically. But knowledge of the argumentation may well be spread.

The best way was to appeal to the national pride and self-respect. "Our fight under occupation has to a great extent been to defend our own laws. Should we really forget that, the moment we are masters in our own country? As it is now, we stand for law and justice, the German and Norwegian Nazis violate them. Let us show the world that we are superior to them. If we violate our own laws the moment we are free, Nazism has in reality won over us, we have become like the Nazis, Nazism has conquered us inwardly in our own hearts." To the more practical mind the following arguing seemed more attractive: "If you put your hands in your pot dishing, you are a criminal according to Norwegian law, and you will never be able to escape it. Will it not be wiser to face now in the court of justice [illegible] all the evidence you have been able to gather about the Germans ways?"

It was very interesting to see the reactions of different people facing this problem. On the whole one can say that many of those who had suffered most did not demand retribution in a spirit of revenge. So one has heard several of the relatives of executed patriots say there is no bitterness or desire for revenge in their hearts. And even men who had received their death sentences and were waiting for execution have sent out as their last greeting to the Norwegian people that they were happy to sacrifice their lives for their country and did not want revenge for their sake.

Those who were most strongly demanding revenge were often people who had not suffered directly themselves, but had seen the sufferings of others at close hand, for instance doctors, lawyers, policemen, prisoners, prisoners who knew fellow-prisoners to be cruelly treated. And of course the primitive wish for revenge may well up again in anybody, when the national instincts are too severely hurt.

On the whole there has been a wonderful inner growth in Norwegian minds. They started wanting primitive revenge, now they want legal procedure of justice. They looked upon the German violators and the Norwegian traitors in blind hatred, they look upon them more and more like criminals, lunatics or neglected children. You do not hate that kind of persons, you take them as a very serious social problem. If there is any possibility of improving some of them that is good. Otherwise they will have to be isolated and effectively prevented from doing harm to others.

Norwegians are wondering whether a similar development has taken place in public opinion in other occupied countries. If that is not the case, would it not be possible to take up a propaganda in this spirit: "Let us show the world that we are the superiors of the violators from the Axis powers. We can show it by national self-respect, i.e. by respecting our own laws."

We add an appeal sent out to the Norwegian people in the spring of 1942. It will give you an idea of the standard of the Norwegian secret press:

"Germans who have got a well founded impression of Norwegian conditions have been heard to say that they understand the Norwegians fight in these days, " for they have got something to defend." In this fight prominent men with great insight and strong feeling of responsibility have given the lead: the Rector of the University, the Supreme Court of Justice, the bishops. These have been followed by clergymen, teachers, doctors, lawyers and many others with higher education. But what is still more: even the great majority of the people have joined, as is proved by the action of the members of sports and athletics unions, the reaction of the workers and the parents' protest against the Nazi youth service.

When the whole people thus has taken an active part and

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not flinched at personal risks. This certainly springs from the fact that we have got a sturdy spiritual inheritance which we all feel that we have got to protect. One of the most precious pieces of this inheritance is our Constitution.

The Norwegian Constitution of 1814 was born in a hurry under, but in a time of hardship, through patriotic and [illegible] and as a result of the more far leaning of generations. It is built in our thousand years tradition as a society of free farmers. It got fine features from the ideals of man's rights of the American war of independence and the French Revolution. It says among other things: "No one can be judged except according to law, nor punished except according to judgment... Torture must not take place... No law must be given back-working power.... No one must be imprisoned except in lawful cases and under observation of the forms prescribed by law....The people exercises the legislative power by the Storting.... Entitled to vote are Norwegian citizens, men and women over 25.... Freedom of press should take place..... Frank speech on the government or any other subject is permitted to everybody.....House inquisitions are not allowed except in criminal cases."

Thus our constitution gives us protection against any infringement of justice, it gives each one of us through the right of voting responsibility for the government of our state and the development of our people. It gives every individual and the whole people freedom to spiritual growth.

We are one of the very few peoples who have through generations been allowed to possess such a wonderful charter of our rights and duties. We have even through a period of 125 years been allowed to develop under the protection, in the freedom and under the responsibility of our Constitution. We had in this period been able to build a popular education, on a broad base, to found social institutions and to create a willingness to international cooperation which have made us a pioneer people.

An important international law, the Convention of the Hague from 1907 contains the agreement on the relation between countries in time of war. §43 says that when a country has been occupied the occupant shall do all he can to reestablish public order and public life. "Hereby the occupant shall respect the existing laws of the country, unless absolute obstacles. (Hauf despechemant absolu)." Both Norway and Germany have signed that Convention. Thus we should now have been allowed to live under our own laws, with our own elected representatives, with our own administrators and civil servants,e.g.,N.S., only with the limitations which would be absolutely necessary to Germany's military interests. For, having signed the Convention of the Hague, we have as an occupied people taken upon us certain duties towards the Germans. As a law-abiding people we should have understood these duties when they were explained to us.

But the Germans and their willing tools, the N.S., have

not

[illegible] the Convention of the Rights, and they have taken [illegible] the protection, the responsibility and the [illegible] of the Constitution guarantees to us. They have done away with the people's rights of free speech and of self-determination. They have constantly violated the law, by illegal dismissals, imprisonment without law and judgment, deportations, house searches, torture, executions.

When the war is over those acts of injustice will have to be put right as far as possible. Germans there who have practised atrocities and injustice a radical settlement is necessary, so that our own - and other peoples, feel convinced that law exists. We may all be justly responsible for how this settlement shall be administered, whether it shall be in legal form, or by taking the law in our own hands and inflicting revenge.

Much of our fight in this period has been to protect law and justice. Now that our sentiment of justice has been violated time and again, we have learnt to understand what a state of law really means. This fight for law and justice we must carry on in the end, even in our own hearts. One often hears good men like Norwegians say: "We must take the law in our own hands, and settle the N.S. problem quickly. We shall let the law sleep for 24 hours, and effect a quick and drastic settlement. Legal procedure would be too expensive and too long."

All thinking Norwegian men and women must combat such ideas. We must not confound thirst for revenge with glowing patriotic sentiment. If we ourselves violate our own laws, we are no better than those we are fighting against, for in that case we have adopted their methods. Then the Nazis have in reality conquered us from inside, in our own hearts, we have become like them. And of what use is then a military victory which others have won for us? Should we perhaps in a night break down what our fathers have built up through generations? But one can use this time for collecting evidence so that one can procure punishment of treachery and atrocities. But we must have patience so that justice have its course. The moment the power of the Germans and N.S. is broken we must all do what we can, so that the principles of our Constitution can come into force immediately. A success in that we prove to the whole world that Norway has not lost the soul in this war.

To those who feel anxious that the punishment will be too [illegible] if it is effected in legal forms, we may point out the [illegible] conduct of the Supreme Court and the protests of the lawyers. These actions prove such a fearless patriotic mind [illegible] the legal profession that one need not be afraid of sentimentality when it comes to meting out punishment of [illegible] and acts of violence. Even our regular laws gave us [illegible] punishing these. In addition there has in [illegible] January 1944 been passed national as well as international [illegible] to guarantee an adequate settlement.

We wish to build a new and better society. We who now [illegible] understand what law and justice mean, because we have [illegible] injustice on our bodies, how could we lay the foundation of [illegible] society by violating our own laws? No, let us make our [illegible] one of the oldest sentences written in Norway's language, [illegible] first words of the old Norse laws: "With law shall land be [illegible] and not with unlaw wasted."

[illegible]

[illegible] Sweden and British [illegible] ships in the Baltic and the North Sea traffic. This survey is confined to available figures approximately [illegible] motor ships totalling [illegible] gross register tons and [illegible] auxiliary motive vessels with auxiliary propulsion between totalling 50,708 gross register tons are engaged in the trade between Sweden and foreign ports. In these figures are not included the so-called "safe conduct" steamers, numbering about 50, which are engaged exclusively in trade between Sweden and ports located outside the Blockaded zone under aggregate tonnage amounting to about 100,000 gross register tons. In the coastwise trade between Swedish ports smaller vessels are generally employed. In this traffic there are engaged 400 steamers and motor vessels totalling 50,000 gross register tons. The remaining tonnage used in the trade between Swedish and foreign ports within the Baltic zone is roughly divided according to the size of ships into the following groups:

Tonnage	Number of Steamships
800 - 1,000 tons	50
1,100 - 1,600 tons	58
1,700 - 2,000 tons	68
2,200 - 3,000 tons	70
3,100 - 4,000 tons	58
4,100 - 5,000 tons	18
Total	[illegible]

The aggregate losses sustained by the Swedish merchant marine during the war period up to October 31, last amounted to 161 ships representing 420,545 gross register tons. The greatest losses occurred in 1940 when 50 vessels totalling 124,255 gross register tons were sunk. In addition to the above, 19 ships amounting to 42,[illegible] gross register tons have been confiscated and seized. Unfortunately these losses involved many casualties. To date 198 persons have lost their lives, including 800 aliens. During the years mid-1939 the Swedish losses of merchant ships owing to the war totalled 558,000 gross register tons.

Obviously the exports of Swedish ore are of the greatest importance, as this item quantitatively is the chief Swedish export item. Imports during the first eight months of 1943 amounted to approximately 2,000,000 tons. Luleå is the principal port of shipment. It is the most suitable for prompt handling as this port is equipped with six loading cranes having a capacity of 700 tons per hour. Oxelösund is the second with four docks which also can handle 700 tons per hour. Oxelösund is used chiefly during the winter months and regularly for mines located in Central Sweden in the provinces of Västmanland, etc. The shipping season for inland ordnance from about the end of May

COPY

May 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Hugh R. Wilson

FROM: Allen W. Dulles

Attached hereto is a memorandum submitted to us by Paul Hagen, giving certain details with regard to cooperation with the German Labor Movement. This memorandum is couched in very general terms and we expect to explore the matter further with Hagen this next week.

A great deal of controversy has centered about Hagen because of his earlier Communist connections and because of his vigorous personality has brought him into conflict with certain of the other German refugee movements. At the moment he is about to publish a book entitled "Will Germany Crack", which while hastily written contains some interesting material, as best I can judge from a hasty reading, over the last week-end, of an advance copy.

A great problem, as I see it, is whether we have as yet established any adequate system by which persons who might go to Germany could send out their reports.

I am rather inclined to feel that Hagen, particularly after his book appears, is too widely advertised a figure to be valuable as the actual directing head of an underground organization. It is possible, however, that he can be of use in advising us as to methods of setting up an organization and he may, also, have some lieutenants who could do the work while he keeps in the background as far as any actual connection with the group is concerned.

W.J.D. saw Hagen when he was here on Friday and was, I believe, favorably impressed with the man. I wish you would tell him that we are actively following it up and would be glad to have any further thought he may have. Also please tell the Colonel that Wallie Deuel has been out of town today but we hope to get in touch with him, as he has apparently shown a great interest in Hagen and can give us further details as to what the man may be able to do for us.

/s/ A.W.D.

MEMORANDUM: COOPERATION WITH THE GERMAN LABOR MOVEMENT

1. The establishment of contacts with German labor during the war is the most important strategic task for effective political warfare. It is also one of the most important preparations for post-war reconstruction. Heretofore this task has been neglected.

Since the outbreak of the war in Europe, there has been little information as to how much of the underground movement has been able to survive and as to how much it has expanded more recently. However, there are symptoms, in the official home front propaganda in Germany and in new measures adopted by the Nazi government, that labor's underground opposition has acquired new strength.

Before trying to establish the contacts it is essential that a reliable report be obtained as to present conditions in the German underground movement. It will be necessary to go to Europe to get this report.

11. Conditions favorable to the development of contacts with labor in Germany are:

a) There are persons available in the United States, in England and in neutral Europe who were formerly active in the underground movement and are still devoted to it, who have a knowledge of personalities and groups in the underground movement. The assistance of these people should be enlisted.

b) At the present time there are more than six million foreign laborers from all European countries, both prisoners of war and so-called "volunteers", working in Germany. This means that many hitherto not existing channels for contact with labor in Germany have been opened up. Representatives of the occupied countries should be contacted and information collected from them.

III. Because of its authority with the German laboring people, the American Labor Movement would be the best organizer and protector of a special agency, whose task it would be to organize and control the reorganization of contacts with German labor inside Nazi Germany. It could help to set up a Center of contacts for the German Labor Movement in this country which, through its ramifications, could reach behind Hitler's lines. The proposed agency or Center could be composed of Intelligence officer (C.O.I.), representatives of the American trade unions, and representatives of the German underground movement, now in America. They would work out a plan of action, through which the contact would be made between anti-Nazi labor groups inside Germany and the American Labor Movement and the American war machine.

IV. It would be best if the Center were financed by a fund created by gifts from the American unions, as a kind of loan to the coming post-Hitler German Labor Movement. The Center would

act as a trustee for such a fund. It may of course be possible that Lease-Lend means be used, but the political success would be better guaranteed if the financing could be independent of any government moneys and under the control of the C.O.I. or any authority the American government designates.

V. The work of the Center should be directed by a mixed board. As German members of this board, the following persons who have been active in underground activity, or who have sponsored underground activity, are proposed: Paul Hertz, former secretary of the Reichstag group of the German Social Democratic Party and former member of the Executive Committee of that party; Paul Hagen, representative abroad of the "New Beginning" group; Jakob Walcher, chairman of the German Socialist Workers' party and former member of the Executive Committee of the metal workers' union of Germany.

VI. The Center should have a charter that would state that the American members are working to help the German underground movement and to prepare a new democratic labor movement and that the German members recognize the control and the discipline of the American government and its military authorities during the war, but are working independently for their political aims, the defeat of Hitler and the democratic revolution in Germany, as a detached group of German labor people.

VII. The following activities should be envisaged in the plan of the Center:

a) The setting up of contacts in countries bordering on Germany, through which inside German contacts could be re-established. (Switzerland, Sweden also South America).

b) The establishment of a research office which would study all German information, the Nazi local press, periocicals, broadcasts, etc.

c) The recruiting of qualified people among German refugees, with organizational or other expert capacities.

d) Work among prisoners of war.

Within the shortest possible time, a staff of people should be working, who would be able to creat and maintain the contacts necessary for the development of the Center's activities.

VIII. After these preparations, carefully selected people should be sent by any possible way into Germany, with commandos, or as parachutists. Their chief task would be to strengthen existing underground circles, to defelop new ones, to build a network of such circle and to keep them in touch with the Center abroad.

Hagen 6543
Antwort → Y. German Soc.
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Mexico B.A.

R. Wagner
c/o Fritz Samuel
142 Lexington Ave.
New York City
January 31, 1940.

Mr. Adolf Held
Jewish Labor Committee
c/o Amalgamated Bank of N.Y.
11-15 Union Square
New York City

Dear Mr. Held:

A matter of great importance to all sections of the socialist movement under the Hitler regime was brought to my attention by Comrade Hager from the New Beginning group and Dr. Paul Hertz from the Parteivorstand of the German Social-Democratic Party. I refer to the opposition that seems to have been made by some of your friends to the continuance of the friendly support which was so generously given to the New Beginning group by the Jewish Labor Committee.

As the Austrian member of the Executive of the Labor and Socialist International, I have had ample opportunity to familiarize myself with the problems and difficulties of the underground movements in all parts of Europe. Deplorable as it is, it is nevertheless true that conditions of underground work seem to favor in all countries divisions of the once united social-democratic movement, very often in the form of the development of different groups. So far only the former Austrian Social-Democratic Party seems to have escaped this fatal course.

I have a feeling, that the fact of the unity of our Austrian movement of which I am the present Chairman, as far as movement and organisation in the emigration represents socialist forces in our country, entitles me to have an opinion on matters of vital importance also to us, and I hope, that the members of the Jewish Labor Committee will not mind my expressing this opinion in a letter to you.

We naturally came into very close connection with the German socialist movement after the annexation of Austria. We collaborated with all socialist groups of the

German movement, but especially with the group, Neu Beginnen, the relations between this group and our party going back to the year 1934. This collaboration with N.B. was intensified at the time of the Annexation in all fields of activity, inside and outside Germany. Thankful for the instructions we got from the most experienced underground workers of N.B. when we most needed such instruction and eager to be helpful in the attempt to reunite the German Social-Democratic Party, we offered our services to Hagen and his friends, as well as to the Parteivorstand. We studied the political and personal reasons for their division, tried to get a full knowledge of their organizations inside Germany and a proper appreciation of their respective work. If our efforts to bring about ~~unit~~ the much desired concentration of the socialist movement ~~of Germany~~ of Germany were not successful, they at least made us well acquainted with the present situation of this movement and its problems and difficulties.

Our attitude was never exclusive and still is without any discrimination against any ~~party~~ part of the German socialist movement. We tried to be on friendly terms with all German social-democrats. We appreciate the work every group is doing for the common cause. We thought the Jewish Labor Committee had made a wise and gratifying decision when it started to give the German Socialist movement its moral and financial support. We are very glad to hear that you did not hesitate to support the work of both the N.B. and the Parteivorstand, as the latter is now unfortunately also in need of your help, and in the interest of the movement we anxiously hope that you will continue generous support to both groups.

I know how distressing the disunity of the German movement is to you and also realize, that your very solidarity seems to put you in a position in which friendly actions are likely to meet unfriendly reactions from one side or the other. This, however, is one more reason, as matters look to me, to continue your present policy to help both groups.

I can assure you that all those anti-Nazi fighters inside and outside Germany, who are not directly concerned with the difficulties between N.B. and the P.V. are thankful for every decision, which is not tainted by the unfortunate spirit of mutual distrust and factional considerations which we so often encounter nowadays in the Labor movement.

I would be very glad if I had an opportunity to give you personally the reasons that made me decide to intrude into your Committee with this letter.

Allow me to express my sincere and unrestricted admiration for the unique socialist work of the Jewish Labor organizations in the United States.

Fraternally yours,

Gustav Richter

Anlage 4)

NAO 168 CABLES-BRUSSELS 63 1/35 15 1938
LC PAUL HERTZ
53 WEST EIGHTYSEVENTH STREET NEWYORK

CANNOT INTERVENE IN CONFLICT BUT WISH TO STATE PERSONALLY MY FULL CONFIDENCE IN PAUL HERTZ AS ONE OF THE SINCEREST AND ABLEST REPRESENTATIVES GERMAN LABOR MOVEMENT STOP.

I HAVE ALWAYS SEEN IN NEW BEGINNING MOVEMENT ONE OF THE HOPES OF THE REGENERATION OF SOCIALISM IN GERMANY AND APPRECIATED THE EFFORTS OF KARL FRANK.

FRIEDRICH ADLER

February 15, 1940

Hoover 6543
German Soc
Bellage 4/ New Beginning

January 31, 1949

Jewish Labor Committee
175 East Broadway
New York City

Attention: Mr. Adolf Held, Chairman

Dear Comrades:

1. We, the undersigned, Paul Hertz and George Dietrich, were both reelected at the last National Conference of the German Social-Democratic Party, the 26th of April, 1933, as members of the Executive Committee of the Party. Paul Hertz was also a member of the so-called Sopade Bureau, built up in Prague by these members of the Executive Committee who had emigrated. Paul Hertz left the membership of the Bureau in April, 1938, but never gave up the position to which he had been elected in the Executive Committee.

2. For no reason Paul H. has been attacked since his arrival in the United States by the Jewish Daily Forward and the New Volkszeitung. In the strong belief that public discussion of this kind would support only one man, that is Adolf Hitler, Comrade Hertz has refrained to date from a public repudiation of the slanders.

3. We have heard that the Jewish Labor Committee intends to discuss the difficulties in the German movement, which it has supported through aid to the New Beginning group as well as the Sopade.

4. We learn that some members of the Jewish Labor Committee have tried to influence it to confine its support to only one group. We feel a strong responsibility to point out the danger for the movement of such a policy. No one questions the fact, that the active representatives of the relatively small underground movement inside Germany are necessarily young people not previously prominent. Every responsible member of the Labor and Socialist International recognizes that they need to be helped. It is another unquestioned fact that the Sopade has little relation to these heroic pioneers of the new movement. The Executive Committee of the Labor and Socialist International was officially informed in 1937 that the strongest existing group inside Germany of those who had previously adhered to the Social-Democratic movement, did not recognize the Sopade as their representation abroad. A memorandum to this effect was filed with Friedrich Adler by this group

in August 1937. This group, as well as other small groups, have never received any financial help from the Sopade, but were supported by the L.S.I and the New Beginning group. Paul Hertz, as former member of the Bureau of the Sopade, knows that the Bureau's expenditure for inside work for one year was less than the expenditure of the New Beginning group for one month. Yet the total annual budget of the New Beginning group was less than one fourth of the annual budget of the Sopade.

5. In giving you this information we do not want to influence you to withhold moral and financial support from any important group of the German movement but we do believe that you should have the benefit of our information before you. As responsible members and trustees of the old movement we are of the opinion that the New Beginning group should receive from you as much support as the Sopade.

Fraternally yours,

Paul Hertz

Georg Dietrich

Id. I personally want to add that I was asked as a member of the Parteivorstand by workers inside Germany of the N.B. group to act as political and financial trustee of their group. The executive Committee of the L.S.I. was informed about this mandate. I controlled since 1936 the financial and political activities of the New Beginning organisation and I know that all the means the group had were used for the purpose for which they were given. I state furthermore that neither Comrade Dietrich nor I ever asked for or received financial remuneration of any kind for the New Beginning group. My judgment is entirely independent and is based on my experience as trustee of the Social-Democratic movement of which I have been a member for more than thirty-five years and on the intimate relations I have had with the New Beginning group and the Sopade since the advent of fascism.

Paul Hertz

bu&au

Hagen 6543
X German Soc.
X Neues Beginnen

DECLARATION on the CASE of PAUL HAGEN
by Dr. PAUL HERTZ,

Former member of the Reichstag and Secretary of the Social Democratic Reichstag Fraction, Member of the Executive Committee of the German Social Democratic Party.

INTRODUCTION:

About a year ago Paul Hagen asked for an investigation of certain accusations that had come up against him in emigre circles. It is known that the investigation was not completed. A declaration by three members of the investigating committee explains why the investigation was discontinued. This declaration, although it was sent only to the Chairman of the Commission and to the other members, resulted in a public declaration by three other members of the committee of Investigation.

In this counter-declaration the questions were made public which were first to have been investigated, questions which in part had been formulated by Paul Hagen himself. The publication of this declaration was made in such a form that it actually was a new slander against Paul Hagen.

I testified as a witness at several meetings of the Committee of Investigation as a member of the exiled Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party and as a trustee of the old Social Democratic movement, on the bases of my exact knowledge of Paul Hagen and of the New Beginning Group. Below I have given a brief summary of my testimony. In doing this I feel that I am serving the integrity and the reputation of the German Social Democratic movement.

The following questions were formulated by the Committee of Investigation. Each question is followed by my answer:

Question A.

a) Is it true, that during the years 1933-1935 Hagen carried out conspiratorial activity against the Executive of the Social Democratic Party of Germany; that he bribed an employee of the late Party President, Otto Wels, for the purpose of obtaining confidential correspondence of the Party Executive?

Paul Hagen and the New Beginning Group tried as early as 1933 to reach an agreement with the exiled members of the German Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party. They asked the Labor and Socialist International to help them in this. The majority of the Committee supported these efforts, although some were opposed. Nevertheless, a kind of cooperation developed. The Executive Committee recognized its duty to support financially this group of active Social Democrats. In the autumn of 1934 a conflict arose within the Executive Committee, in the course of which the majority expelled two members. This conflict became a pretext for stopping the financial support of the New Beginning Group. The New Beginning Group nevertheless kept trying to incorporate itself organizationally in the Social Democratic Party; it was ready to sacrifice its separate existence, but the majority of the Executive Committee prevented any reconciliation.

In the summer of 1934 a memorandum on the New Beginning Group was prepared in the office of the Executive Committee. At that time there was still cooperation between the Executive Committee and the New Beginning Group. The preparation of this memorandum was ordered by members of the Executive Committee who had only reluctantly collaborated with the New Beginning Group and who now wanted an excuse to break off relations. That is why the memorandum was kept secret from the members of the Executive Committee presumedly not in agreement with such methods. The memorandum contained exact names and addresses of comrades working underground in Germany. That was not only contrary to the requirements of any underground work, but it endangered the freedom and the lives of these men and women. Moreover, there was a certain Reinhold Schwabe employed in the office of the Executive Committee who had been gravely suspected for months by several members of the Executive Committee. Shortly afterwards he was unmasked as a Gestapo agent and only then-- after being paid a high sum as separation pay- was he fired by the Executive Committee. The author of the memorandum was on intimate terms with Schwabe, so that Schwabe had access to the memorandum. Otto Schoenfeldt, who worked in the same room, saw the memorandum and recognized that dozens of underground workers were highly endangered by it, among them two friends whom he personally had won for the underground work. It is necessary to mention in this connection that Schwabe, after returning to Berlin, denounced many underground workers among the Social Democrats and brought them to prison. Moved only by a sense of responsibility towards

Social Democratic underground workers, independently and without any selfish material interest, Schoenfeldt, knowing that he would risk his position with the Executive Committee, of his own accord gave the memorandum to Paul Hagen in order to warn his underground friends.

In September to October 1934 a committee set up by the Labor and Socialist International, consisting of Albarda, De Brouckere, Grimm and Dr. Adler, came to Prague to investigate accusations against the Executive Committee at the Labor and Socialist International by the two members who had been excluded; Hagen passed on the memorandum on to Adler so that he would influence the Executive Committee to destroy it. At the end of an official session of the committee with the Executive Committee, Adler asked for a special meeting and described the above mentioned memorandum prepared in the office of the Executive Committee. Several members of the Executive Committee indignantly denied the existence of such a memorandum; one even said it was a "vicious slander". I personally was completely surprised by Adler's information. When it was denied I thought that Adler had been deceived, and I tried to make it clear to him that such a monstrous decoument could not exist if members of the Executive Committee denied its existence. I became uncertain only when Adler insisted that this was the case. Then I noticed that I had seen the Treasurer Crummenerl sitting silent, and that the presumed author of the memorandum, normally present at sittings of the Committee, could not be found, although he had recently been seen in the office. After Adler had left the office, Wels, the Chairman, and Vogel admitted to me that this memorandum existed. In a session of the Executive Committee the next day I proposed that Wels inform Adler that this memorandum existed but that he (Wels) had not been able to remember it at the time. This proposal was rejected. The matter had never been mentioned since. No action was taken against either Otto Schoenfeldt or Paul Hagen or any other person. Six years later a dangerous action committed by the Executive Committee is distorted into a slander against Paul Hagen.

Because I was convinced that the tiny Social Democratic forces rescued from the debacle of the old Social Democratic movement could only become a political force again if it were possible to overcome senseless factionalism and to recreate the unity of the movement. I overcome my reluctance to collaborate with the Executive Committee in Prague in 1933. I felt it was my duty to help the Executive Committee to fill the position of "Trustee" for the entire Social Democratic movement, which it had received from the former Party. I was guided by this consideration from 1933 to 1938

at which time I voluntarily left the office of the Executive Committee. My confidence that the majority of the Executive Committee was directed by the same motives was strongly shaken when it became clear that the above-mentioned facts showed that petty factionalism and jealousy was producing petty fights and did not even stop at endangering underground workers.

Question B.

Is it true, that in 1936 Hagen deceived the American representative, the late Charney B. Vladeck in Carlsbad by introducing to him a so-called "conference of German delegates from a great German underground movement" who were in truth not from Germany at all, intending by this to obtain financial support?

Comrade Vladeck never talked to Paul Hagen in Prague; Paul Hagen at that time was secretly in Germany. There was no conference, either in Carlsbad or in Prague, in which Vladeck participated.

Question C.

Is it true that some time around 1937 Hagen sent letters to various American Socialists denouncing Wilhelm Sollmann as anti-Semitic?

During the years 1935-1936 I carried on a correspondence with Sollmann about his notions on nationalism, race and the Jewish question. I have been a friend of Sollmann for thirty-five years. When Sollmann came to America in 1937, the "Neue Volkszeitung" published an interview in which Sollmann boasted about his political friendship with Otto Strasser, who just at that time had reaffirmed his anti-Semitic views, practically and theoretically. In order to avoid the impression that the underground movement endorsed these ideas, I felt it necessary to send some of my American friends copies of my letters to Sollmann.

Paul Hagen did not write letters about Sollmann, as I had already ascertained at the time. When this accusation first came up, I asked Sollmann to give me his proof. Sollman thereupon admitted that such letters by Hagen did not exist. (In his letter mentioned, he traced the rumors about his anti-Semitism to an English translation of a pamphlet by Paul Sering on "Folk Socialism".)

Question D.

Is it true, that in the spring of 1940 Hagen denounced Hans Gaidies, author of an article against Hagen, "as a Gestapo agent" and "a suspicious person who was not to be believed", although in 1936 Hagen in Prague before a Party arbitration court called because of similar charges stated expressly that he was all right?

There were rumors among Social Democratic emigrants casting doubt on the reliability of Gaidies, who had written a slanderous article against the New Beginning Group. In investigation in 1933 did not establish any proof, but Gaidies was never cleared from the suspicion of being unreliable. He tried several times to be elected to the Board of the Social Democratic Emigre Association, but he never achieved it, always receiving only a few votes. Particularly strong was the distrust of the Executive Committee. I had no prejudices against Gaidies but rather considered him a nuisance. In 1937, when Gaidies was proposed as a member of the Board of the emigre organization, several people protested against his candidacy: among them Paul Hagen. Gaidies asked for an investigation of the accusations. Paul Hagen declared he had never called Gaidies a Gestapo agent, an inaccurate story which had been told to Gaidies, but he did not drop his political doubts about him. The investigating committee cleared Gaidies from the suspicion of being a Gestapo agent; but in spite of that, Gaidies was not elected. The great majority of the Social Democratic exiles did not consider him reliable.

Question E.

Is it true, that the so-called New Beginning Group in Germany - if it still exists at all - is a completely unimportant group which has no connection with those hundreds of thousands in Germany who were formerly Social Democrats and trade unionists; that this group is as completely unknown to the masses of German working men as in Hagen himself; that Hagen, in declaring himself the "foreign representative" of the German "Neu Beginnen" organization deceptively appears to represent an inner German "movement", which in truth does not exist, but which is merely a small group of German emigres of various political shades who never played an important political role under the German Republic?

The New Beginning Group originally was a small circle made up mostly of young Social Democrats who understood the character of the dictatorship and the modern conditions of the underground fight against fascism. It later developed into an anti-fascist organization which collaborated with the surviving active progressive elements of the old Social Democratic movement. It survived, in spite of heavy losses, the persecution of the Gestapo, and it continued its work even after the outbreak of the war.

In a session of the Executive Committee in Prague, February 10, 1938, I gave evidence of a far-reaching network of organizational contacts of the New Beginning Group inside Germany, no doubt having more and better contacts than the Executive Committee. The great majority of the valuable reports coming from Germany through comrades, adherents of the New Beginning Group, who through collaboration in the German reports wished to demonstrate that they considered the successful struggle against Hitler more important than their narrow group interest. Impressed by this statement of mine , the Executive Committee decided unanimously to start discussions for unification.

The New Beginning Group collaborated closely with the strongest of the old Social Democratic and trade unionist groups inside Germany. This group known as the "Ten Point-Group" had tried in 1937 to collaborate with the Executive Committee. Originally promising moral and financial support, the majority of the Executive Committee nevertheless refused to fulfill this promise. There was no inclination to foster forces not adhering to the Party machine, even if they were invaluable. This Ten Point Group in January 1938 presented to the Executive of the Labor and Socialist International a memorandum on the situation and the tasks of the underground movement in Germany, which is one of the most important documents of the underground struggle that was written in Germany. On the subject of relations with the Executive Committee, the memorandum says:

> " Our movement developed independently of the organs of the German Social Democrats abroad and has not been aided by them. But it represents an essential part of the living and fighting Social Democrats in Germany. When the barriers of economics and foreign policy have thrown the German regime into a crisis, our movement will have a much greater importance for giving directions to the masses than will the Executive Committee. The best that can be said of the latter is that it is forgotten in Germany, it has no authority there. The defense of the independence of the German Socialist movement against Communist influence will also be laid in our hands... We are not a new party, but a part - and as far as we can see, an essential part- of the old movement which has deve-

loped and renewed itself under fascism."

At the head of this Ten Point Group were functionaries of the old German labor movement, men of the highest reputation, many of whom are suffering today in German prisons.

The accusation that Paul Hagen had knowingly spread false ideas about the strength of the underground movement in Germany, especially of the importance and the strength of the New Beginning Group, is wrong. The best proof of this is to be found in the publications of the New Beginning group. Paul Hager used to be criticized for having an overcautious judgment and a tendency to understatement. He never competed with the romantic dreamers who existed in the Communist as well as the Social Democratic camp, one of whom, at the beginning of May 1940, still described the underground movement as a movement of masses, to prove that nobody stood behind Hitler.

Question F.

Is it true, that Hagen uses the funds collected by his organization, the American Friends of German Freedom, chiefly for the purpose of maintaining the above named tiny group of political emigres, "Neu Beginnen"?

Asked by comrades working in Germany and by the committee abroad of the New Beginning group I undertook in 1936 conscientiously to control the funds collected abroad for the support of all the Social Democratic groups in Germany and for help for the victims of fascism.

The expenses for the underground work in Germany and for the victims have always been considered of primary importance by the New Beginning group; every important expense abroad has been subordinated to them. The expenditure of the New Beginning group for the work in Germany was relatively and absolutely much higher than what the Executive Committee spent for this purpose, in spite of the fact that the latter had a budget ten times higher. As early as 1937 I statet in a session of the Executive Committee that the New Beginning group, although it had much less money than the Executive Committee, reserved many times as large a sum for the work inside Germany. The few salaries paid by the New Beginning group were usually a third smaller than those paid by the Central Committee. If there was a shortage of funds, the salaries were cut first. Paul Hagen always took the initiative. The money

was never used for relief in districts abroad.

While the Executive Committee from 1935 on used its large funds simply to continue its own work, the New Beginning group considered it its duty to help all the other Social Democratic groups within the limits of its funds. In particular, a considerable sum went to the Ten Points Group. Only thus was this group able to serve as a rallying point for the active forces of the old labor movement, notwithstanding the ineffectiveness of the Executive Committee.

Question G.

Is it true, that in the light of all the facts concerning his past and his activities Paul Hagen can, under no circumstances, be deemed a trustworthy political personality, that he has no mandate whatsoever to set in the name of German Social Democracy, of the German Labor Movement or the democratic and republican movements of Germany; that he is merely a political adventurer wholly and completely unworthy of support from any American groups who wish to assist the Social Democratic Labor movement of Germany?

It is a difficult problem to decide who has the authority to speak for the German Social Democratic labor movement and it is not possible to answer this question satisfactily here. The answer depends essentially on what one means when one speaks of the German Social Democratic labor movement. Is it those circles, which like the top leaders of the German trade union movement in 1933, tried in vain to get contact with Hitler and which defend the German Labor Front in Nazi Germany against democracy and Bolshevism today? Or is it those circles which have remained faithful to their old ideas but have become completely inactive, condemning as useless any underground work inside Germany or abroad? Or is it the groups of old and young Social Democrats who, in spite of all the persecutions under the dictatorship, continue the fight for a liberal, democratic and socialist Germany?

If you believe that only these underground fighters, have the authority to speak in the name of the German Social Democratic movement, it is necessary only to point out that many inside statements similar to the judgment of the above-mentioned Ten Points-group exist. All the statements from such circles, including those who think highly of the accomplishments of the old labor movement up to 1933, emphasize that underground work in Germany has been done effectively only by newly developed groups.

I have been familiar with the political work of Paul Hagen since 1935. I know he is not an adventurer, but an unselfish and courageous fighter, who, not risking merely his mouth and his pen, but risking his life and his liberty inside Germany, has worked for the overthrow of Hitler and the setting up of a militant, free, democratic and socialist Germany.

Replies to the Attacks on PAUL HAGEN

WHAT THE NEUE VOLKSZEITUNG
REFUSED TO PUBLISH

EDITED BY FRIENDS OF PAUL HAGEN
WITH A PREFACE
by FRANK KINGDON

New York, 1941

Hahn, Soon Kyo -4967
X Korean

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

CC-285



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Date: [illegible]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

To: Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services

Attention Colonel Goodfellow

From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SOON KYO HAHN, with alias

Reference is made to the recent telephone conversation of Colonel Goodfellow with Mr. J. K. Mumford of this Bureau pertaining to S. K. Hahn, a Korean who you stated is now visiting in Washington. This person is probably identical with Soon Kyo Hahn, alias Creaton Hahn, who resides at 2310 Cottage Grove Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, and is secretary of the Dong Ji Hoi, an organization of Koreans.

Soon Kyo Hahn was born at Pyeng Yang, Korea, on April 30, 1903. It is reported that he was admitted to the United States on July 16, 1925, as a student and it is now presumed that he is residing in the United States as a treaty merchant under Section 6 of the Immigration Act of 1924. He is the proprietor of the Oriental Importing Company which is engaged in the importation and sale of Oriental articles, incense and perfume. He is also reported to be the sole owner of the Sanithriad Products Company at Chicago. He is alleged to be one of the wealthiest Koreans in the United States and, as such, has had considerable influence within the numerous Korean factions and organizations. He was also interested in the Korean Village at Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, which was subsequently sold to Caucasians. The latter enterprise is reported to have consisted of a perfume and art goods store as well as a restaurant. It has been stated that Soon Kyo Hahn backed Kilsoo Haan, a Korean who represents himself as the agent of the Sino-Korean Peoples League, and was one of Haan's principal supporters. It has been reported however that Hahn is no longer associated with Kilsoo Haan.

Soon Kyo Hahn has ostensibly been trying to unite Korean political groups and factions in the United States and in Korea and to further this purpose visited a number of Government agencies in Washington in 1942. He is also said to have called upon Chinese officials at that time.

It has recently been reported that Hahn has completely removed himself from Korean social and political affairs as his obsession for the freedom of Korea weighed so heavily on his mind that he became mentally affected. In this connection it is observed that Hahn is said to have compiled two reports pertaining to Korea and the prosecution of the war against the Axis. His theories of war are said to be based upon mathematical calculations and upon the hypothesis that wars occur periodically. Hahn has insisted that this report is only for the exclusive use of the President of the United States.

Some sources have reported that Soon Kyo Hahn is loyal to the United States and violently anti-Japanese. Other sources have indicated their belief that Hahn may be employed by the Japanese but did not substantiate their statements with any factual data.

SEP 14 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services

Attention Colonel Goodfellow

SOON KYO HAHN, with alias

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File

Hahn 4962

THE CENTRAL NORMAL COLLEGE

SEOUL, KOREA

Hotel Plaza
Washington, D.C.
April 1, 1942.

My dear Col. Donovan,

Your kind letter of March 26th has just been forwarded to me, and I wish to thank you for your interest and sympathy with the Korean Cause.

As you know, all small, oppressed nations have many political parties at the beginning of their independence. In the Korean case, our job is to unite only two different parties.

Unfortunately, some untruthful rumors have confused the minds of your officials. However, I am confident that our meeting will expedite the consolidation of these two parties.

The Korean soldiers in China, Manchuria, and Siberia as well as the Koreans in Korea and Japan can play a big role in aiding America and her allies when Russo-Japanese War begins in the near future.

The time is essence! I shall, therefore, appreciate your kind consideration of granting me a personal interview at your earliest convenience. May I look forward to receiving a favorable reply?

Respectfully yours,

Loom K. Hahn.

Hahn 4961
X Korea

March 25, 1942

Mr. Soon K. Hahn
Oriental Importing Company
664 West Lake Street
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Sir:

I appreciate your willingness to devote your full time and energy to aiding America win the war.

As you know, the problems connected with the Korean movement are difficult ones. I have discussed them with members of my organization and it seems to me that more would be accomplished by a personal meeting with you when your plans have been further developed. I am in touch with the situation and will take pleasure in notifying you should it develop in such a way that a personal conference would be useful.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

JMHaydon/cmt

DATE 3/20/42

Dr. Hayden:

Dear Joe:

Will you talk to me about this.

WJD

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

Hahn - 1927
x Korea

ORIENTAL IMPORTING COMPANY

IMPORTERS MANUFACTURERS

ORIENTAL GOODS INCENSE PERFUME

654 W. LAKE ST.

CHICAGO

NEW YORK OFFICE
245 FIFTH AVE.

FOREIGN OFFICES
SEOUL, KOREA
YOKOHAMA, JAPAN
SHANGHAI, CHINA

PHONE MONROE 1999-1988
CABLE ADDRESS
"DONGHAHN CHICAGO"
CODES { COMMERCIAL / BENTLEY'S

Suite 210 - 245 Fifth Ave.,
New York City, N. Y.,
March 19th, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Co-Ordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I take the liberty of introducing myself:- I am a Korean, who has great admiration for your integrity and justice.

Since the outbreak of the war on December 7th, I came East to devote my full time and energy to aid America to win the war. I have been giving voluntary service to the War Department and Officers of the Co-ordinator of Information in New York City and in Washington.

On January 26th, I submitted a War Plan to the President, who gave careful consideration to it, and turned it over to the General Staff of the War Department. In acknowledging the receipt of it, in a letter from the White House, he said, "The ideas of strategy embodied in it have been carefully considered in connection with studies which are conducted continuously by the General Staff. Your strategic concept and theory of operations may have practical application when the decision is reached to commit appropriate military forces to specific theaters. I deeply appreciate the patriotic spirit which prompted you to commit your Plan to writing and submit it to me".

Your department has been doing a wonderful work in co-ordinating all governmental activities, and I am very appreciative of your interest in the Korean cause. I have been spending considerable time in bringing the two Korean political parties and personalities together in order to give our maximum service to the United States in her efforts to win the war. I am glad to inform you that there is good prospect in the near future of accomplishing this purpose.

I have some important matters on various subjects to discuss with you, and would appreciate your kindness if you would grant me a personal interview any time next week. May I receive a favorable reply?

Respectfully yours,

Soon K. Hahn

SOON K. HAHN

Date: 6/10/43

To: Mr. Edmond Taylor

Colonel Buxton asked me to send the attached along to you. He would like you to read it at your earliest convenience and if the gentleman interests you, he can be contacted at the Hotel Harrington, Washington, until Friday at which time I believe he is leaving town.

We have advised him that his material has been placed in the proper hands and if he can be useful we will get in touch with him.

F. Smith

P.S. When you have finished with it will you please return it to Colonel Donovan's files? Thank you.

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

Date: 6/10/43

To: Mr. Edmond Taylor

Colonel Buxton asked me to send the attached along to you. He would like you to read it at your earliest convenience and if the gentleman interests you, he can be contacted at the Hotel Harrington, Washington, until Friday at which time I believe he is leaving town.

We have advised him that his material has been placed in the proper hands and if he can be useful we will get in touch with him.

F. Smith

P.S. When you have finished with it will you please return it to Colonel Donovan's files? Thank you.

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

1.

Haig, Geo 4887
x Middle East

Captain George Haig,
412th Armored F.A. Bn.
Camp Campbell, Ky.
After June 5, 1943
A.F.R.T.C.,
Fort Knox, Ky.

June 3, 1943

General William Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Sir :

Early in January, upon my return from the Middle East, I was introduced to Mr. Henry Paynter of OSS who asked me of my opinion on how to solve the Arab problem. I dictated a brief outline. (See inclosed ARAB PROBLEM NO. I). He later told me that he wanted to ask for my transfer to the OSS. On February 5 I received a letter from him saying that he has turned all my papers to Lt. Col. Pantaleoni. I wrote to Col. Pantaleoni later but I received no answer.

In A pril I saw in the papers that Nahass Pasha suggested a meeting of the Arab leaders to discuss a federation as I had suggested to Major Paynter. I noticed that the leaders he had called were not the ones who could handle the Arabs. I then wrote the second article. (See imclosed ARAB PROBLEM NO.II). In this article I predicted that there would be a strong opposition.

On May 24 I saw a news item in the NEWSWEEK magazine which reports exactly what I predicted on April 10. (See inclosed news item from the Newsweek magazine.).

I further predict that the difficulties in Arabia will be intensified to a state of revolution. That the Arabs will be aroused against the Allies, and more specially against the U.S.

In other words, because our agencies are making their contacts with the wrong leaders, the real leaders are working h harder to oppose any suggestion or plan proposed or promised by the Allies. That, the unfortunate part of it is that our agencies are not able to contact these extremist leaders because they are not on the surface. The leaders with whom our agencies dealing are nothing but "fronts" who have very little to say about shaping the Arab policies.

I did make a similar suggestion to Mr. Lowd, and Mr. Frank Mouran in April, 1942. (See my files in OSS.) My suggestions and plans were not accepted at that time. Had they been accepted a year ago the riots and demonstrations against the U.S. Government wouldn't have happened as it did last winter.

I do not propose that I can solve the Arab problem single handed. No one man can. But I wish to report that I can contact every one of the extremist leaders who have power and influence, in the Middle East, wherever they may be, reason with them, and bring them to our officials who may negotiate with them. Perhaps I am the only non-Arab whom they trust. I know personally all the extremist leaders in Syria, Palestine, Lebanan, and Iraq, from the Mufti down to the workers in the cities and villages. Incidentally my contact and friendship have been mostly with the Moslems, and I know personally the few Christian ones. While I was in the Middle East last November I met some of the Mufti's men who told me what they were doing, and planning. One of them told me of the coming riots, of which I warned the authorities there, before it happened. (I have the copy of my report).

Perhaps it is not polite or diplomatic of me to say what I can do. But polite or not it is surely patriotic. Definitely it is not a crime to offer one's long experiences during these critical times to help our war effort. (Please see my brief life history, inclosed). For years I have been warning my government of the seriousness of the Arab question. Now one must admit the situation has gone from bad to worse. A people who had great love and respect for the United States, rioted and made ugly demonstrations against the United States Government.

I believe, Sir, that I can be of more use to the OSS with its M.O., or S. O. sections, dealing with the Arab and Moslem countries than what I am doing now. (To day I received orders to go to Fort Knox as instructor in gunnery.) I know the Middle East stone by stone, its peoples and their problems, their psychology, and their languages, and they know me and trust me.

Upon receiving orders to day I requested a few days leave. After visiting my home in Connecticut I am planning to stop in Washington on my way to Fort Knox, between June 14 to 19. I would like very much to have an interview with you, and if you desire I would like to recommend a detailed plan to eliminate the opposition which has arisen to the Arab-federation plan.

Respectfully yours,

G. Haig

Inclosures :

No.1, Arab Problem No. I,
No.2, A rab Problem No.II,
No.3, News Item from Newsweek magazine,
No.4, Report by Capt. Haig,
No.5, Life Story of Capt. Haig.
No.6, Letter from Dr. Penrose.
No.7, Copy. Plan for Police organization of Syria.

Upon my return from the Middle East I met Major Henry Paynter in the Office of Strategic Services who asked me about the solution of the Arab problem- I dictated this article and afterwards he told me that he was going to make a request for my services for the OSS- Early in February he wrote to me and told me that he has turned all my papers to Lt. Col. Pantaleone- I haven't heard from anyone of them since then-

I read in the papers early in April that such a plan as I suggested to Major Paynter was announced by Nahass Pasha of Egypt- I am afraid that it will fail as I have pointed out in the article "Arab Problem No.II"- It is unfortunate that Major Paynter didn't get all the details from me in order to carry out this plan and win all of the Arabs of Iraq, Syria and Palestine, the main reactionary elements-

While in the Middle East I observed all of the Arab extremmists' actions and plans- I found out where are some of the strong leaders and what they are going to do whether the Germans attempt to invade the Middle East or not- It is unfortunate that I haven't had the chance to report all these to an interested officer in your office in order to make counter measures against them-

INCL. # 1.

ARAB PROBLEM

By:
Captain George Haig
January 11, 1943
Washington, D.C.

1. GENERAL SITUATION:

At the moment the Axis forces are locked up in the Caucasus and it seems that they have failed in their advance there and are faced with retreat. In North Africa, too, their days of holding seem to be numbered. It must be realized that holding any part of Africa is not a major issue in winning the war for the Axis, yet they seem very anxious to hold that much of the ground in North Africa along Tunisia and Tripoli with great effort. The reason that they are resisting in North Africa appears to be, not to hold the ground there, but to keep engaged as many of our light forces as are there now. It should be apparent to them that with so many Allied forces there, they will be forced out, yet they are holding on and the purpose of this is probably to keep these forces there until the time comes for them to operate in the Near East (Turkey, Syria, Palestine and Iraq).

From past experience or reasons we must realize that Hitler must do something in the face of such retreats. They cannot take failure such as they have faced in the last few month and must do something desperate. With the troop movements in the Balkans (Bulgaria, Dodecanese Islands and so on) and recent Axis radio broadcasts and also Arab agitations and riots in various Arab states, indicate that they are heading towards the Persian Gulf, which we must realize is today the most important issue. It contains oil which is being used by the Allies. A Nazi thrust towards the Persian

Gulf will infuriate all the extreme Arab Nationalists into a revolutions. It is believed that even if the Axis cannot advance a great deal in the Arab states, a landing, a foothold or organized this effort will easily arouse the Arabs to revolution which may entangle the Allied movements to a great extent.

As for Turkey, the Turks cannot stand against the Axis without support from the Allies. If a showdown come between Hitler and Turkey they may, in the face of destruction, give concessions if not outright cooperation. This, again, will encourage the Arabs against the Allies.

Situation in Arabia.

Since the revolution in Iraq and the occupation of Persia, most of the important leaders among the extreme Arab Nationalists have gone into the Axis camp. Yet their followers and organizations are operating in their homeland. Aside from the major Nationalists organizations, there are many smaller factions among the Arabs which make it impossible for the Allies to come to any kind of understanding with the Arabs to win them to our side. Yet past Arab incidents show that in time of crisis or revolution or any kind of uprising all those smaller factions have cooperated together. In 1936, before the six month strike there were four major parties in Palestine and several in Syria and so on. But during the strike, all those nationalists including Anton Saadi's Youth Organization, joins with Mufti and aided him. Even Arabs of other states came to join the rabble in Palestine, such as Fawzi Kawukji and his friends. Therefore it is reasonable to believe that if and when the Axis makes an effort to arouse the Arabs against the Allies, or attempt to in-

vade Syria and Iraq these small factions will join with the strongest of the Arab Nationalist parties and work against the allies.

At the moment, the Axis fifth columists are working in Arab states to make strong propaganda against the American Government and Army. This is not for a particular reason to undermine the Americans but to arouse the people against someone so that when aroused, they will be united. The main cause for such an uprising has been the doubtful status of the Arab states after the war. They are telling the Arabs that their country will again be divided and that they will be slaves and not get their independence.

II. WHAT TO DO:

The Arab people, divided into many factions is a dangerous affair for the Allies as we do not have someone to talk to. They do not submit to dictation or suggestions from other factions as they are afraid of being dominated by them. Therefore, if the Allies approach even one strong faction and discuss with them the cooperation of the Arabs with the Allies, other factions will throw a monkey-wrench into the plans and thus upset them. It is also a fact that even the strongest realize that the Allies are going to win the war and that they are being blackballed and that after the war they will have no place in their country under any set-up, so they are more anxious to see the Allies fail in Arabia, even they many know that an Axis success in Arabia will not be any better, but worse.

Yet there is not any tangible, logical or reasonable offer from the Allies that they need an join them and cooperate. In other words, if there were a plan for an independent Arabia offered them by the Allies, they would gladly join them to save themselves from further persecution.

Therefore, on the face of all this, the Arab factions should be under one leader whom they could trust and for whom they have a great respect. First, there should be an unofficial and informal gathering of these leaders of various states, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan and also including a representative of Ibnse'ud. These people should be "induced" by Allied agents to suggest a post-war independent Arabia and suggest it to the Allies for approval. They should also be "induced" to ask "mild treatment" of the political prisoners and Nationalists including Mufti and his followers. Accepting such a plan by the Allies would encourage them to have more faith in the Allies and hope for their cause. It must be realized that it will take a long time for such a plan to be put into effect. But while it is in progress, they will cooperate with the Allies. Such a plan should be in cooperation with the British policy in Arabia, present and future.

Another problem is the Jewish Palestine one. Although the Arabs will never submit to an independent Jewish Palestine, seperate from Arabia, they will cooperate witht the Jews and give them ample concessions and their aim for a non-political Jewish home in Palestine. They will give concessions to Jews in other parts of Arabia and even permit them to have a voice in the independent Arab countries.

III. HOW TO DO IT:

The American Mission to the Near East should cooperate with the agencies there and with British, following their policies.

First, selected American agents should unofficially make propaganda among the Arab's newspaper writings and personal contacts, showing, them the importance of getting together, and also the futility, danger, and destruction of supporting the Axis. This must be done completely through Arab hands, for instance, enlisting an editorial page and writing article and editorials under Arab names. Posters and radio have not been to successful. Newspapers and personal contacts are the best means of inducing Arabs to do anything. The heads of the factions should be called into a meeting as suggested above, and at that meeting powerful weapons of inducing Arabs are economic and agricultural projects.

I shall be only to glad to go into detail on other matters and answer any question on the subject.

I wrote this "ARab Problem No. II" after I learned that Nahass Pasha had called such a meeting- I wish to add that there are very few officers who know the Mufti's followers in the Fertile Crescent as well as I do- I learned, while I was in the Middle East last November and December whereabouts of many of the key men who have controll over the Mufti's organization- I can bring the Mufti's party to our side-

I will be too glad to give you a plan to win the Mufti's party to our side-

IN-1 #2

ARAB PROBLEM

II

April 10, 1943

By CAPT. GEORGE MAIO

The conference called by Nahas Pasha of Egypt with other Arab leaders, including Ibn Sa'ud to discuss a Pan Arab Federation is indeed timely and one must agree is a good move for a better understanding between the Arab world and the Allies. I perceive that such a move was either initiated or instigated by the British and the United States.

What benefit the allies will derive out of this conference or what particular benefit the Americans will derive: (1) The Arab world, when promised a Federation of some sort, uniting them and giving them an independence, will turn their tone to mildness and change their attitude to cooperation with the Allies from uncooperation and, perhaps, will abstain from helping the Axis when the opportunity arises. (2) For the United States, the benefit will be in regaining the respect and prestige in Arab lands. The Arabs (even Egyptians; I have evidence from personal observations) have been very hostile towards Americans. We must admit that our prestige has been waning. The apprent or obvious reasons are: The announcement of the United States officials that the United States favors a Jewish Palestine. (There is another reason which I will reveal only upon request by competent authority.)

Indeed, it would be a diplomatic success if the above mentioned benefits could be attained from this conference but I regret to inform you that neither of the above mentioned benefits will be derived of such a conference because; (1) Those who are called for this conference are only on our side, namely, Nahas Pasha,

the repatriated the Egyptian government, the Egyptian government is with us on the surface, at least, and the attitude of the Egyptian people does not amount to anything. Even though the Egyptian people sometimes speak against the Allies, they have no power to affect any of our plans. The fact is that our troops and government are spending money in Egypt to keep them quiet. Even if we don't spend money, the Egyptian people haven't the boldness, determination or organization to do any harm to our cause. (The fact is that a great many Arabic publications in Egypt, which fan the flame of a Pan Arab or Arab nationalistic movement, are sponsored by Arabs of Arabian origin and are directed for the Arabs of the Peninsular and the Fertile Crescent" and not for Egypt and that such nationalistic leaders and organizations are somewhat safe in Egypt and have better facilities to conduct their campaigns.) (8) Those in the conference who represent Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq are puppet leaders of these states and they do not represent the antaganistic strong nationalists who are in power. (9) Ibn Sa'ud of Sa'udi Arabia, is an important factor, fact, even Ibn Sa'ud, no matter how well respected he may be in the Arab mind, he cannot swing the entire Arab world without the consent and cooperation of the ardent nationalistic organizations of the Fertile Crescent, namely, the Mufti's organization.

Furthermore, if this conference brings better results, that is to say, if the Arabs agree in this conference to form a federation in the event of an Allied victory, the opposition party - the followers of the Mufti and Ali Gailani will do their utmost to oppose this plan of Arab unity and prevent it from being successfull. This means that if the Arabs will be able to form a Federation when the Allies win the war, the Mufti's party will do all it can to

prevent the allies from winning.

What can they do to prevent the Allies from winning?

(1) The fifth columist in the Fertile crescent, which is supported by the Germans, will keep the public opinion against such a federation, which is sponsored by this conference and backed by the Allies. We are told that the riots in certain parts of Syria, etc., and propaganda directed against the United States are caused by declarations by the United States officials that America favors a Jewish Palestine. The fact of the matter is that these unofficial declarations by United States officials are nothing but alibis. Ever since last September, there has been fifth column activities originated in Germany and executed by the Mufti's organization, for the purpose of keeping the Arabs at a frenzy. Should the American Government openly declare that Jews have no business in Palestine, the Germans will find another alibi to arouse the Arabs.

(2) Even if such a federation were agreed upon and a foundation set, the opposition party is able to offset such a plan by terror or arousing the people against the leaders of this federation.

(3) If and when the Germans make a move to invade Iraq or the Persian Gulf, the opposition can organize a strong guerrila force to hamper the communication lines and troop movements of the Allies and thus render a certain number of our troops useless and help the enemy.

Then what is the solution? It must be agreed that the Mufti has a strong organization with the immense followers not only in Palestine, but in Transjordan, Syria and Iraq as well. All the nationalists of Iraq, Syria, Lebnan, Palestine, and Transjordan, are under one leader and one system.

This strong and efficient organization exists today and is functioning. Some of their leaders are working for the government and some are even working for the Allies. To apprehend them will not seem so very much because of the peculiar system of this organization. (I will be glad to give a detailed account of this organization, the system they use, and many of their leaders.) With the existence of such a strong organization, with firm leadership and German support to make this organization effective, one can imagine its influence upon the success or failure of this conference.

Therefore, the only way to make this conference bring the expected results is to win over this strong opposition party to our side. Indeed, the key to success of the Allies (both Brittain and America) in Arabia is in winning this organization to our side.

How to win this organization?

I have a definite plan to win this organization with all its leaders to our side. I spent two months in the middle-east (November and December, 1948) and have observed them and learned the whereabouts of most of their leaders. I also talked with some of them with a possibility of their coming to our side and working for an Arab Federation sponsored by the Allies.

* E N D *

but the Reich was ...ed to make prior delivery of an ... ent value of arms. Despite dire ... as evidenced by diligent workip ... Balkan mines and rigorous chr... conservation at home, the Nazis ... ified for only a minor fraction of the first-quarter allotment and got out ever less because of Turkish transportation snarls. Clodius's pleas and threats failed to get the terms eased. Note that some experts credit the German crackup in the last war partly to inadequate chrome in machine-gun barrels which made them defective and caused troops to suspect home-front sabotage.

Middle East Turmoil

Now that North Africa and the Middle East are secure in Allied hands, expect more jockeying for postwar position by Arab and Jewish factions. The Emir of Trans-Jordan, backed by chiefs in Iraq, is trying to organize a Pan-Arab federation but is being opposed behind the scenes by an influential Arab group in Syria and Lebanon which is seeking to enlist French support of its stand. In Palestine, resurging Arab and Jewish claims are creating sufficient tension to cause the British to take precautions against violence. All groups are watching for any differences between British, French, and American policies which might help or hinder their cause.

French Falange Fiasco

Embarrassing facts about Pierre Laval's African Falange" have been bottled up by French censors. The Falange was to be an expeditionary force to aid in retaking North Africa, and Laval managed to wangle exemptions from forced labor in Germany for any skilled workers who joined the unit. Learning this, some 3,000 Frenchmen promptly enlisted, but leaders soon found that these recruits were hostile to Vichy and defiant toward discipline and military training. Some even rioted in their Paris barracks and were arrested. Their actions broke down group morale and, since its original purpose became rather dim day by day, the Falange rapidly became moribund. A nucleus still exists, however, and the Germans may allow Laval to keep it as a "prestige concession."

Foreign Notes

General Giraud is consulting some former American publicity men on ways and means of increasing his popularity in French Equatorial parts of Africa. There are some 5,000 aspirants seeking the 144 seats in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies that come up in the July elections. Rightist Manuel Gomez Morin of the Accion Nacional and leftist painter Diego Rivera are considered two good bets. British antifeminists who want women to leave the factories and return home after the war have organized a mysterious "Council of Seven" which is believed to have Conservative party ties. . . . Australia has had to release men from the army to trap rabbits which have multiplied so enormously that crops are threatened.

Shoplifting Increase

A spot survey in several cities shows that shoplifting, always a headache for grocers, has increased since rationing. Small expensive items, easily secreted, have been the perennial favorites, but now "red point" items—canned meats and fish and dairy products—have become the shoplifters' special prey. Because merchants have no coupons for replacements, the OPA is considering a plan to give grocers some leeway to take care of pilfering, breakage, and shrinkage of stocks. Incidentally, it takes an experienced hand to spot a shoplifter, and stores have to take care to see that their present untrained workers don't make costly mistakes through false accusations.

Scotch Situation

New information from Britain modifies somewhat predictions that American supplies of Scotch whisky will run out before long. Latest reports indicate that about 100,000,000 British proof gallons are in storage, enough perhaps for five years. However, U. S. imports depend on several factors. One is the shipping situation, and another is Britain's continuation of exports to obtain dollar exchange. The big intangible factor, however, is how much of available stocks distillers will decide to retain. Since Scotch is a blended product, old spirits will be essential if a palatable whisky is to be available for sale after the war when production is resumed. From the consumer's viewpoint, therefore, Scotch will continue to get scarcer but will usually be available.

Stock Financing Renascence

Look for a wave of new financing through issuance of common and preferred stocks. During the last decade, bond financing has been relatively easy, with the demand greater than the supply, as partly evidenced by steadily declining interest rates. But stocks were difficult to sell, partly because of SEC issuing restrictions and partly because investors were interested primarily in Grade A bonds. Now, with revived public interest in common stocks (see page 58), business is expected to return to equity financing. This permits companies to expand working capital without being saddled with fixed charges and extends the capital base to which earnings are applied before excess profits taxes become operative.

Business Footnotes

State governments, whose revenues have been hit hard by gasoline rationing, are now facing additional troubles as liquor taxes fall off, that's why some state officials are urging that distillers be permitted to make some whisky . . . At least one war factory is trying to combat absenteeism among women workers by offering free visits to the company beauty parlor to those with good attendance records . . . Subsidy proponents point out that while the 5-cent subsidy to high-cost copper producers costs the government $8,000,000 a year, raising the price of all copper purchased for war production to the level of the high-cost mines would cost $110,000,000.

Press Notes

Throughout the Tunisian campaign, the daily New York Times used Dietloff as General von Arnim's first name, even though The Times's Sunday staff, in keeping with other papers, correctly referred to him in articles as Jürgen von Arnim . . . The Hearst press taboo, which prohibited mention of Orson Welles's name even in paid advertisements, was broken to report his rejection by the Army . . . McGraw-Hill will shortly launch a weekly news letter and a new monthly magazine devoted to aviation (both manufacturing and transport) which will have as an editor Fowler Barker, who now holds the position of secretary to the Air Transport Association.

Movie Lines

Though Margaret Buell Wilder's book "Since You Went Away," composed of letters to a soldier from his wife, hasn't been published yet, Hollywood has already started ballyhoo for a film which David O. Selznick, of "GWTW" and "Rebecca" fame, will make . . . Candidate for the longest credit line (for the film "Prelude to War"): "Produced by the Special Service Division, Army Service Forces, War Department, in Cooperation with the U. S. Army Signal Corps. Released through the Office of War Information, Bureau of Motion Pictures. Distributed and Exhibited Under the Auspices of the War Activities Committee, Motion Picture Industry" . . . Lupe Velez will appear opposite the famous comedian Cantinflas (Mario Moreno) in a Mexican studio's slapstick version of "Romeo and Juliet."

Miscellany

Maj. George Fielding Eliot will be the vacation replacement on the Blue network for Raymond Gram Swing at the end of this month . . . H. I. Phillips, New York Sun columnist and author of "Private Parkey," will incorporate his newest columnar character into a forthcoming book called "All Out Arlene" . . . Residents of a seaboard city who recently saw a destroyer flying the skull and crossbones besieged libraries and Navy information offices for an explanation, the answer was that the crew of the U. S. S. Kidd (named for the late Admiral Kidd) flew it as a prank.

Vol. XXI, No. 21

Newsweek

The Periscope

Registered U. S. Patent Office

What's Behind Today's News and What's to be Expected in Tomorrow's

Capital Straws

All top Washington sources say further action against the Japs in the Pacific can be expected soon, but they don't consider island hopping along the northern arc from Attu as likely . . . The proportion of British and American troops to be used in blows against the Continent may be included in decisions of F D R and Churchill, in some parts of Europe, as in Africa, American troops might be more welcome than British . . . Incidentally, this Churchill visit was the best kept secret of all, few newspapermen and even few officials had advance word of his coming . . . Appointment of Admiral William Glassford as American Minister to French West Africa will make it clear that the U S regards such areas as sovereign territory . . . In shipping circles it's said that one-sixth of the American losses to submarines last year were tankers

War Plans

Though details of the F D R Churchill conference are naturally secret, informed Washington sources don't expect a full scale second front this year. The consensus is that a limited Continental invasion this summer and a strong blow against the Japs in the fall are in the cards. Every effort could be made, of course, to hold any European bridgeheads but full strength wouldn't be thrown into the breach unless surprising weaknesses were found or there were signs of an imminent German collapse. China's precarious internal condition makes a major move in the orient, probably a Burma drive almost imperative. There's real fear that China might collapse if it were forced to carry on another year almost unaided while Allied attention was concentrated predominantly on Europe. And the hopping situation would probably preclude full scale drives in both theaters

South Pacific Meeting

Don't jump to the conclusion that General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey at their recent meeting drew up complete plans for major assaults on Japan's Pacific holdings. It's safe to assume that many plans were discussed but factors beyond the control of either commander will determine specific action. Report that the South Pacific Fleet will be available for MacArthur's use at will should be taken with a grain of salt. However, cooperation between the two commanders in the past has been closer than many realize. For instance, MacArthur's bombing attacks on Jap bases in the Northern Solomons have been a great help to Halsey, while the admiral's submarines have materially aided MacArthur in his operations.

National Notes

Justice Murphy says he's deaf to offers of other jobs because he wants to remain on the Court until critics of his fitness for the post have to "eat crow" . . . Other government agencies admire, but won't join, the FCC's fight against its House critics; they regard the battle as hopeless, because Congress holds the purse strings . . . The President is trying to get former Senator Norris to accept the chairmanship of the Committee on Fair Employment Practices

Morale Photography

There's an unpublished story behind the recent reorganization in the Army Signal Corps. Not long ago, Economic Czar Byrnes, disturbed at public [illegible] on rationing and wage and manpower controls suggested to the President that more photographs showing the ordeals of the men on the fighting fronts might harden home morale. F D R passed the word along to the War Department and, as a consequence, Col. Melvin E. Gillette, aggressive chief of the Signal Corps photographic unit in Long Island City, N. Y., was brought to Washington to head the Army Pictorial Service. At his urging, U S commanders in all the areas have just been instructed to facilitate front line shots by Signal Corps and news photographers. The Navy is cooperating in the scheme, and plenty of stark photos (see page 24) will be appearing soon

Philippine Succession

The Philippine refugee government in Washington will soon face a "delicate" problem. Under the islands' constitution no President is allowed to hold office more than eight years, and President Quezon's term expires Dec. 30, 1943. Since the exile government claims the Constitution is still in force, the problem of succession will arise unless the laws are temporarily suspended on Congress intervenes, which is not likely. There's no way of determining sentiment in the islands but it's thought the majority of Filipinos in the U S favor Vice President Osmena's succession, and this may prove the solution. Incidentally, the papers delineating Quezon's wartime powers have been lost, and the government depends on a New York [illegible] clipping for definition of them

Trivia

OPA Chief Prentiss Brown personally checks adherence to ceiling prices at the grocery store near his Washington home . . . When the news of the fall of Bizerte and Tunis came in, General Marshall relaxed for the first time in months by going home and working in his Victory garden, he didn't even wait for later details on the victory . . . President Roosevelt is believed to be one of the very few who calls Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon MacKenzie King "MacKenzie"

Trends Abroad

There's no evidence that the Nazis have strong ground forces in Sicily, Sardinia, or Italy, defense would fall almost entirely upon the Italian Army . . . Russia's militarization of communications lines indicates the scope of the Red Army's plans. Soviet officials say they expected [illegible] foreign supply lines considerably, and they want to be prepared . . . Talk that the reopened Mediterranean will permit abandonment of the dangerous Murmansk route to Russia is fallacious; the Persian route is already overburdened . . . Neutral reports from Tokyo say the Japanese public is showing alarm over inflationary trends, that black markets have greatly increased, and that speculation has forced rice prices sky high

Canadian Notes

Under a newly adopted system, Canadian aid to the United Nations will be granted directly instead of through reimbursements made by Britain or the U S . . . Because the labor shortage and bad weather have delayed spring planting, Ottawa officials are beginning to worry about this year's crop prospects . . . The Canadian Wartime Prices and Trade Board's highly successful "soap opera" radio program, which explains rationing and food problems to housewives, is attracting OWI attention

Nazi Chrome Failure

It's now conclusively established that the Nazi trade expert, Dr. Karl Clodius, failed in his effort to get the Turkish chrome agreement with Germany liberalized. The original pact gave the Germans 45,000 tons in each of the first and second quarters of 1943 and 60,000 tons in 1944,

Better men than me have been accused of bigger offenses, and after being exonorated they have served their country well and have become very useful-

I was accused, by my jealous subordinate officers of an offense and have been completely exonorated-

Please see the following officers who have made the investigation about me and my record-

Col. George C. Lewis,
President of Re-Classification Board,
50 Broadway,
New York City

Lt. Col. Godfrey,
G-2,
Second Service Command,
Governors Island,
Fort Jay, N.Y.

Major Hugh D. Wise,
Chief of Counter Intelligence Corps,
Washington, D. C.

General Hayes A. Kroner,
G-2,
Washington, D. C.

I have initiated formal charges against these officers, on May 31, 1943.

INCL #4

REPORT OF CAPTAIN GEORGE HAIG, Exec. O.S.S., S-30467

I am an Armenian by birth. I was born in Aintab, Turkey. In 1915, I was exiled into Arabia where I travels. all over Palestine, Transjordan and Syria. In 1918, I fled through Jebel Druse and joined the forces of Colonel T. E. Lawrence, and I served as an interpreter, participated in raiding bridges, trains and Turkish positions with Arab forces under a British officer. I also made two trips through the Turkish lines to Damascus to deliver messages to Arab leaders.

In 1919, I went back to Aintab and there served as contractor to British forces, supplying them with vegetables, fuel, forage, etc.

In 1920, I came to America and attended three years of college.

In November, 1935, I went back to Arabia and spent two years there traveling all over Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. I ran an advertising agency in Palestine and Syria advertising in Arabic newspapers all over these countries. While engaged in this business, I got acquainted with the Arab nationalist leaders, studied their methods and characteristics, how they worked, their organization, etc. I was so respected by them that I was instrumental in inducing them not to cooperate and accept help from Fascist agents who were urging them to do so. Upon my return to America, I lectured on the Near Easter affairs, particularly of Turkey and the Arabian states.

I speak, fluently, Turkish and Armenian, and Arabic, fairly.

I became a United States citizen in 1923 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Field Artillery on October 13, 1924. In 1925, I attended the Field Artillery School Battery Officer's Course.

I was called on active duty on December 1, 1940. I served with the 7th Field Artillery, 82nd Field Artillery and about seven weeks in the Armored Corps.

In June, 1942, while visiting in Washington, I was introduced to Captain Lowell Bradford of the Counter Intelligence Corps. When he learned of my experiences and background, he asked me if I would transfer to C.I.C. I was serving with the 2nd Armored Division, at that time, as instructor of the Commando Unit. I told him I had to think it over.

About 10 days later, I wrote to him that I would like to be transferred to C.I.C. if I could be sent to the Middle East right away. He wrote to me that I would be sent, immediately, if I applied for transfer. I did apply for transfer, but the Commanding General of the 2nd Armored Division disapproved, saying that I was needed as a Commando instructor in his division, but the Chief of C. I. C., as I was told, had a high ranking general send a wire to the Commanding General of the 2nd Armored Division, asking him to consent to my transfer because I could be of more value to the war effort in C. I. C. in the Middle East on account of my experience and background. He reconsidered and I was transferred on July 17, 1942.

I wish to add that when I sent in my application for transfer, I definitely told them what I could be used for, namely:

1. Bringing the Arabs to the side of the Allies.

2. Bringing better relations between the Arabs and the American troops.

3. Instructing the American troops in how to get along with Moslems and be respected by them.

4. Supply and transportation.

5. Detect pro-Axis elements and activities.

(See copy of my life history attached.)

Upon my arrival in Washington, I was ordered to the O.I.C. School in Chicago. I graduated four weeks later.

While in Washington, I was made to understand that, being the senior officer, I was to be in charge of the O. I. C. Detachment going to the Middle East until another officer, a Lieutenant Colonel, arrived.

In September, 1942, I sailed for the Middle East together with three O. I. C. lieutenants, who had just received their commissions, and a cadre of men as agents.

After arriving in Egypt, the three lieutenants made charges and allegations against me that, while aboard the transport ship, I revealed my identity to various persons.

On November 7, 1942, a Lieutenant Colonel of O.I.C. arrived in Cairo and, upon hearing of such charges against me, without seeing me, or interviewing me, or getting my side of the story, made a report, backed only by the accusations and allegations of these three lieutenants, that I be relieved from O. I. C. and sent back to the United States to face a Reclassification Board in New York.

I requested, formally, that I be granted a court of inquiry to investigate my conduct, but my request was not granted for the reason that the accusations and allegations made by these lieutenants made me appear as undesirable that the Middle Eastern Command would have nothing to do with an officer "like that".

In a few days time, I secured affidavits and statements from some officers, who were aboard ship, about the excellent service I rendered to the officers and men who were going to the Middle East by lecturing to them on conditions in the Middle East and hints on how to behave, in order to be liked and respected by the natives.

I had made a plan about how the Germans might invade Syria without going through Turkey, where they would land, what routes they would take, etc., and another plan to stop the Germans, if they invaded. (These plans were analyzed by the G-2 in Washington and proven valuable. Copy now in G-2 in Washington.) I handed this plan to the G-3 in Cairo, who, after studying it, tried to intervene and have my orders stopped so that I might remain in the Middle East to be more useful, but again the Middle Eastern Command would have nothing to do with me.

Another useful work I was interested in was food supplies. While in Cairo, I made acquaintances of many influential Egyptian and Syrian leaders through the former Governor-General of Syria, who owned immense farmlands in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. They asked me what my duties in the Army were. I told them that I was an economic observer. They told me they could raise anything the United States Army needed in the Middle East. I then went and learned what the Army needed and they said they could raise all that sufficiently. Then I informed them that such products might be raised only with the following conditions:

1. That they must not use any land which now is used to raise food for the natives. They may use lands which are now vacant, or raising products which are not essential, such as hemp, etc.

2. That they raisin must meet the Army standards.

3. That prices must be not more than the market prices.

They said they could meet all these requirements.

I reported this to the Quartermaster Purchasing Officer, who refused flatly. Had I succeeded in having the natives produce such things, we could have saved a great deal of ship space for the Middle East.

On December 17, 1942, five days before I left Cairo, I submitted a report to the Middle Eastern Commanders on the activities of a fifth column movement in Arabia against the United S...n and our Army, and also requested that I be given a chance to counteract this movement. This was ignored and I was sent away on December 27, 1942.

After I left, Arabs in Damascus and in other parts rioted against the United States. Had I been given a chance to remain there, I could possibly have discovered the leaders behind this movement. Although it was too late to prevent the riots, I could have taken countermeasures to prevent further occurrences against such anti-United States movements.

I also observed other affairs, such as propaganda among the natives concerning our war effort by other war agencies, which up to this date, I have not had the chance to report on it.

Upon my arrival in New York, I presented my papers to the Reclassification Board and after careful examination of my case, they exonerated me and recommended me for further duty with the military intelligence.

The following are my charges:

1. Having been selected by the War Department as an experienced

and qualified officer for the Middle Eastern theater, I was rendered useless and sent back because of false and fraudulent charges. The fact that I was a qualified officer for the Middle East was not only the opinion of the War Department but the opinion of the Reclassification Board, after examining the charges and my records.

2. The officers responsible for relieving me from duty in the Middle East convinced the War Department that foreign born officers are not suitable personnel as Intelligence Officers for duty abroad. This misunderstanding has resulted in the War Department losing, not only my services, but the services of other valuable and trained foreign born officers, who are loyal and efficient, and who could render valuable services in the above mentioned theater of operation. In spite of the recommendations of the Reclassification Board that I could be valuable in the Middle East, I am now ordered to an Armored Division.

3. It is the opinion of the undersigned that the type of officers who would make a "detrimental report" upon their superior officer, based on unsubstantiated and false affidavits, and this said report being affirmed by an officer who had only known me "less than two weeks", which report was disregarded by the Reclassification Board, are unsuitable and cannot be trusted with confidential information, investigations and reports in this highly reliable and respected branch of the service, serving as C.I.C. officers in a critical outpost such as the Middle East, or anywhere [illegible] United States Army as C.I.C. officers.

The names of the officers are:

1. Lt. Col. Leo J. Query
2. Lt. Edward F. Barry
3. Lt. Francis J. Smith
4. Lt. Coulter D. Shyler

all of them, C.I.C., U.S.A.F.I.H.W.

GEORGE HAIG,
Captain, F. A.

CAPTAIN GEORGE HAIG, F. A. Res. O-304657

I was born in A intab, Turkey of Armenian parentage in September, 1901. In 1915 I was exiled into Arabia where I traveled from Aleppo to Amman. In 1918 I fled from Damascus and joined the forces of Col. Lawrence and Emir Faisal. There I served as an interpreter to an English officer with some Arab guerrilla fighters and participated in many raids. I also made two trips to Damascus through the Turkish lines to deliver messages to Arab leaders there.

I came to America in 1920- In November 1935 I went back there and after spending two years I returned to America and lectured on the Near Eastern affairs.

While in Arabia I made the acquaintances of many new Arab nationalists including the Mufti and his inner staff- I know all the Arab leaders from Gaza to Aleppo. I wish to add that I was greatly influential in preventing the Arabs from accepting help from the Fascists who were working hard to win over the Mufti's men. I can say, definitely, that until November 1937 Mufti's party did not accept any funds from the Fascists.

While in Damascus during the summer of 1937 I helped Shukri Bey Kuvvetly, the then Minister of Finance, make a "seven year economic plan" which was released to the domestic press. Shukri Bey is now head of the Nationalists Bloc of Syria

I also worked with Dr. Abdulrahman Keyyali, then Minister of Education and Justice, to introduce the American education system. He then asked me to make a plan to organize a Syrian Secret Service organization like our F.B.I. The present Syrian

1 of 45

Secret Service police organization is still running on my original plan- Copy inclosed.(I can tell you more about this organization which has a great deal of importance to the present situation)

While in the Middle East during the last November and December I made observations and discoveries of many facts- I talked with many Arab leaders and got their purpose and plans- I learned whereabouts of the Mufti's followers and ardent workers. I have learned that they are planning a hot revolution even after Germany is defeated. I can prove this.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 30, 1943

Captain George [illegible]
70th Armored Division
Camp Campbell, Kentucky

Dear Captain [illegible]:

Thank you for your letter of April 24th with its enclosures. I am turning them over to Mr. Loud in this office to be kept with your file. He will let you know if there is an opportunity of making use of your services.

I am on the point of leaving for an extended trip and will not be able to follow through on your case at the present time. I regret this very much but I am sure that Mr. Loud has you in mind and will not forget your capabilities if an opening should occur.

With all good wishes, I am

Very sincerely yours,

Stephen B. L. Penrose, Jr.

S. B. L. Penrose, Jr.

Inc. # 1

This is a copy if a plan I made for the Syrian Secret Service Police organization in 1957. The present Police organiza tion of Syria is still running on this plan. This organization has a lot to do with the present comflict.

1 Inc. #7

OUTLINE OF A PLAN FOR A SECRET SERVICE ORGANIZATION

This plan consists of four parts:

1 - Organization
2 - Training
3 - Work
4 - The field of work.

ORGANIZATION

Headquarters to be in Damascus.
This organization should be governed by five men; one chief or director, and four aids. The Chief to be responsible for everything.

The four aids to be in charge of four departments; namely Political, criminal, counterfeit, and narcotics.

The force will consist of squads (or I would like to call them murabbaat) of four men each, one being in charge . This is for two re-asons; one is economy, four men will do the work of eight. And the second reason is four men will be less noticeable than eight. And when eight men are required on a job it is easy to assign one or more squads.

The number of squads may be increased lateron as needed. I would suggest to start with 20 men; four of them to be assistants of the Chief and the remaining 16 to form the squads.

The men selected for this service should be of better class men with higher education. Before they are taken in an educational requirement should be prepared. Also their family and their own life background should be checked up. They should be of Loyal Type and close mouthed. When the service is formed they should be paid better than the regular police force in order to attract better men to the organization.

TRAINING

There is no definite form of training for detective or secret service work like shoe-making, tailoring, or dentistry. Sure enough a detective must be of average or above average intelligence. The more intelligent the better. The most important phases of a detective or secret service organization are cooperation, personalecy, ability to use ones resources, and deducting or reasoning power.

Incl #6

and a good knowledge of the law. Detective responsibilities are the basis of training for this organization.

INTERNAL TRAINING

1-Military training-This specially military discipline. The man should be able to know the working knowledge of a military organization. More than that military discipline, they must be trained to obey orders. Respect their superior officers, and carry out orders like a soldier under any difficulty. Also to take care of once self like a soldier.

2-Self defense-This is very important. Every man should be trained to defend himself. Man armed without weapons be must be able to defend himself and keep alive. The following are recommended:

a- Boxing-To learn to use once fists.
b- Wrestling-Jiu-Jitsu if possible.
c- Gymnastics-Type climbing, pole vaulting, hurdle race etc. They must be able to get in and out of buildings, climb rope fill.
d- Shooting of fire arms-They must be taught to draw their gun and shoot instantly. They must learn to be quick on the trigger, etc.
e- Target practice - They must qualify as marksmen, and keep on doing.

3-Citizenship-They must be taught the importance of their job.
a- Love of once country and loyalty to it.
b- Proper way of honoring the flag and higher officials.
c- To be close mouthed.

4-Crime detection-Or espionage and counter espionage. This subject is not a knowledge but experience. An apprentice where is man can be taught to be a detective but a thorough experience and doing well of the following subjects will make a man a regular detective.

a- Experience in observation-They must be taught to observe and take notice anything that comes within their sight, not ignoring anything.
b- Investigation-Whether political or criminal they must be taught to investigate properly and not be hasty anything for granted. Not to be satisfied until it is well explained or understood.
c- Cross-questioning-This is an art. Many people fail to find out a truth because of not cross-questioning properly.
d- Following a lead-When a clue is found they must be able to trace it to the proper person or place.

SECRETS TRADE

a- Finger print identification-This may be taught by sending a student abroad.
b- Ballistics-Knowledge of fired bullets, and also a knowledge of fire arms, their make and model, etc.
c- Dove dactylscopy.
d- Other laboratory investigations - tests, chemical.

5 - Rich breeding-During civil wars police attacks are and the people mostly hostile unless first won. But if we had some spies placed among them (as had been done) or winning their affection to other things, or if they friends here, the mob usually disperses much quicker and easier.

6 - Psychology. This is an important subject. A thorough course should be given to the recruit. They must be trained to mix with different classes of people and also to learn to make contact with different groups. Also to learn to make a person "talk" without any formal questioning.

7 - Languages - Arabic, French and other necessary languages. The more languages they know the better it is. Also they must learn the Arabic dialects of all sections.

8 - A little law.

THE WORK

The work may be divided into four general departments:

1 - Political Instigators and plotters against the Government. This branch will handle all the uprisings, and Government agents, communism, nazyhism, anti-Arab propaganda, religious disturbances, etc.. In fact this department will be the intelligence department of this secret organisation. They may also do espionage and counter espionage work. They will have contact with all groups of people so as to notice any movement against the Government, or any other institution or against any class of people. They must be able to know before hand when a riot or disorder is coming.
Also under this department illegal entries into the country will be handled.

2 - Criminal-Murders, thefts, swindling, etc..

3 - Counterfeit-To investigate counterfeit rings also counterfeit passport matters.

4 - Narcotic traffic's use that narcotics are not distributed freely.

MY FIRST IN WAR

In order to simplify the work of this Bureau, the 3 field [illegible] in the system proper should be divided into [illegible] of classifications. This is done so that the responsibility of the heads of this bureau or the subordinate [illegible] people should be taken as groups as they are found [illegible]. For instance, there are areas and municipalities, there are [illegible] there are [illegible] and [illegible], there are [illegible] the areas. Along the [illegible] the [illegible] the same being applied to the [illegible] Armenian, Turks, Arabs, Assyrians, etc. Those that be [illegible] from these are to deal [illegible] of [illegible] and religious movements, [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] Indonesia, [illegible], [illegible], etc. etc. etc.

The heads of these groups are distinguished by the [illegible] of this Bureau. The easier it will be to make investigation of any movement of the people and detect any plot or foresee any uprising against the constitution.

Then the country must be divided into many geographical sections for administration.

Hayes Edmond 2402
x Taylor, E.

January 13, 1943

Mr. Edmond Taylor

Algiers

Dear Ed:

This will introduce Commander Edward V. Hayes, who is engated in a special mission for the Navy. I have known Commander Hayes for many years and he is a close personal friend. I have asked him to see you, and I know that you will give him the fullest assistance and cooperation. His mission is most important and I know he will appreciate your help.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

January 13, 1943

Mr. John Hughes

Algiers

Dear John:

This will introduce Commander Edward V. Hayes, who is engaged in a special mission for the Navy. I have known Commander Hayes for many years and he is a close personal friend. I have asked him to see you and I know that you will give him the fullest assistance and cooperation. His mission is most important and I know he will appreciate your help.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

January 13, 1943

Colonel William A. Eddy
Naval Attache
Tangier

Dear Colonel Eddy:

This will introduce Commander Edward V. Hayes, who is engaged in a special mission for the Navy. I have known Commander Hayes for many years and he is a close personal friend of mine. I have asked him to see you, and I know that you will give him the fullest assistance and cooperation. His mission is most important and I know he will appreciate your help.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Hayden 499

FROM:

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. 18247

Date Rec'd GA MAY 9 - 1943

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1.				P.E.	
P. N.H.				H.	
Mrs. O'Donnell					Now Lt Marine Corps at OT School
4.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
Line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer designations should be used in *To* column.
Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY

[redacted]

[redacted]

STERLING HAYDEN
Born March 26, 1916 } Carlton Hotel

From March 1933 - October 1933 - Seaman on Schooner Puritan - New London to San Pedro

October 1933 - November 1935 - Fisherman on Gloucester Schooners on Grand Banks.

Winter of 1935-36 - Mate on schooner from Gloucester to Jacksonville and thru West Indies.

March 1936 - October 1938 - First Mate of Schooner Yankee on voyage around world (Lt. Commander Irving Johnson USNR)

October 1938 - Navigator of Gloucester schooner Gertrude Thelend during International Fisherman's Races.

November 1938 - May 1939 - Captain of Brig. "F. C. Robinson - on voyage from Gloucester to Tahiti.

May 1939 - September 1939 - Captain of sloop Aries - New England coast.

October 1939 - January 1940 - Captain and part-owner of 165 foot schooner Aldebaron between Panama and Charleston, S.C.

February 1940 - left sea.

/S/ S. Hayden

Born March 26, 1916 } Carlton Hoffl

Hayden 499

File

Born March 1933 - October 1933 - Seaman on Schooner Carlton - New London to San Pedro -

October 1933 - Nov - 1935 - Fisherman on Gloucester schooners on Grand Banks -

Winter of 1935 36 Mate on schooner from Gloucester to Jacksonville - + Other West Indies

March 1936 - Oct - 1938 - First mate of sch. Yankee on voyage around world - (USE Commander Waldo Johnson U.S.N.R)

Oct 1938 - Navigation of Gloucester schooner Bermuda Thelma during International Fishermans Race -

Nov 1938 May - 1939 - Captain of Brig "F. C. Robinson" on voyage from Gloucester to Manila -

(over)

May 1939 - Sept. 1939 - Captain of
schooner Arcas - New England coast

Oct. 1939 Jan. 1940 - Captain + part-owner
of 163 ft. sch. Albatross between
Bermuda + Charleston S.C.

Feb 1940 - Left navy.

S. Hayden -

H-1941

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480006-6